INTERIM REPORT OF THE GROUP TO THE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT

1. The Group was established by the Committee on Trade and Development in March 1965, and was instructed to examine problems involved in the expansion of trade among less-developed countries, with particular reference to the role of preferences in this regard, and to perform certain related tasks. The full terms of reference of the Group are given in Annex I to this report.

2. The Group held its first meeting in June 1965, and the discussion at that meeting was summarized in a secretariat note (COM.TD/D/2), which was transmitted to the Committee and discussed at its meetings in July and December 1965 (COM.TD/10 and 12). The comments made by the Committee on these occasions have served as further guidance for the Group in the pursuance of the tasks entrusted to it.

3. The Group had before it certain documents specially prepared for it, including a background note on past discussions of the subject (COM.TD/D/W/2), and a general review of trade among developing countries (COM.TD/D/W/3), as well as a pilot study, as referred to in paragraph 3 of the Group's terms of reference (COM.TD/D/W/1).

Preferences

4. In discussing the role of preferences among developing countries in promoting their mutual trade, the Group had before it two proposals which had been submitted to the Committee on the Legal and Institutional Framework, and remitted to the Committee on Trade and Development. The first of the proposals, submitted by the United Arab Republic, envisaged the establishment of general preferences among less-developed countries and the other, submitted by the United States, related to preferential arrangements among countries in the same geographic or economic region. These proposals provided a starting point for the Group's deliberations, and the questions raised on them and answers provided by the proposing delegations, as well as certain general and specific comments on their various elements, are summarized in the notes annexed hereto (see Annex II).
5. The Group was aware that the value of the exchange of preferences among less-developed countries in increasing the foreign exchange earnings of these countries, and in diversifying their economies had been widely recognized in past discussions in GATT. There had also been a large measure of agreement on the principle involved in the granting of such preferences, even though views on the exact form of the preferential arrangements to be adopted had tended to differ. The discussion in the Group has led it to the unanimous conclusion that the establishment of preferences among less-developed countries, appropriately administered and subject to the necessary safeguards, can make an important contribution to the expansion of trade among less-developed countries and to the attainment of the objectives of the General Agreement. The general view of the less-developed countries, as reflected in the discussions in the Group, is that such preferences should be granted and applied on a non-discriminatory basis and that less-developed countries should be in a position to exchange preferences with other less-developed countries in general and not only in the context of regional schemes of integration. Some delegations held the view that any preferential agreements proposed should be examined by the CONTRACTING PARTIES and they felt that it was desirable to ensure that any preferences extended should provide a reasonable expectation of increased productivity through the enlargement of markets for the products concerned. Many other delegations pointed out that the value of preferences in expanding trade among developing countries would also be affected by other considerations, including those relating to balance-of-payments difficulties.

6. It was also the general view that the establishment of such preferences should most appropriately be the subject of negotiations between developing countries. In such exchange of reciprocal preferences due account would be taken of the different stages of economic development of the negotiating partners.

7. The Group further noted that, while the negotiation of any preferential arrangements among less-developed countries must be the responsibility of the less-developed countries themselves, adequate provision should be made to ensure that the interests of the other contracting parties are not unnecessarily damaged.

8. The Group felt that, before attempting to draw up specific legal provisions, or formulae for the exchange of preferences, it would be helpful to see what concrete proposals or arrangements might in practice be made or negotiated by less-developed countries acting within the spirit of Part IV. The representatives of the less-developed countries stated that they proposed to enter into exploratory talks at an early date. The Group recommends that arrangements should be made for the examination of any such proposals, or arrangements when they are received.
Other measures

9. While discussion in the Group was concentrated on the proposals on preferences, a number of other aspects of the problem of trade expansion among less-developed countries were also taken up. In this regard the Group again was guided by past discussions in GATT. In particular the Committee on Trade and Development had, at its meeting in July 1965, referred to a number of measures other than preferences and had given attention to the trade and payments aspects of the problem, particularly:

(a) the dismantling of quantitative restrictions affecting intra-trade;
(b) non-tariff arrangements to overcome payments limitations;
(c) avoidance of tied loans.

It had also been suggested in the Committee that a specific programme of action aimed at trade expansion among developing countries, limited in scope at the beginning and capable of being expanded subsequently in keeping with the needs of the contracting parties concerned, might be drawn up.

