In recent years Poland has ceased being the leading or even an important exporter of the principal agricultural products at world level. In certain cases (for example, eggs), this is the result of protectionist agricultural policies applied in recent decades by the principal European importers of these products.

Nevertheless, with respect to the major agricultural products of which Poland is only a secondary supplier or to secondary agricultural products of which Poland is an important supplier even at world trade level, exports of these represent and will still represent in coming years an essential part of Poland's foreign sales particularly to the industrialized countries of Western Europe.

Having regard to the particular pattern of Poland's agricultural exports and considering that our economic system is different from that of most of the contracting parties to GATT, we do not feel that we are in a position to propose solutions that might be regarded as a negotiations primer. If, on the other hand, such solutions were proposed by other countries and if we could find in such negotiations solutions that might be of interest to us, we would be prepared to participate therein.

It appears to us, however, that it might perhaps be useful to present some remarks on the subject of agricultural negotiations:

1. During the Kennedy Round, an attempt was made for the first time to find multilateral solutions to the difficulties encountered by trade in agricultural products. It did not prove possible, nevertheless, to extend the principles of linear tariff reductions to the numerous agricultural products. Nor was it found possible to achieve a certain balance between the concessions granted to each other by the participating countries in the industrial sector and those granted in the agricultural sector. Considering that the terms of international trade in agricultural commodities were less advantageous than those for industrial products even before the Kennedy Round, the successful outcome in the industrial sector
coupled with the absence of any significant progress in the agricultural sector will further aggravate the disequilibrium that had already become apparent during the past decade; the growth in agricultural trade will be less dynamic than will the growth in industrial trade.

2. The fact that most contracting parties are at present applying protectionist policies in the agricultural sector (in general for non-economic reasons — whether social or political) that are not consistent either with the letter or with the spirit of the General Agreement, leads us to raise the question whether it might not be appropriate to modify the legal bases of the General Agreement to the extent that it applies to trade in agricultural commodities. If such a course were considered undesirable, one might perhaps envisage a general waiver for a limited period of time (for example, five years) so as to make it possible, by implementing a system to be elaborated and which would be adjusted to existing circumstances, gradually to put agricultural markets on a sound basis and thereby provide valid conditions for negotiations.

3. Because of the fact that during the Kennedy Round international trade in agricultural commodities was to some extent dissociated from trade in industrial products, it is doubtful that one could arrive at negotiations on agricultural commodities alone, based on the principle of equivalence of concessions. It would appear preferable to tend rather towards a different negotiating technique, envisaging organization of markets. For the industrial countries, the resulting advantage might be a reduction of expenditures connected with the various forms of subsidies granted to agricultural producers.

4. There are only a few agricultural products that might be the subject of arrangements negotiated at world level.

If it were thought desirable to identify them and to establish working parties to consider them, it would perhaps also be of interest to clarify and take into consideration the possibility of concluding regional arrangements on other products.

5. The technique of negotiating on a product-by-product basis seems essential. One might, however, nevertheless pinpoint certain general rules applicable to several products.

It would perhaps be desirable to divide the work of the Agriculture Committee into two successive stages:

(a) first, to determine the feasibility of negotiations on a standstill in protective measures applied at the frontier (whether or not taking into consideration the suggestions of a legal character mentioned above in paragraph 2 as the case may be);
(b) thereafter, to identify the various forms taken by policies of subsidizing agricultural production in the various countries. Here one might use the technique proposed by the European Economic Community in the Kennedy Round, that of identifying the support margin. This might lead to negotiations aimed at achieving a standstill in subsidies which would make it possible thereafter to create more favourable conditions of market access.

During this latter stage of the work, it would perhaps be appropriate to review, in the light of the most recent technological progress, which branches of agricultural production can still be considered as being related to the status of a rural population, and the precise scope of quasi-agricultural productions that are of an industrial nature.

The incidence of subsidies in these latter cases far exceeds what was originally intended.

In a number of cases, solutions would be made substantially easier by establishing a correlation between certain agricultural surpluses and food aid.