Mr. Chairman, it is in no mere formal sense of courtesy that I venture to congratulate you - or rather to congratulate the Conference - on your election as its Chairman, because I still retain very vividly in my mind the stimulation and encouragement which I felt when you were good enough to receive me in Cairo on the occasion of our conversations leading up to the provisional accession of the United Arab Republic to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. I am therefore more than happy to be taking part in this Conference under your distinguished guidance.

Before touching on some of the issues which are before the Conference, I would like to make one point which was mentioned the other day by the Secretary of State for Industry and Trade of the United Kingdom, but one which I derive from my own experience of many years of dealing with the problems of trade and development which are the subject of this Conference. It is that, in my view, we are not dealing here with the interests of one group of countries as opposed to another group of countries; we are not, I feel - or should not be - thinking in terms of a confrontation between poor nations and rich nations, between less-developed nations and more highly developed nations, between under-privileged and privileged; the problem with which we are dealing here is a problem for the international community, and it is just as much a problem for each member of the community, whatever his stage of development, poverty or wealth. It seems to me that, just as in the national community today no country would accept that one part of the country should be wealthy and prosperous and another part poor and under-privileged, so this is true also of the international community. And if we are to tackle this problem effectively it must be on the basis that it is, as I have said, an urgent problem, to which each country must address itself as a problem in which it has itself a stake. That is what we have tried to establish in recent years when we have dealt with these subjects in the
framework of the General Agreement. We have a Committee, which has achieved
some fame as Committee III, in which discussions are not between pairs of
countries with opposed or divergent interests but between countries which are
seeking together to deal with problems to whose solution all of them must
contribute.

We have submitted abundant documentation to this Conference about the work
of the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in
relation to the problems under consideration here, and it would be wearisome
if I were to reiterate the content of those documents. However, I hope that I
may make some supplementary remarks which will be of some help in the critical
days which now lie ahead of this Conference. If I use the expression
"critical days", it is because I feel that the Conference has now reached the
point when the general debate is drawing to its close and the committees will
be addressing themselves to practical problems, and we shall be in a position
to judge whether the international community, confronted with the need to
adopt practical, down-to-earth and positive measures is able to discharge its
responsibilities in connexion with the problems it is examining.

I would like to recall first of all the long and painstaking study of
the trade problems of special concern to developing countries which has been
made in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade since 1957. This work in
the GATT has undoubtedly had great influence far beyond the GATT itself.
The process of study and education was a necessary prelude to more positive
action, although, in fact, concurrently with the process of study and education,
Committee III of the GATT, to which I have referred before, has been exercising
continuous pressure for the removal of restrictions bearing particularly on
the export trade of developing countries. It became clear to us, however,
that more was needed than this unspectacular, although necessary, work:
it was desirable to obtain endorsement at a political level of concepts and
principles which could provide guidance for more positive and effective
action in the future.

The first step in this process was the Declaration by Ministers of
November 1961 regarding the trade problems of developing countries. This
Declaration is set out in the documents before you. Nevertheless, it seems
to me to be of such major significance that I will venture to recall its
main elements; it contains important principles which a large number of
governments of countries accounting for a very large proportion of international
trade have accepted at the political level as a basis and guidance for their
commercial policies.

This Declaration affords recognition of what is required in the interests
of trade and economic development of less-developed countries, namely:
First, the need for a rapid and sustained expansion in the export earnings of less-developed countries;

Secondly, that aid can be no substitute for trade, and that in the final analysis economic development will have to be paid for from the earnings of the countries concerned;

Thirdly, the need for restrictions hindering access to markets for the export product of less-developed countries to be reduced to a minimum;

Fourthly, the desirability for increased opportunities for the developing countries to increase their exports of manufactured and semi-manufactured goods.

The Declaration then goes on to indicate how governments can contribute to these general objectives, taking into account facts regarding tariff and non-tariff measures affecting access to markets under the heads of quantitative restrictions, tariffs, revenue duties, State trading, preferences, subsidies, and disposal of commodity surpluses.

