We have heard from thirty-one speakers during the course of this series of general statements. This has served the useful purpose of enabling the different contracting parties to present their points of view on the subject of the Review of the Agreement. The statements have furnished a clear indication as to how the various countries with diverse economies stand in relation to the General Agreement. Many of the statements have been specific in character and have outlined the amendments which those contracting parties would like to see introduced into the Agreement. Other statements have been more general, but, no doubt, we will be hearing from these countries during a later stage of the Review.

By and large, I would say that many of the contracting parties are well satisfied with the Agreement as it stands and only wish to introduce a few amendments in order to improve the text and to bring it more in line with the experience we have gained. Other proposals advanced by these countries are designed to pave the way for the new situation which will arise with the convertibility of the currencies of a number of important countries. Other contracting parties wish to go further and some of them would be disposed to revise the Agreement in a more drastic manner. For example, it has been suggested that the General Agreement might tolerate for an unspecified period the use of quantitative restrictions for the protection of industry or for bargaining purposes.

We have also heard from most of the representatives of the underdeveloped countries. Their interest naturally has been focused on more freedom to use tariffs and quantitative restrictions for giving effect to their development programmes. Most of these countries have also pointed out their interest in commodity policy and some would like to see written into the Agreement the basic principles on which commodity agreements could be concluded. Other contracting parties have not been adverse to extending the scope of the Organization to deal with commodity policy, but without including in the Agreement itself provisions analogous to Chapter VI of the Havana Charter. A number of the representatives have drawn attention to the importance they attach to the inclusion in the Agreement of more specific provisions relating to the disposal of non-commercial stocks. Mention has also been made of regional preferences to assist economic development.
As regards quantitative restrictions, we have had one specific proposal put forward in respect of the use of quantitative restrictions for balance-of-payments purposes. This has obviously been designed to meet the situation which will arise when most of the currencies of importance to international trade have become convertible. There has been support from other contracting parties for tightening up the rules in this respect and for giving the Organization more effective supervision over the use of quantitative restrictions. Furthermore, certain representatives have referred to the desirability of making the existing agreement more effective pending the coming into force of the amendments which will arise out of the action taken during the Review. Others have indicated a reluctance about going too far in the elimination of quantitative restrictions. While concrete proposals were not put forward, some of those who spoke appeared to want more freedom than is contained in the existing rules.

We have also had many references to the use of quantitative restrictions for the protection of agriculture. Here again there is a sharp division between the agricultural exporting countries who wish to tighten up the rules in this respect and those countries who wish freedom to use quantitative restrictions for the protection of agriculture or for imposition in connexion with their price support programmes. This is one aspect of the Review on which the position of those most concerned has been expressed with clarity.

Interwoven with the discussion of quantitative restrictions has been the references to tariffs. The low-tariff countries in Europe have stressed the disadvantage to them of the removal of quantitative restrictions if these barriers to trade are to be replaced by high tariffs. They also stressed their desire to have an undertaking to negotiate the reduction of high tariffs specified in the Agreement. A number have spoken in favour of the French plan for tariff reductions, while some have indicated that they would not be able to participate in this plan. It is obvious that negotiating procedures will have to receive further attention in the more detailed examination upon which we are soon to embark.

On the binding of the Schedules for a further period we have had expressed the differences of view to which we have been accustomed in our previous debates on this subject. A number of those who spoke have proposed the rebinding of the Schedules until the end of 1957. There has been general support for the procedures we have worked out for the "sympathetic consideration" of requests to renegotiate. The representatives of underdeveloped-countries have stressed again the disadvantage to them of rigidity in respect of tariff schedules and have advocated either more flexibility or exceptional treatment for the underdeveloped countries. The respective positions of the different countries on the tariff schedules have been made fairly clear during the course of the statements delivered this week.

One or two delegations have referred to the rule for no increases in preferences, but others have indicated that they could agree to no relaxation of the present position.
Few references have been made to valuation and other aspects of customs administration. On the other hand, we know from proposals already circulated that this field will require a good deal of attention during the course of the Review.

Many speakers emphasized the need of broadening the provisions respecting subsidies. They would like to incorporate in the Agreement the other provisions of the Havana Charter relating to subsidies. Mention was also made of countervailing duties. The provisions relating to state trading were referred to, although I do not recall specific proposals being put forward in any of the oral statements. The extension of the scope of the Organization to cover restrictive business practices and cartels was advanced by certain of the contracting parties, but the position of other delegations on this subject remains to be clarified.

On the question of organization I find that there is general agreement that more detailed provisions should be incorporated either in the Agreement itself or in a separate instrument. Reference was made to the desirability of a strengthened subsidiary body to act for the Organization between sessions. A number of representatives spoke about the need of maintaining the efficiency of the past without augmenting unduly the size of the secretariat. Apart from this, the main outlines of the organization have still to be elaborated, although written proposals have been advanced which should afford a useful basis for our further discussion of this question.

It is probably understandable that few references were made to the important question of amendment procedures and the application of the Agreement, as amended, but, no doubt, we will be hearing at a later stage from representatives of the contracting parties on this question.