Quantitative Restrictions
Consultations Committee

Draft Report on the Consultation under Articles XII:4(b) and XIV:1(g)
with the United Kingdom

I. Introduction
1. In accordance with the Decision taken at the plenary meeting of the CONTRACTING PARTIES on 17 November 1956, the Consultations Committee has conducted the consultation with the United Kingdom under paragraph 4(b) of Article XII. The consultation under Article XIV:1(g) was held at the same time.

2. The Committee had before it:
   (a) a basic document prepared by the secretariat in collaboration with the United Kingdom authorities describing the system and methods of the balance-of-payments import restrictions in operation in the United Kingdom. The document also contains a statement under Part II - "Effects on Trade", submitted by the United Kingdom authorities;
   (b) documents provided by the International Monetary Fund.

   All these documents should be deemed to be supplementary material annexed to this report.

3. In conducting the consultation the Committee followed the Plan recommended by the CONTRACTING PARTIES for the consultations. The present report summarizes the main points of the discussion during the consultation.

Consultation with the International Monetary Fund
4. Pursuant to the provisions of Article XV of the General Agreement, the CONTRACTING PARTIES had invited the International Monetary Fund to consult
with them in connexion with this consultation with the United Kingdom. As a part of the consultation between the CONTRACTING PARTIES and the Fund, the latter transmitted the results and background material from its consultation with the United Kingdom concluded on 27 February 1957, as well as a supplementary paper dated 13 August 1957 supplying information on subsequent developments.

5. In accordance with the procedure agreed upon by the Consultations Committee the representative of the Fund was invited to make a statement supplementing the Fund's documentation concerning the position of the United Kingdom. The statement made was as follows:

"The International Monetary Fund has transmitted to the CONTRACTING PARTIES the results and background material from its last consultation with the United Kingdom under Article XIV of the Fund Agreement, which consultation was concluded on February 27, 1957.

"As some time has elapsed since the conclusion of this consultation with the United Kingdom, the Fund has also provided a supplementary paper on the United Kingdom, dated August 13, 1957, to supply background information on subsequent developments in the internal situation, the balance of payments, and the restrictive system. This paper, together with the background material from the last consultation under Article XIV of the Fund Agreement, and the results of that consultation, have been distributed to the members of this Committee.

"With respect to Section I of the Plan for Consultations, relating to balance-of-payments position and prospects, the general level of restrictions of the United Kingdom which are under reference does not go beyond the extent necessary at the present time to stop a serious decline in its monetary reserves.

"With respect to Section II of the Plan, relating to alternative measures to restore equilibrium, the attention of the Committee is drawn to the results of the last Fund consultation with the United Kingdom and to the measures taken more recently. The Fund has no additional alternative measures to suggest at this time."
Opening statement by the United Kingdom Representative

6. The full text of the opening statement of the United Kingdom Representative is attached to this report as Annex I, and is summarized in the following paragraphs.

7. The United Kingdom Representative referred firstly to the excellence and usefulness of the basic documents prepared for this consultation: the secretariat document provided a comprehensive analysis of the systems of quantitative restrictions in operation in the United Kingdom, and it would be found on many desks in Whitehall as a most valuable reference work. He pointed out that this year they were consulting not only under Article XIV:1(g), about the discriminatory aspects of their import restrictions, but also under Article XII:4(b), about the restrictions themselves. As the difficulty in reducing discrimination had been the difficulty in liberalizing the restrictions it was appropriate that he take up the argument from the point which had been reached last year in the consultation under Article XIV:1(g).

8. The United Kingdom's surplus on current account in the first half of 1956 had been substantial - £154 million; but the second half of the year was seasonally unfavourable and a continuance of the surplus could not be anticipated. Events in the Middle East had to be watched; these proved caution to be justified, and indeed matters turned out much worse than had been feared. Substantial speculative movements against sterling took place in November and December 1956 and at the end of that year the United Kingdom were obliged to make a drawing and obtain a large standby from the IMF and to arrange substantial credit with the Export-Import Bank. These measures were effective and the drain on sterling ceased.

9. Despite the closure of the Suez Canal, and other Middle East events, and despite the need to obtain large quantities of oil from the Western hemisphere, the United Kingdom had a surplus on current account of £86 million in the second half of 1956, and a further surplus of £125 million in the first half of 1957. The Chancellor of the Exchequer had pointed out that the trends in the United Kingdom economy suggested they would have a still bigger surplus for the year ending June 1958. This surplus, however, would not be enough.
10. The United Kingdom Representative then referred to a statement which he had circulated showing the current account balances of his country by regions for the years 1952 to 1956 and for the first half of 1957 (see Annex II to this report).

The disturbances caused by the Korean war had caused a sharp deterioration in the United Kingdom's balance of payments and they were obliged in 1951-52 to re-introduce fairly widespread quantitative restrictions. Subsequently the position improved and in four of the five following years there was a surplus on current account, the average being £160 million a year.

11. As this improvement took place they liberalized imports; concerning imports from OEEC countries and their possessions the percentage of liberalization rose from 44 in February 1953, to 80 in November 1953, 84 in December 1954 and 93 in August 1956, the last mentioned figure being more than the percentage of 90 to which they were committed in OEEC. The position regarding other countries to which the United Kingdom accorded similar treatment was broadly the same. The percentage of United Kingdom imports liberalized vis-à-vis the United States and Canada - on the basis of 1953 trade - rose from 50 in June 1954 to 59 in August 1956. The record of these five years was one of continuing progress in liberalization.