This comprehensive coverage by the Declaration of the questions involved is completed by statements in regard to the question of reciprocity in negotiations, the improvement of the production and marketing methods of developing countries, the need to lessen the instability of export earnings resulting from fluctuations in primary commodity markets and the diversification of the export trade of the less-developed countries to reduce their vulnerability to market fluctuations, and, finally, the recognition of the possibilities for encouraging sound economic development in the less-developed countries through increased trade amongst themselves.

Hearing this, one might well ask why this Conference is necessary, or why in fact any other action is necessary. Of course, the answer is that, while it is important to set up appropriate guide lines, it is even more important to secure active implementation of agreed principles and policies.

Programme of Action

It was for this reason that, in 1962, a group of twenty-one less-developed countries put forward a Programme of Action which set targets for the removal of barriers to the trade of less-developed countries. This Programme, which I think is worth recalling and which largely reflects the practical work which had been done previously in subsidiary bodies of the GATT, is as follows:

Firstly, it provides for a "standstill", namely that no new tariff or non-tariff barriers should be erected by industrialized countries against the export trade of any less-developed country in the products identified as of particular interest to those countries;
Secondly, it calls for the elimination, within a period of one year, of quantitative restrictions on imports from the developing countries which are inconsistent with the provisions of the General Agreement. There is, of course, recognition that there may be problems which prevent action being taken within this short time limit, and there is provision for consultations in these hard-core cases; but even here the period of grace is limited to 31 December 1965.

Thirdly, the Programme also calls for duty-free entry for tropical products to be achieved by 31 December 1963.

Fourthly, it calls upon industrialized countries to agree to the elimination of customs tariffs on the primary products important in the trade of developing countries.

Fifthly, it calls upon industrialized countries to prepare urgently a schedule for the reduction and elimination of tariff barriers on exports of all semi-processed and processed products of less-developed countries, providing for a reduction of at least 50 per cent of the present duties during the next three years.

Sixthly, it calls upon the industrialized countries to reduce internal charges and revenue duties on products wholly or mainly produced in less-developed countries, with a view to their elimination by the end of 1965.

Industrialized countries which maintain barriers of the kind to which I have referred are also called upon to report to the secretariat of the GATT, in July of each year, on the steps taken by them during the preceding year to implement these decisions, and on the measures which they propose to take during the next twelve months to provide greater access to the products of developing countries.

Finally, the Programme calls upon the contracting parties to the General Agreement to give urgent consideration to the adoption of other appropriate measures which would facilitate the efforts of the developing countries to diversify their economies, strengthen their export capacity, and increase their earnings from overseas sales.

This was a Programme put forward by developing countries to translate into action the Declaration to which I have referred. It was adopted by the Ministers of the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement at their meeting in May 1963; I may point out that this Meeting of Ministers was the most comprehensive ministerial meeting on trade since 1947 and prior to the present Conference.
It is true that the group of countries linked together in the European Economic Community found it necessary to make certain reservations on the Programme of Action, but I would point out, however, that these reservations were expressed in terms that, in the view of these countries, the measures proposed did not go far enough in dealing with some of the basic problems of the developing countries; we have had indications from the representatives of the European Economic Community that both in the General Agreement and in this Conference they will be making a proposal relating to these basic problems. The fact remains, however, that the bulk of the contracting parties to the General Agreement have accepted this Programme of Action.

The Programme of Action represents a significant reinforcement of the attack which has been made in GATT on barriers to the exports of less-developed countries. I, for my part, would be very happy to see this Conference, which is broader in scope than the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, endorse this Programme and thus bring to bear upon it the political prestige of the United Nations.

Of course, the question remains as to how far the Programme is being implemented. I am happy to say that there are some positive indications that I can give to this Conference.