10. At the meeting in January-February 1966, the Group took up these points and heard certain specific suggestions from the Indian representative. These suggestions related to a number of measures aimed at giving greater flexibility to less-developed countries in the planning and implementation of their commercial policies and at directly increasing the imports of less-developed countries from other less-developed countries on a reciprocal and non-discriminatory basis. They included the following:

(a) A target rate be adopted for the annual expansion of trade among less-developed countries.
(b) Less-developed countries should try to identify, from their lists of products notified as being of export interest to them, those items the export of which to other less-developed countries appear to be capable of expansion. The products thus identified should be notified to the CONTRACTING PARTIES together with any relevant data on trade, production, production plans, etc. Such notifications should be collated and circulated for the information of all less-developed contracting parties. Less-developed countries should then be asked to supply data concerning their present and future import capacity for these products.
(c) Less-developed countries should be asked to indicate what special measures they consider should be taken by importing countries under Part IV, or by international organizations, for the expansion of this trade.

(d) In addition to the exchange of tariff preferences, such measures as the exchange of import quotas might be resorted to by less-developed countries in order to enable them to obtain imports over and above that which could be effected on the basis of their overall foreign exchange availabilities.

(e) Where imports were made by governments, or State agencies, rules might be evolved to ensure that maximum possible preference was given to purchases from sources in less-developed countries.

(f) Guidelines or rules might be adopted to ensure that aid given to less-developed countries by developed countries, or by international institutions, were untied, or at least that a part of the foreign exchange thus made available was usable for payments for imports from other less-developed countries.

(g) A fund be set up, within the framework of the appropriate international financial institution, for the provision of loans needed to finance imports by less-developed countries from less-developed countries.

(h) The exchange, on a regular basis, of information about their development plans and import requirements, so as to maximize imports.

(i) Measures should be taken to prevent the operation of licensing and similar arrangements, entered into by firms in less-developed countries with foreign firms, from operating in such a way as adversely to affect trade among less-developed countries.

(j) Measures should be taken to solve any transport, communication, and marketing difficulties which might be limiting the expansion of trade among less-developed countries.

(k) Since the Kennedy Round provided an immediate opportunity for implementing these and other ideas for general expansion of trade among less-developed countries, maximum advantage should be taken of the Kennedy Round to expand trade among less-developed countries.
11. The representative of India further urged that maximum possible flexibility should be provided to the less-developed countries in working out arrangements for expansion of trade among themselves in a non-discriminatory manner. The only requirement should be for establishing reporting and consultation procedures after the arrangements have been worked out.

12. The points in paragraphs 10 and 11 were presented by the Indian delegation as suggestions to facilitate discussion in the Group and not as official proposals by the Indian Government. In view of the lack of time, the Group did not enter into any detailed discussion of the merits of, or the technicalities involved in, the suggested measures. Some members of the Group, however, did take the opportunity to engage in a preliminary exchange of views on some of the points. Some members stressed the importance which they attached to such measures as the provision of untied loans, the earmarking of governmental purchases, and the exchange of import quotas, which, in their view, would make a significant contribution to the expansion of trade among developing countries. Some members of the Group pointed out the difficulties inherent in these points. As regards the exchange of import quotas among the less-developed countries, it was pointed out that Article XIV:2 could also be utilized for expanding trade among the less-developed countries. Some members of the Group, while agreeing that these suggestions warranted careful study, did not feel that the GATT, being an organization having competence primarily in the field of commercial policy, was an appropriate forum for the discussion of certain problems which lay in the field of finance and payments. Other members considered, however, that the GATT, precisely because of its responsibility in the field of international trade, could not disassociate itself from international financial problems related to trade.

13. The Group draws the attention of the Committee on Trade and Development to the work being undertaken in other organizations, particularly relating to the problems of aid, loans and credit facilities. The Group believed that it was important for contracting parties to keep abreast of developments in these fields in order that GATT could, where appropriate, collaborate in seeking feasible methods for expanding the international trade and exchange earnings of developing countries.

