GENERAL AGREEMENT ON
TARIFFS AND TRADE

CONTRACTING PARTIES
Fifth Session

DRAFT

REPORT OF WORKING PARTY "F" ON AMENDMENT TO LAST PARAGRAPH OF PART II OF ARTICLE XX

The Working Party addressed itself in the first instance to point (2) of its terms of reference, i.e., "whether the proposed extension of the date limit should apply to all three subparagraphs of Part II of Article XX or only to subparagraphs (a) and (b)." The view was expressed at the outset of the discussion by the representative of the United Kingdom that this question could not properly be examined except on the basis of a consideration of the various types of measure which were being applied or might have to be applied under subparagraphs (a) and (b) on the one hand, and subparagraph (c) on the other. Such an examination would enable the Working Party to appreciate the necessity for the extension of the time period in respect of measures applied under subparagraphs (a) and (b), and at the same time demonstrate that the same considerations did not apply to subparagraph (c). The view that the circumstances which justified an extension in respect of subparagraphs (a) and (b) did not apply in the case of subparagraph (c) was supported by the representatives of Norway and New Zealand. Most members of the Working Party felt that it was not within the terms of reference of the Working Party to embark upon such a detailed examination and they felt, moreover, that it would not be practicable to do so at the present session of the Contracting Parties. They felt that a sufficient measure of agreement had been manifested in the discussion in the plenary meetings of the Contracting Parties that any extension agreed upon with respect to (a) and (b) should apply equally to (c).

The representative of the United Kingdom developed at some length the reasons which in his view justified a differentiation between the treatment to be accorded to paragraphs (a) and (b) on the one hand, which dealt with shortages, and (c) on the other, which dealt with surpluses; in his view the difficulties envisaged under (c) no longer existed or should no longer exist; the stocks referred to under paragraph (c) should by now have been liquidated or, if not, the question could be dealt with on a case by case basis and considered by the Contracting Parties; the problems with which subparagraphs (a) and (b) were intended to deal were, however,
of a much more persistent character requiring the application for a considerable
time to some of various measures which might not otherwise be consistent with
the Agreement; shortages continued to exist and countries which were experien-
cing balance of payments difficulties had for that reason limited access to
certain sources of supply, which imposed upon them the need to take measures of
the type contemplated under paragraphs (a) and (b). The representative of
Norway expressed his entire agreement with the representative of the United
Kingdom with regard to the necessity for a lengthy prolongation of subparagraphs
(a) and (b). The representative of the United Kingdom pointed out that there
was considerable ambiguity as to the scope of subparagraph (c) and that it might
be used as a justification for protective import restrictions in a manner
entirely contrary to the principles and objectives of the Agreement. Other
members of the Working Party felt that the same problem arose with respect to
sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), namely, that they, too, contained a considerable
element of ambiguity as to their scope and might be used to justify protective
measures contrary to the principles and objectives of the Agreement.

The representatives of Chile and Cuba felt that if any extension were to be
agreed as to any of these subparagraphs, it should in any case apply to sub-
paragraph (c), which was of vital importance to primary producers, since it was
they who would suffer from the absence of any provision for the orderly liquida-
tion of surpluses of primary products: paragraph (c) called for consultation with
a view to international action, which afforded some safeguard for the interests of
primary producers; the new circumstances, such as needs for rearmament
programmes, which had been adduced by those who favoured an extension of the
period for subparagraphs (a) and (b), as aggravating and prolonging the problem
of shortages, also created the danger of the accumulation of surpluses, which
were of great concern to the primary producing countries; the safeguard of
subparagraph (c) providing for consultation with a view to international action
was, therefore, of great importance to them; particularly as neither Article 32
nor Chapter VI of the Havana Charter was included in the General Agreement.

The representative of the United Kingdom, whilst sympathizing with the
anxieties of the primary producing countries, felt that paragraph (c) did not
afford them any guarantee; on the other hand, the acceptance by contracting parties of the obligations of Article XXIX, which involved acceptance of the principles of Chapter VI and of Article 32 of the Havana Charter, did give them some protection.

As regards the length of the extension, whether applied to (a) and (b) only or to all three subparagraphs, a majority of members were in favour of a short period, in view of the sweeping nature of the exceptions involved. The United Kingdom and Norway who, as explained above, favoured an extension in the case of (a) and (b) but not of (c), felt that the date to be inserted in the Article should be left for subsequent determination by the Contracting Parties in conformity with the provisions of Article 45 of the Havana Charter. They felt the exceptions contained in subparagraphs (a) and (b) were of great importance and that a long prolongation in respect of these two subparagraphs was essential. The representative of New Zealand, while supporting provision for a longer period for subparagraphs (a) and (b), desired only a limited extension of subparagraph (c).

Since most members of the Working Party felt that it was not possible at this session to examine in detail the types of measure which might be taken under subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c), the Working Party agreed to recommend that all three subparagraphs should as an interim measure, be prolonged until 1 January 1952, so as to enable a more thorough examination at the next Session of the question of what extension, if any, should be made with respect to each of the three subparagraphs.

As regards the method to be adopted to give effect to the interim solution recommended by the Working Party, it is considered that the most practicable and expeditious method would be by way of a decision of the Contracting Parties under Article XXV:5(a) waiving until January 1, 1952 the obligation of contracting parties instituting or maintaining measures under Part II of Article XX to discontinue them. A draft of a Resolution to this effect is submitted with this report for consideration by the Contracting Parties.
DRAFT RESOLUTION

WHEREAS it is provided in Article XX that nothing in the General Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures described in Part II of Article XX, and that measures instituted under the said Part II of Article XX which are inconsistent with other provisions of the General Agreement shall be removed as soon as the conditions giving rise to them have ceased and in any event not later than January 1, 1951.

and WHEREAS the conditions due to the war have not improved at the rate and to the extent expected when the General Agreement was drawn up.

the CONTRACTING PARTIES DECIDE by a two-thirds majority in accordance with Article XX (5) (a) to waive until 1 January 1952 the obligation of contracting parties instituting or maintaining measures under Part II of Article XX to discontinue them.