There has been a substantial adherence to the "standstill" provision of the Programme, namely to the requirement that no new tariff or non-tariff barriers should be imposed on the export trade of the less-developed countries. Significant progress has been made in achieving the removal of barriers to this export trade as a result of the follow-up work in the GATT in relation to the commitments of the Action Programme.

Committee III's approach has been to consider products by groups. It carries out a systematic examination of a particular group of products, makes recommendations and, thereafter, applies pressure for the removal of the trade barriers which it has identified. It then moves on to another group. In this way more and more products of interest to less-developed countries have come, and continue to come, within the purview of Committee III, and trade barriers affecting an increasingly wide range of products have come under the attention of the Committee. The scope of the investigation now extends to 270 headings of the Brussels Tariff Nomenclature.

As regards quantitative restrictions, the number of industrialized countries applying such restrictions against the exports of the less-developed countries has constantly decreased. Some countries have eliminated all restrictions or have reduced their application to one or two items only. In fact, in many markets quantitative restrictions have ceased to constitute a significant barrier to trade. It is important, however, to remember that among the hard-core restrictions that remain are some affecting products which are of very considerable and immediate importance to less-developed countries in the context of their export earnings and their economic development.
In the tariff sector some downward movement in tariffs was achieved in the course of the 1960-61 tariff negotiations which were known as the Dillon Round. In cases where preferences are involved there has been a decrease in discrimination during the past year.

Kennedy Round

This modest, but solid, measure of progress pales into insignificance before the opportunities which are offered to the international trading community, in the course of the comprehensive trade negotiations which will open next month and which are generally known as the Kennedy Round, to make a major contribution to a solution of the problems we are considering. As I say, these negotiations offer opportunities. Unfortunately history is strewn with the corpses of great opportunities which have been missed and I would exhort all governments represented in this Conference who are intending to participate in the Kennedy Round not to miss this one. The hour is late and, unless we tackle this problem with the generosity, imagination and courage which is required, it may very soon be too late.

In the course of the session of the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement which terminated just prior to the opening of this Conference, the industrialized countries again re-emphasized that they considered that one of the major objectives of the Kennedy Round is the attainment of a significant contribution to the trade of the less-developed countries. In these circumstances, I think it is important to be quite clear on what is needed if the Kennedy Round is to give significant results in this field.

First of all, the reductions in tariffs in industrialized countries must be deep and comprehensive. They must cover not only fully manufactured products but also semi-manufactures which is an area in which some of the developing countries can most rapidly develop their own capacity. There will be exceptions to the general reduction of tariffs which are proposed but I would hope that, in no case, will the exceptions which are made by industrialized countries bear upon products which are of significant importance to the export interests of the developing countries. As is, I think, generally known, the industrialized countries have agreed that, in the Kennedy Round, they will not seek reciprocity from the developing countries and this attitude represents a significant advance on the somewhat rigid conception of trade reciprocity which prevailed in some of the earlier trade negotiations under the aegis of the General Agreement.

The second requirement if this aim of the Kennedy Round is to be achieved - and I emphasize again that the industrialized countries have said that this is one of the principal aims of the negotiations - is that non-tariff barriers must be properly covered. Here there are difficult and delicate problems involved. But it seems to me that, when viewed against the great human and social problem to which we are addressing ourselves here they are by no means difficulties which cannot and should not be overcome.
Thirdly, and certainly not least important, is the fact that the negotiations must cover - and cover adequately - the question of trade in agricultural products. This is an area where the industrialized countries themselves have acute social and political difficulties. I have noted that they are remarkably sensitive to these social and political difficulties in their own countries; I would hope that this Conference would perhaps focus their attention with equal intensity upon the rather more acute social and political difficulties which restrictions in this field create in the developing countries. I would therefore lay particular emphasis on the importance of making real progress with a significant liberalization in the course of the Kennedy negotiations with respect to agricultural as well as industrial products.

Preferences

I should like to turn to one or two other specific topics which have arisen here and which are concurrently being examined in the General Agreement. First of all I shall take my courage in both hands and refer to the subject of preferences.