14. Members of the Group suggested that it would be useful for the less-developed countries, in considering ways and means of expanding trade among themselves, including the reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade on a most-favoured-nation basis, to have available to them statistical data relating to imports and exports of particular commodities and information on some of the points mentioned by the Indian representative. This information would also be of particular value in the immediate context of the Kennedy Round. The Group agreed that such statistical data would have to be supplied largely by the less-developed countries themselves. The secretariat was asked to provide appropriate assistance in the collection and the co-ordination of such material.
ANNEX I

Terms of Reference of the Group on Expansion of Trade among Developing Countries

- To examine the problems involved in the expansion of trade between less-developed countries, with particular reference to the role of preferences between less-developed countries in promoting such trade, and taking full account of the work done earlier in the Working Party on Preferences and its findings;

- to examine in this context, any specific proposals submitted by contracting parties for the establishment of preferences between less-developed countries;

- to examine the pilot studies on trade flows between less-developed countries produced by the secretariat and to arrange for the extension of these studies to additional lists of products;

- to report, with appropriate findings and recommendations, to the Committee on Trade and Development at the next meeting of the Committee and to transmit its findings also to the Working Group on preferences.

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1 See L/2410, paragraph 42.
ANNEX II

Secretariat Note on the Discussions at the
Second Meeting of the Group

1. The present secretariat note is intended to summarize the discussion at the
second meeting of the Group, held from 31 January-7 February 1966 inclusive. It
does not cover all points already noted in the report of the Group which alone
constitutes its official record.

A. Preferences among developing countries

2. The discussion was opened by a statement\(^1\) of the United Arab Republic
representative in which he recalled briefly some of the major problems affecting
trade among less-developed countries, the still very low level of trade among these
countries, and the major provisions of the United Arab Republic proposal relating
to preferences. This proposal (see COM.TD/W/2, Annex II) envisaged the establish-
ment of preferences on selected products by means of agreements negotiated between
interested developing countries to which other developing countries could also
accede. In selecting the products account would be taken of the negotiating
countries' respective need for industrial protection and for customs revenue,

\[\text{etc.}\]

It was not envisaged to draw up any common list of products for the granting
of such preferences, and the choice of types of products to be covered would be
determined through negotiation, which would also ensure a proper balance of
benefits and obligations among the participating countries. The preferential
arrangement would apply not only to tariff rates but also to non-tariff measures.
One would also expect that such preferences should provide benefits for imports
from less-developed countries no less favourable than those at present accorded
by certain developing countries to imports from certain developed countries. As
regards the question of safeguarding the interests of third countries, the United
Arab Republic proposal provided for the accession of other developing countries
to any agreement concluded, and for recourse by any contracting party considering
its interests impaired to the provisions of Article XXXVII:5. The United Arab
Republic proposal also contained provisions on time-limits for the validity of
the preferences so that they would not be in force longer than was necessary for
the purposes for which they were granted. The representative of the United Arab
Republic considered that the envisaged preferences could be implemented within the
frame of Part IV of the General Agreement.

\(^1\) The full text of the statement by the representative of the United Arab
Republic was circulated to the Group in document Spec(66)2.
3. The representative of the United States recalled briefly the major considerations underlying the United States proposal (COM.TD/W/2, Annex IA). First, it was the view of the United States that the establishment of preferences among less-developed countries should be closely linked to the co-ordinated development of production and trade among the participating countries and that co-ordinated development could most easily be achieved between countries having common interests and practical facilities for collaboration, which would normally mean countries in the same region. Secondly, preferential arrangements might be desirable because the countries concerned might not always find it possible to establish free-trade areas or customs unions, while wishing to make progress nevertheless towards co-ordinated development in a more limited manner. Such arrangements would enable them to collaborate in establishing or expanding their industries, through the creation of a wider market, sheltered from outside competition for a specified period of time. For this purpose an exception might be made to the provisions of Article I of the General Agreement to enable developing countries to enter into preferential arrangements. The criteria for justifying such a deviation from Article I should be, first, that the arrangements in question could be expected to lead to a rise in efficiency and productivity in the industries concerned so as to enable it eventually to withstand foreign competition, and secondly, that they would not cause undue damage to the interests of third countries. In his statement the United States representative also commented on the specific questions raised at the first meeting of the Group (see COM.TD/D/2, paragraph 29). The points made by him are noted in the following paragraphs which summarize the discussion of the various aspects of the general question of preferences.

