Application of Principles of Chapter VI
of the Havana Charter

A letter dated 11 August 1949 has been addressed to
Sir James Helmore, the Chairman of the Interim Co-ordinating
Committee for International Commodity Arrangements along the
lines of the draft contained in ICITO/1/20. A copy of the
letter is attached in Annex A. The final paragraph of the
letter refers to a draft report drawn up by a Working Party
of the Executive Committee; this draft report will be found
in Annex B.
Sir,

I have the honour to refer to your letter of 28 June to the Secretary-General of the United Nations regarding international action on problems arising in connection with world trade in commodities. The Executive Committee of the Interim Commission for the International Trade Organization has recently given careful consideration to your letter at an emergency session held in Annecy.

In the course of its examination of this problem, the Executive Committee considered the desirability of drawing up and submitting to governments a protocol bringing Chapter VI of the Havana Charter into provisional application. All members of the Executive Committee were agreed as to the importance of the observance of the principles of Chapter VI in any international action on commodity problems. The majority considered, however, that it was not possible to put particular Chapters of the Charter formally into force while the Charter as a whole was awaiting consideration by their legislations. Moreover, in the present circumstances action on the lines of the proposed protocol was not thought to be sufficiently urgent to justify the difficulties it would present. It was pointed out:

a) that the principal trading countries of the world are, by virtue of their being contracting parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, under an obligation "to observe to the fullest extent of their executive authority the general principles of Chapter VI .... of the Havana Charter". (see Article XXIX of the General Agreement).

b) that the resolution of the Economic and Social Council creating the Interim Co-ordinating Committee for International Commodity Arrangements recommends that pending the establishment of the International Trade Organization, members of the United Nations should adopt as a general guide in inter-governmental consultations or action with respect to commodity problems the principles of Chapter VI, and
e) that the ICCICA - although not a governmental body and therefore operating under the handicaps mentioned in your letter under reference - provides machinery for facilitating compliance with the Economic and Social Council's recommendation and for keeping under surveillance the extent of such compliance.

The Executive Committee has therefore decided to take no further action at this time, except:

a) to express its satisfaction at the assurance contained in the last paragraph of your letter under reference that the Committee will continue to carry out the commitments assigned to it by the Economic and Social Council, and

b) to draw the attention of the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade to the problem and to furnish to the Contracting Parties a draft report drawn up for a working party established by the Executive Committee which contains some suggestions as to how the Contracting Parties might, if necessary, in accordance with the terms of the General Agreement, assist in assuring the observance of the principles referred to in the Economic and Social Council resolution and in Article XXIX of the General Agreement.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

E. Wyndham White
Executive Secretary.

Sir James Helmore,
Chairman,
Interim Co-ordinating Committee
for International Commodity Arrangements,
Board of Trade,
Millbank,
London, S.W.1
ANNEX B

Draft Report of Working Party on Chapter VI for submission to the Interim Commission for the International Trade Organization

As requested by the emergency session of the Executive Committee on 22nd July (ICITO 1/19), the Working Party has considered possible alternative methods to give effect to the provisions of Chapter VI pending the entry into force of the Charter but without prejudice to the final decision as to whether the Chapter should be put into effect or not. A proposal submitted by the United Kingdom Delegation in the form of a draft Protocol of provisional application is contained in document ICITO 1/W.1 and the Working Party presents an alternative method which might be adopted, namely a Decision to be taken by the Contracting Parties under Article XXV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. A draft Decision which might be recommended to the Contracting Parties by the Executive Committee is attached to this Report.

In presenting this draft Decision, the Working Party wishes to draw the attention of the Executive Committee to the differences between the two methods. The main points of difference are summarized in the following paragraphs. (For the sake of brevity, the draft protocol of provisional application proposed by the United Kingdom Delegation will be referred to as "the Protocol", and the draft decision of the Contracting Parties attached hereto will be referred to as "the Decision"):–

(i) Extent of obligations

The nature of the obligations under the two methods might in practice not be greatly different. The Protocol would indirectly impose on its signatories the obligations of Chapter VI on a provisional basis and would provide for their administration through machinery similar to that contemplated in that Chapter. The Decision, in order to implement the obligation to observe the principles of Chapter VI, would also set up machinery which would be operated substantially in accordance with the provisions of that Chapter.
(ii) The extent to which the Contracting Parties would be bound

The Protocol would bind those contracting parties accepting it whereas the Decision would bind all contracting parties. The Working Party considers, however, that neither the Protocol nor the Decision would bind contracting parties to any obligations additional to those to which they are already bound as contracting parties to the General Agreement, but both would establish machinery for implementing those obligations.