We in the General Agreement have often been accused of rigidity and doctrinaire attitudes, and in no area more so than in the case of preferences - and, I think, quite understandably. I think that the most-favoured-nation clause is more than an abstract principle of economics. It is something which has been at the basis of international trading relationships since the international trading community took shape in the nineteenth century. It is however, no more sacred, in my view, than any other principle and one ought to be prepared to examine with an open mind whether there are departures from the most-favoured-nation clause which will offer real benefits and advantages, particularly to the developing countries. However, I think these benefits must apply to all the developing countries. I think that if we got into a position where preferences were accorded by some countries to some developing countries, and not accorded to others, this could create serious and lasting damage to those which were not so favoured and would act as a seriously divisive force which would far outweigh the particular advantages which might be derived by the favoured few.

As a matter of fact, this question is being actively discussed in the GATT at the present moment in accordance with ministerial directives; and I can say that it is being discussed with an open mind. However, I would be less than frank if I were to suggest that, so far, we have found it easy to make progress in this field. The reason is that it is an extremely complicated, difficult, and, above all, very important development which has to be worked out and elaborated with the utmost care. We have found in the preliminary discussions in the GATT that there are substantial differences of view, not only between the highly developed countries and the developing countries, but also between the developed countries themselves; and there are very strong differences of view between the developing countries.
It is for this reason that with perhaps more prudence than heroism, but still I think with prudence, we have recorded that our preliminary investigation indicates that there are interesting possibilities in this field - I repeat, there are interesting possibilities - but that much remains to be done in order to work out the procedures and conditions under which such preferential arrangements should be negotiated. We shall resume this examination at a fairly early date.

Arrangements have been made for the competent bodies of the General Agreement, after the governments have had an opportunity to consider the results of the first reconnaissance, to revert to this question later this year, in the hope that a report leading to decisions could be considered at a session of the Contracting Parties during November of this year.

I have been speaking so far of preferences to be accorded by the industrialized countries to the developing countries. There is of course another side of the question which relates to preferences between the developing countries themselves. That of course is rather a difficult question because, in the first instance, any preferential arrangement in effect means that the country according the preference agrees to pay rather more for its imports from one particular source of supply than it would if it obtained them from the cheapest source of supply. Unfortunately, the plight of the developing countries is such that they need to mobilize every possible resource they can for imports; and therefore the luxury of discriminating between sources of supply, other than on grounds of price and advantage, is not an easy one for them to contemplate. On the other hand, I think that most of us would concede that a process of industrial development which could proceed on more rational lines on the basis of a large regional market, made possible and favoured by preferences or liberalization of trade on a regional basis, is a concept well worth consideration.

In fact, in a sense, this whole question is - so far as the GATT is concerned - rather like pushing at an open door. It was carefully considered in the course of the review of the General Agreement in 1955, when it was conceded that the waiver provisions of the General Agreement could be invoked in favour of systems of regional preferences of this type. These waiver provisions depend upon obtaining an approving vote of two thirds of the contracting parties which in effect means, in present circumstances, that provided the developing countries themselves were agreed on the desirability of such arrangements, the GATT presents no real obstacle to them, because at the present moment more than two thirds of the contracting parties are developing countries. I think, therefore, that one cannot argue that the most-favoured-nation principle, as incorporated in the General Agreement, accompanied as it is by the waiver provisions of Article XXV, is a significant obstacle to valid regional arrangements which commend themselves at least to most of the developing countries.
Commodity problems

I turn now to the question of commodity problems. The GATT has been widely criticized in that one of its inadequacies is that it does not deal with the problem of commodity trade and, as developing countries are still largely dependent on the export of and trade in primary products, this means that the General Agreement excludes to a large extent the major part of their trading interests. To some extent I think this criticism is directed at the modesty of the GATT; I think it is a good, valid criticism. I think that it is rather difficult to argue that an international trade agreement should not concern itself with such an important sector of international trade; but of course this argument conceals certain fallacies.