4. In discussing the general objectives of such arrangements, representatives of some less-developed countries pointed out that the less-developed countries expected the preferences to make a contribution to their development more immediate and substantial than the benefits that they might eventually derive from regional economic integration arrangements. In present balance-of-payments circumstances, for example, the establishment of tariff preferences, coupled with other appropriate measures, might open up new avenues of trade, creating trade that would not otherwise have been possible owing to the constraints imposed by the scarce foreign exchange resources of less-developed countries.

5. Some representatives pointed out that preferential arrangements among less-developed countries must be aimed at making industries more competitive; for otherwise they would not achieve the final objective of increasing standards of living, but merely burden the economy with the higher economic and social costs involved in obtaining imports from higher cost suppliers. The implications of this element for the balance of payments were particularly important if account were taken of the capital outlays which would be needed for the ensuing expansion of industrial production.

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1 The full text of the statement was circulated to the Group in document Spec(66)3.
6. Representatives from less-developed countries explained that they placed emphasis on the creation of trade which would otherwise not exist. While, in the short-term, the preferences might involve a shift towards higher cost suppliers, it was their hope that, once production for a larger market got under way, developing countries would become increasingly competitive suppliers of the goods in question. As regards the effect of preferences on the balance of payments, representatives of developing countries noted that, there being a scarcity of exchange resources in convertible currencies, imports at lower nominal prices in terms of convertible currencies might well be far more costly to the less-developed countries than those at higher prices but payable in non-convertible currencies which they could earn through expanding their mutual trade. At any rate, even if a loss was involved this would be outweighed by the direct and indirect benefits deriving from the development production and trade which would otherwise not have been there.

7. On the question of regional versus a more generalized system of preferences among developing countries, representatives of less-developed countries also felt that preferences embracing a few countries confined to a given region would not provide them with the flexible instrument which they felt was required for obtaining the maximum benefit from preferences. Such advantages of regional co-operation as the greater ease for collaboration among countries situated close to each other, a more intimate knowledge of each others markets, and the generally lower transport costs were likely to be less significant and fundamental than the accompanying disadvantages, such as the often found lack of complementarity, on account of similarity in resource endowments and in the stage and pattern of industrial development, etc. On balance one would think therefore that inter-regional trade among developing countries should be just as easy to develop and expand through the establishment of preferences as would intra-regional trade.

8. The United States representative explained that for the purposes of the United States proposal, the term "economic region" need not necessarily be taken strictly in the geographic sense, but might broadly denote any group of countries which were considered capable of co-operating with each other for their integrated development. Other members of the Group felt that any tying of preferences to the concept of economic regions would introduce an undesirable limitation, which was not envisaged in the generalized language used in Part IV of the General Agreement. Furthermore, many members noted that regional trading arrangements among developing countries could be covered by the provisions of Article XXIV of the General Agreement.

9. As regards the mechanism to be used for establishing preferences among developing countries, the Group generally considered that any preferential arrangements would have to issue from negotiations among developing countries. Members of the Group explained that such agreements would probably have to be negotiated between a limited number of interested countries on the basis of reciprocal concessions and to be broadened thereafter by the accession of other less-developed countries. Due allowance would have to be made in the negotiations for differences in the stage of economic development of the negotiating partners. The methods and procedures evolved in the GATT tariff negotiations in the past might serve as a guidance for the less-developed countries.
10. Certain members stated that preferences in their view should be exchanged mainly on manufactured and semi-manufactured products. One member of the Group referred to the generally low level of duties on raw materials and to the need to minimize raw materials cost in industry, and considered it particularly inadvisable to apply preferences on primary products. Other members of the Group felt that there was no need to spell out, at this stage, the type of products that could be covered by such preferences; the advantages or the disadvantages of using preferences for specific products would have to be weighed and compared in the course of the negotiations.

11. As regards commercial policy measures to be covered, the representative of the United States explained that the United States proposal related only to the customs tariff preferences since, under the General Agreement, this was to be the main instrument of protection that could be accorded to domestic industries. He agreed, however, that one could examine the possibility of extending the use of such preferences to other commercial policy measures, for example in the administration of quantitative import quotas and restrictions, although this was not covered by the United States proposal.

12. Reference was made in the discussion to the effect of preferential arrangements at present in force between certain developed and certain developing countries. It was suggested by certain members of the Group that the margins of the new preferences should be at least as large as those granted to imports from the developed country. As an alternative, some members suggested the preferential treatment at present in force for imports from the developed country might be withdrawn.