(iii) The extent to which non-contracting parties would be bound

The Protocol would bind non-contracting parties accepting it equally with contracting parties accepting it. Under the Decision non-contracting parties which participate in the consideration would be bound to observe the principles of Chapter VI by virtue of their acceptance of the ECOSOC Resolution mentioned in the Decision as a condition of their participation.

(iv) Entry into force

The Decision would be formally in effect immediately. The Protocol would pre-suppose signature by a nucleus of countries of importance in the commodity field; after they had signed the Protocol there might be delay in obtaining the signatures of other countries. It would be difficult at this time to foresee under which method more speedy action could be taken.

(v) Secretariat

The Protocol would allow the I.C.C.I.C.A. to pass out of existence, which possibility was implied in its letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and another international entity would be created. Under the Decision, on the other hand, I.C.C.I.C.A. would probably continue and expand its activities pending the establishment of the International Trade Organization.

Procedural Questions

It is provided in the draft decision that from time to time the matters referred to therein will be considered in accordance with a procedure to be established. The preparation and adoption of a detailed procedure is a task which must be left to the Contracting Parties. But, in view of the fact that the procedure to be adopted might in some particulars affect the consideration of this proposal by the Executive Committee, the Working Party wishes to mention the two main procedural questions involved:
1. The responsibility for convening meetings

It is contemplated that meetings to consider the matters referred to in the Decision would be convened by the Chairman of the Contracting Parties after consultation with the Chairman of the I.C.C.I.C.A. Such meetings would be convened by the Chairman on the request of a contracting party or of I.C.C.I.C.A; if a government which is not a contracting party or an inter-governmental organization should desire to request a meeting, this request would be addressed to I.C.C.I.C.A.

2. Rights and obligations of non-contracting parties at such meetings

It is suggested that a government which is not a contracting party, which is invited to participate in the consideration by the CONTRACTING PARTIES of matters referred to in the decision, should have the right to full participation including voting rights with the sole exception of voting on matters referred to in sub-paragraph (c) of the decision. It would be understood that a decision on any matter arising from sub-paragraph (c) would not be binding on governments which are not contracting parties.

DRAFT DECISION CONCERNING JOINT ACTION BY THE CONTRACTING PARTIES ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN PRIMARY COMMODITIES

WHEREAS special difficulties which may jeopardize the general policy of economic expansion are occurring or are likely to occur in the international trade in primary and related commodities, which difficulties are giving rise to international discussion of inter-governmental commodity agreements relating to these commodities, and

WHEREAS the solution of these difficulties on appropriate lines is essential to the objectives of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade as set out in the preamble thereto, and

WHEREAS the General Agreement provides in paragraph I (h) of Article XX that nothing in the agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures
undertaken in pursuance of obligations under inter-governmental commodity agreements conforming to the principles approved by the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations in a Resolution of March 28, 1947, and now incorporated in Chapter VI of the Havana Charter, and

WHEREAS the Interim Co-ordinating Committee for International Commodity Arrangements established by the aforementioned Resolution of the Economic and Social Council in a letter addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations has expressed doubt whether at the present time an interim body not composed of representatives of governments can effectively exercise the functions assigned to the International Trade Organization in this matter by Chapter VI of the Havana Charter,

WHEREAS paragraph 1 of Article XXIV of the General Agreement provides that the Contracting Parties undertake to observe to the fullest extent of their executive authority the aforesaid principles pending their acceptance of the Havana Charter in accordance with their constitutional procedures, and

WHEREAS Article XXV of the General Agreement provides that representatives of the Contracting Parties shall meet from time to time for the purpose of giving effect to those provisions of the Agreement which involve joint action and, generally, with a view to facilitating the operation and furthering the objectives of the Agreement:

The CONTRACTING PARTIES decide:

a) to consider from time to time as may be necessary in accordance with a procedure to be established, the matters referred to in this Decision;

b) to invite other governments which are eligible for membership in the International Trade Organization to participate in such consideration on condition that they accept the principles of the Resolution of the ECOSOC referred to in this Decision;
c) to review, having regard to paragraph I (h) of Article XX, existing commodity agreements in which one or more contracting parties participate, to ascertain whether or not they conform to the principles referred to in Article XXIX of the General Agreement;

d) to take or recommend such other action as may be appropriate in the light of the aforesaid principles, including the convening of commodity study groups and/or conferences; and

e) to request the Interim Commission for the International Trade Organization to furnish such additional secretariat services as may be necessary for the carrying out of these functions.