First of all, as regards the examination of commodity questions in the ordinarily accepted sense of the term, that is, through the negotiation of commodity arrangements, the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement have consistently taken the view - and this is a self-denying attitude which is rather rare - that they should not arrogate to themselves the right to deal with questions which have been entrusted by the United Nations to its own organs. Therefore we in the GATT have directed our efforts so far as we can to seconding and assisting the efforts of the appropriate United Nations bodies such as the Interim Co-ordinating Committee for International Commodity Arrangements, the Chairman of which is appointed by the Secretary-General on the recommendation of the Contracting Parties; the United Nations Commission on International Commodity Trade and the Food and Agriculture Organization. But within these limitations I myself have taken the initiative in the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination in suggesting to my colleagues that as far as secretariats are concerned we should establish, within the framework of inter-agency co-ordination, a committee to keep our activities under constant review and to ensure that we are giving the maximum support we can to governments in the orderly consideration and discussion of these questions. Apart from that, however, there are in fact constant consultations, discussions and negotiations on problems relating to particular primary products entering international trade, which take place within the framework of the General Agreement, although these are not directed to the formulation of classical commodity agreements in general in the accepted sense of the term.

One of the things this Conference will be doing will be examining with a critical eye the institutional machinery which exists for dealing with international trade problems of special concern to the developing countries, and I would certainly think there might be a very good case for calling upon the GATT to fulfill additional responsibilities in this field; and I am quite sure that, if that is the view of this Conference, the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement would give the most careful consideration to any suggestions or requests in this direction that might be made to them.
I pass now to another aspect of this problem which I regard as being of the utmost importance. There has been much discussion in this Conference - I think quite rightly - of the serious consequences for developing countries of the deterioration in their terms of trade as exporters of primary products. This is a problem of very grave concern and one which we have examined for some years in the General Agreement. I must say that my own conclusions on this are that, whilst wherever possible it is desirable - indeed, urgent - to enter into and elaborate agreements for the stabilization of prices to prevent violent fluctuations, a solution to this problem is not to be found by attempting to manipulate prices in such a way as to jeopardize the competitive position of primary products; these are already seriously threatened by competitive synthetic products and by technological processes which - at a price - enable considerable economies to be made in the use of primary products in manufacturing processes. Therefore, one form or another of compensatory financing for primary producers is the way to deal with one side of this problem.

**Development of export potential**

The way to deal with the other side of this problem is to assist in every possible way in the diversification of the economies of the primary producers. It is with this objective in mind that we have recently initiated in the GATT - with perhaps too modest means, but on a pilot basis - a new project in which I place great hopes, and on which we would certainly be interested to hear any suggestions and comments by this Conference. This project entails a systematic series of studies of development plans and prospects of individual exporting countries with a view, above all, to identifying what is the most readily available potential export capacity in these countries and what is needed to develop that potential production, and then enquiring into the possibility of providing really adequate guarantees that, if this potential does become actual, it will not be frustrated by restrictions in international markets. The latter part is the particular concern of the organization which I serve. However, we hope to collaborate very closely with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, with the OECD, with the United Nations and with lending governments, in order to offer advice about the directions in which development finance could be moved in such a way as to bring about the earliest possible return in the form of export proceeds. This, I think, is a programme of great potentiality. It will of course - and this is a point I make with some trepidation, but I make it because I think it is honest to make it - bring out that the problem of developing industrial export potential in the developing countries is not only a problem which relates to restrictions which they may or may not encounter in the markets of other countries. It will also bring out the fact that there are certain minimum conditions which must be observed in the developing countries themselves if they are to develop manufacturing capacity which will be capable of competing in international markets; in many countries restrictionist policies, which are not protectionist in their origins or perhaps even in their purposes, are nevertheless creating conditions which in fact inhibit the possibility of production by export industries on conditions which would enable them to be competitive in
international markets. This, I think, is an important element which cannot be
excluded when one is looking towards the long-term solution of these problems.
The problem is not exclusively an external one.