13. Members of the Group discussed the question of safeguards for the interest of third countries. Some members of the Group stressed that the preferences should not be established through an increase in the most-favoured-nation rate, nor should the existing most-favoured-nation rates be raised for the purpose of providing larger margins of preference. Particularly in cases where existing rates were high, there should be some limitation on the permitted preferential margin, so as to ensure an equitable share of the market for suppliers in third countries. Some members noted that they did not think preferences should be extended to non-tariff measures such as quotas precisely because of the greater danger of adverse effects in the interests of third countries. If it should be agreed that preferences should cover import quotas, especially careful attention must be given to ensuring that third countries' fair share of the market was not excessively affected.

14. There was general agreement that, as one of the safeguard measures, adequate provision would have to be made for consultations with affected contracting parties. Reference was also made to the provision in the United States proposal for compensation to be given to third countries in case of injury resulting from the preferences. Some members of the Group were of the view that any preferential agreements negotiated should be submitted to the CONTRACTING PARTIES for prior approval. Other members stressed that sufficient
flexibility must be left with developing countries in the negotiation of such agreements, and that there should be no cumbersome procedures which might delay action. They felt that the provisions of Part IV provided sufficient scope for the use of such preferences. One delegation pointed out that, whatever provisions of the General Agreement were invoked to cover such schemes, it would be useful to draw up, at an appropriate time, guidelines or procedural provisions for adoption by the contracting parties which were to formulate the establishment and operation of such preferences.

15. Several members of the Group stated that they intended to avail themselves of the opportunity offered by the Kennedy Round to hold exploratory talks with other contracting parties on ways and means of expanding trade among less-developed countries.

16. In the course of formulating its conclusions on this subject (see paragraphs 5-8 of the report), the Group took note of a statement made by Ambassador Valenzuela (Chile) on behalf of the less-developed countries represented at the second meeting of the Group. Ambassador Valenzuela stated that the discussions in the Group had shown a general consensus that preferences among less-developed countries constituted a useful means for the expansion of their mutual trade. There appeared also to exist among all members of the Group a genuine desire to explore the possibilities open to contracting parties for action in this regard. The less-developed countries were aware of the similarities, as well as the complementary features, of their economies and were mindful of the common links in the objectives of their national development programmes. Taking these into account they were in favour of general, non-discriminatory preferences among less-developed countries, to be established on the basis of negotiations in which due account would be taken of the different stages of economic development of the different countries and of the interest of third countries. The less-developed countries in GATT would take the first opportunity to enter into exploratory talks within the spirit of Part IV and in the light of economic realities, on the most appropriate form and procedures to be adopted in order to bring about practical and viable preferential schemes among developing countries. At this stage of the discussion, the less-developed countries would not wish to ask contracting parties to undertake any commitments, or to bind themselves with regard to the modus operandi or any specific formulae to be adopted, on the establishment of preferences among developing countries.

B. Other measures for the expansion of trade among less-developed countries

17. In the course of discussion the representative of India presented a number of suggestions which might constitute a programme of action for the expansion of trade among less-developed countries (see paragraphs 10 and 11 of the report). The establishment of such a programme of action had been suggested by the Committee on Trade and Development at its meeting in July 1965 (COM.TD/10, paragraph 31). Members of the Group pointed out that, since they had not yet had time to study the issues involved in these suggestions, they could make only observations of a preliminary nature. These points made by the representative of India and other members of the Group are noted below:
(a) Adoption of a target rate for the expansion of trade among less-developed countries: The representative of India noted that in view of the still very low level of trade among developing countries, it should not be unrealistic to envisage a target of expansion of between 15-20 per cent per year. Some members of the Group agreed that the establishment of target rates for the expansion of trade might be of some value in providing a focussing point for action. They felt, however, that the actual target to be adopted would have to be examined on the basis of statistical data on the pattern of export production, etc.

(b) Identification of products particularly worthy of attention in the mutual trade of less-developed countries: The Indian representative suggested that the products might be chosen from those already notified as being of export interest to less-developed countries, but that they need not be confined strictly to this category. Members of the Group agreed that such an indication should be of value in this regard. Some members noted in this connexion that the data so far compiled by the secretariat related in general to broader commodity headings while, to be really useful for the purpose of exploring possibilities for trade expansion, they should be fairly specific. It would therefore be in the interest of the less-developed countries to supply the secretariat with all relevant data relating to specific export production. Members expressed the hope that the collection of further material would not in any way delay any immediate action that might be open to the less-developed countries.