Institutional aspects

I should not like to finish without saying a few words on the institutional
question. First of all I should like to voice an apprehension. I have been a
bureaucrat for far longer than I care to remember, and I have had one consistent
experience. That is that, whenever I have raised an awkward problem in the GATT
which has caused some embarrassment to any of the member governments, their reaction
has been immediate and predictable: they create an institution -they set up a
committee - and that is usually the end of the problem. There is another one,
however, which is even more insidious, and that is to set up several institutions,
for nothing rejoices the heart of a government more when confronted with an awkward
problem than to have it discussed simultaneously in several institutions. This
enables you to move from one to the other and, with a sufficient amount of agility,
you may avoid dealing with the problem in any of them.

However, let me say this. I think it does all of us who are engaged in
established institutions good to have the cold eye of criticism directed upon
us. Complacency is one of the most catching of sins. I think it is extremely
useful and valuable for all of us - not only GATT but all of us - to come under
close examination here. Some of us will not pass. We may have to pull up our
socks. There may be gaps and, if there are, these should be filled - there is no
question about that.

Let us also remember that international institutions are as effective as
the governments which constitute them. To group the same lot of governments,
or perhaps even a few more, in another place does not often change their habits.
Therefore, although it is important to have effective and comprehensive
institutions, and to have organization where organization is required, I hope
that we will not at any stage lose sight of the fact that we are dealing with an
urgent, challenging social and human problem where the solution lies really in
the will of governments to act. I do not think that they lack the instrumen-
talities for making their action effective. What is lacking so far is the will
to take the necessary political decisions.

Now I should like to say a little about the institutional character of GATT
itself. GATT is not a universal institution. That is usually put forward as a
criticism. Why is it not a universal institution? The reason is that it is an
international trade agreement which contains important, sometimes heavy, legal
obligations and confers upon its members legal rights and a means of vindicating
them. It is open to accession by any country provided that two thirds of the
members are convinced that the acceding country can accept, fulfil and carry out
the obligations which they have accepted, in exchange for which they, for their
part, are prepared to extend to that country the full rights which accrue to any
contracting party.
I ask myself what sort of international trading arrangement which did not have that character would be of any value at all. One can of course have an institution where there are no rights, no obligations - just principles, declarations and resolutions. There do exist, and one can envisage creating, institutions or arrangements where valuable discussions may take place within that sort of framework, but they are not of the same character as an organization which rests on an international agreement involving carefully defined legal rights and obligations, and machinery for their enforcement.

There is an area in which the adequacy of this international trading instrument has been strongly questioned; it has been said that it is not adapted to dealing with the relations between countries with market economies and those whose economies are based upon central planning and State control. I have been glad to see that in the course of this Conference much emphasis has been placed upon trade between the centrally-planned economies and developing countries, because I share the view which has been expressed here that this is an area in which there is much room for development of trade, if only because, relatively, this is where there has been a considerable lag. I think this is something which merits the most careful study and examination, and that there must be the institutional means of stimulating the process.

It is true, of course, that the General Agreement, as an international trade agreement, was conceived and brought into being fundamentally as an instrument to serve as the basis for trading relationships between countries with market economies. However, as I have said, there is a provision which says that any country which wishes to do so may accede on terms to be discussed and agreed with the contracting parties and acceptable to two thirds of them. There is no limitation as to what those terms may be, and I cannot conceive of any circumstances in which, if such discussions resulted in the finding of a formula under which a country, which organized its economy on other than the market basis, could satisfy its trading partners in the General Agreement that it could assume and carry out commitments and obligations comparable to those which the contracting parties accept, the accession of that country to the General Agreement would create serious problems.