(c) Suggestions on special measures importing countries might take: One member suggested that action to be taken by developing countries might relate to the reduction of high rates of duty, the relaxation of non-tariff barriers, etc.

(d) Exchange of foreign exchange and import quotas. In the course of this discussion a reference was made to the provisions of Article XIV:2 of the General Agreement which might conceivably be invoked to cover action in this field. Some members pointed out that, in view of the scarcity of foreign exchange in developing countries, these countries should endeavour to make the best possible use of their exchange resources, and avoid imports from Higher cost countries. One member, representing a developed country, expressed concern that action by developing countries along these lines, by favouring a return to bilateralism, might lead to trade diversion. Representatives of developing countries noted that the purpose of such action would be to create additional trade among developing countries, for instance trade in certain types of consumer goods which would not have been possible were it not for the foreign exchange facilities thus made available. Reference was made during the discussion to the possible exchange of tariff quotas in the context of the Kennedy Round. Some members thought that tariff quotas applying to imports from certain contracting parties, but not those from others, would be contrary to the existing provisions of the GATT and that no provision had been made for this measure in the negotiating rules of the Kennedy Round.
(e) Earmarking of State agencies purchases: Some members of the Group supported the suggestion. Other members of the Group expressed the view that an undue reliance on government purchasing policies for the purpose in question might easily lead to an undesirable diversion of trade.

(f) Untied loans: Some members of the Group from developed countries noted that the provision of an untied loan was financially more burdensome to the lending country than loans which did not include the use of its convertible currency resources; insistence on untied loans would thus simply mean that fewer loans could be granted. They stated that their delegations would be prepared to discuss the financial assistance measures operated by their governments if it was the wish of the Group to examine the experiences of aid-giving countries. Some members of the Group noted that the issues involved related not only to the trade implication of aid, but also to developments in the international financial situation and that the matter was under discussion in other international institutions more directly concerned with problems of international payments.

(g) Fund for the provision of loans needed to finance trade among developing countries: One member of the Group recalled the operation of the Export and Import Bank of the United States, and the contribution which it had made to the expansion of trade in the inter-war and post-war periods. Many members stressed the need to give adequate attention to the payments aspects of the problems encountered by developing countries in expanding their trade. Some members referred to the work being undertaken by other institutions in this field and recalled the view of contracting parties that the GATT could make a contribution by providing advice on the trade aspects of international financial arrangements. Other members noted that the fact that these matters were under examination in other institutions should not prevent the contracting parties from addressing themselves to problems so intimately linked to international trade. Some members suggested that the Indian suggestion be given serious consideration by governments, and be taken up again in the Group at an early date.

(h) Exchange of information among developing countries on development plans and import requirements: Several members of the Group stated that such an exchange of information should indeed be helpful. One member suggested that countries in each region might wish to consult with each other on their development plans with a view to eliciting the pattern of their production and exports.

(i) Avoidance of harmful effects of industrial licensing arrangements: There was no discussion on this point.

(j) Measures to overcome difficulties in transport, communications and marketing: No discussion.
(k) Making use of the Kennedy Round: Members from a number of developing countries stated that their governments were anxious to make the greatest possible use of the opportunities thus afforded.

18. In presenting these specific suggestions, the representative of India stated that his Government considered it important that the less-developed countries should enjoy sufficient flexibility in the establishment, operation and adaptation of any necessary and justifiable measures. For instance, less-developed countries should be free to take action within the framework of Part IV of the GATT without having in each case to bring it before the CONTRACTING PARTIES for approval or formal action. In most cases it should be sufficient if action taken under Part IV were reported to the CONTRACTING PARTIES and adequate opportunity were provided for consultations to be held where such action was considered to have an adverse effect on the trade of third countries. The consultations would serve to explore what needs to be done in order to avoid any such unnecessary damage and what alternative measures were available for the purpose of expanding trade among less-developed countries.

20. Members of the Group noted that the preliminary exchange of views on some of the Indian suggestions had been useful, but that it would not be possible to enter into a full discussion at the present meeting. Members generally agreed to revert at a later stage to these points, if possible on the basis of more detailed suggestions.