In recent years we have, in fact, carried out negotiations with certain countries which have chosen the system of a centrally-planned economy, entrusting all trading transactions to State institutions, and we have found a basis for their accession to the General Agreement. I refer specifically to the case of Yugoslavia, which has acceded provisionally to
the General Agreement and whose provisional accession will ripen automatically, and very shortly, I hope, into full accession. We have negotiated for the provisional accession of the United Arab Republic, and I am equally hopeful that the remaining steps to convert that provisional accession into full accession will also be taken in the near future.

For a number of years we have had an arrangement of association with the Government of Poland which I know has given great satisfaction to the contracting parties, and which has enabled Poland to play an active and important rôle in the work of the Contracting Parties. Again, I have no doubt that as far as the contracting parties are concerned there is no reason why this association should not similarly ripen, through processes of consultation and discussion, into the full accession of Poland to the General Agreement.

Then there are a number of developing countries which have not so far seen it to be to their advantage to accede to the General Agreement. I find that quite understandable. For one thing, the General Agreement is a pretty unappetizing document to read. It is also a document which is very badly out of date as it does not reflect the great changes and modifications which have been made in the actual content and nature of the work of GATT over the past few years. We have perhaps been remiss in not bringing it up to date - perhaps, I say; I myself, shortsightedly maybe, have placed greater emphasis on getting on with the work rather than repairing the facade. But these are political questions, and I think that this was possibly an error - an error, however, which we are now in the process of repairing. We have recently concluded a careful investigation of the respects in which the GATT needs to be modified in order to bring it up to date and to reflect the present state of international trading relations and what is in fact currently taking place within the GATT, particularly with respect to the problems of developing countries. We have largely completed the establishment of a special chapter on trade and development which will confirm, among other things, the great flexibility which the contracting parties observe in the application of the obligations and commitments of developing countries under the General Agreement. It will - and this is perhaps more important - embody as treaty commitments and obligations, fully binding on all contracting parties, a good deal of the Programme of Action and a good deal of the 1961 Declaration on the trade of less-developed countries, to which I have referred. That, I think, will be an improvement and also give a truer picture of what the GATT is about.
Meanwhile, it is, of course, a matter of judgement for individual developing countries as to whether or not they seek accession to the General Agreement. But the door is open, the entrance is fairly wide and it would certainly be my hope that more and more of the developing countries, as they come to have a clearer understanding of what it is we are trying to do and of the spirit in which we are trying to do it, and perhaps paying rather less attention to the somewhat ungainly language in which international legal instruments have necessarily to be drawn up, would see an advantage in coming and assisting us with their own contribution to our efforts and, at the same time, benefiting from the work which is being done currently by so many of their fellow developing countries in the GATT.

As I have said before, this one-time rich-man's club now has developing countries as two thirds of its membership, and this number increases daily. I think this is good evidence that, within the limitations which quite naturally and properly exist on the total scope of the work of the Contracting Parties, the GATT's value and relevance to the problems of developing countries are being more fully appreciated.

One final word. It has been my strong hope that, apart from the political impulse which this Conference will give to the work on which we have all been engaged for some years - and that will be an important result of this Conference in itself - there will be one other result, and that specifically in the institutional sphere. It is this. I think that one thing clearly apparent to anyone working in this field for any length of time, and of which he must be very conscious, is that there is in fact an absence of a coherent international development policy which takes into account all aspects of a very wide and complex problem. I doubt whether all these aspects can be encompassed in one technical organization or series of technical organizations. But I think it would be a source of great strength to us who are engaged in sectors of this programme if one did have the feeling that there was a purposeful, coherent, co-ordinated, international development programme to which all governments of the United Nations felt themselves to be committed as a primary aim of policy - and I mean by that, of national policy.

That brings me back to where I started. I think that such an international policy, and acceptance of the fact that the effective carrying out of this international policy is a primary concern of national policy in each country, is perhaps the type of political decision which needs to be forged and the type of political decision with which any institution resulting from this Conference might well serve to provide us.

END