12. Having in mind this apparently satisfactory current account record, he had to explain that the reason why they had not succeeded in removing all restrictions was the state of their gold and dollar reserves. At the end of 1952 they were £1,846 million, and at the end of 1956, but for their IMF drawing of £561 million, would have been even lower. In fact they stood at £2,133 million, and rose slowly in the first half of 1957 to £2,381 million; by the end of September 1957 they declined, because of widespread speculation, to £1,850 million. Moreover the EPU deficit in September amounted to £62 million, and of this three quarters had to be settled in dollars in October. The United Kingdom would be drawing on the Export-Import Bank line of credit in the coming weeks.

13. The fact that surpluses on current account had not been reflected in increases in gold and dollar reserves could be explained by the triple
role of the United Kingdom in world trade as trader, investor and banker. Flows of investment capital were as much part of the United Kingdom's "commercial" affairs as payments and receipts for imports, exports, services etc. Such transactions in 1956/57 used up the whole current surplus and about £90 million more. The United Kingdom had therefore to earn a current surplus sufficient to cover these operations and commitments (including repayments to the IMF and the Export-Import Bank) and to build up sufficient reserves to enable them to act also as international banker; in this role the United Kingdom had encountered difficulties during the past year.

14. The Committee would have little difficulty in appreciating why during the last year the United Kingdom had not been able to liberalize further. From 1 August 1957 a wide range of raw materials, foodstuffs, chemicals and semi-manufactures had been placed on Open General Licence; although some of these were previously importable liberally this relieved importers of complying with licensing formalities; for other goods the effect was to give United Kingdom importers access to dollar sources of supply which had been partly or largely closed to them. The broad result was to remove such controls as remained on the import of the basic raw materials of industry.

15. The United Kingdom had also extended the £100 travel allowance to the dollar area.

16. Even if only a little progress had been made during the past year in removing restrictions, the United Kingdom had not gone back; they had sought to deal with their balance-of-payments problems by means other than quantitative restrictions. By adopting a firm credit policy and other internal monetary and fiscal measures they had sought to restrict the demand for imports, to stimulate exports, and thereby to improve their external financial position. The United Kingdom were determined to maintain the internal and external value of the £; the increase in the bank rate from 5 per cent to 7 per cent, and other measures announced, were evidence of that determination. When these measures had produced the desired results, further steps in the process of liberalization and in the reduction of discrimination could be expected.
The United Kingdom representative concluded by saying that he hoped his statement would show why it had not been possible to go further in the direction of liberalization, and by pointing out that the IMF's statement confirmed the United Kingdom's analysis and conclusions.

**Balance-of-Payments Situation and Prospects, and Alternative Measures to Restore Equilibrium**

17. Members of the Consultations Committee warmly complimented the United Kingdom representative on the very clear and informative statement he had made, and expressed appreciation of the fact that the United Kingdom Government had resorted to internal measures rather than to an extension or intensification of quantitative restrictions on imports.

In response to a question about internal measures taken, other than the raising of the bank rate, and about the results which might be expected from these measures, the United Kingdom representative referred (i) to the limitation placed on the expansion of investment, whereby it was virtually frozen at the 1956 level and (ii) to the decision to maintain bank advances at the 1956 level also. It was difficult to say how soon these measures would be effective, but what had been remarkable was the effect on the exchange rate. The results of the various measures taken were already beginning to be apparent.

18. Several members commented on the favourable current account position of the United Kingdom, and observed that the main problem seemed to have been the deterioration in the capital account and in monetary reserves. It would seem, especially to one member, that the favourable development in the current account provided a rational basis for further progress in the liberalization of imports. It was important, however, to note that the United Kingdom had not gone back on the liberalization policy developed over the past few years and had even made improvements. This clearly illustrated a liberal policy on the part of the United Kingdom Government and their determination to conform to the principles of the GATT and to observe their economic obligations to other countries.

19. One member noted the improvement in United Kingdom exports to the dollar area and elsewhere, and asked what were the various factors which might have a limiting effect on a further expansion of those exports - for example, prices and availability of resources. He inquired about the prospects for the future.
20. The United Kingdom representative said he believed his country's export prices were competitive, and that the internal measures recently taken to limit further price increases and to stabilize the £ would sharpen the United Kingdom's competitiveness; the measures taken to reduce inflation and home demand would release resources in such a way as to enable the United Kingdom to avail themselves further of export opportunities. Concerning future prospects, they were moderately optimistic, and on forecasts based on current trends, would expect a rather larger current account surplus in 1957/58 compared with 1956/57. In regard to the dollar area they were beginning to profit from the consistent efforts which had been made to develop markets there. Even quite small exporters were beginning to realize the opportunities available, and to take advantage of them, despite the initial difficulties and costs associated with developing a new market. It was gratifying to observe that imports to the dollar area had risen and were continuing to rise - but there were many signs which caused some apprehension - certain developments in the large creditor countries, and deflationary policies being adopted, and the re-introduction of quantitative restrictions in some areas. There was considerable uncertainty in various quarters about the level of business activity likely to be maintained in the United States and Canada. United Kingdom forecasts were necessarily based on the continuance of current trends; if further restrictions and deflationary policies were introduced elsewhere, the forecasts might prove to be quite incorrect.

21. One member, referring to the expected improvement in the United Kingdom's export position, inquired whether the improvement would be in the current trade balance, and made some observations about the possible effects on the sterling area as a whole of a decline in prices of raw materials. The United Kingdom, as an important purchaser of raw materials, would benefit from such a fall in prices, and thus enjoy some improvement in their balance of payments. A decline of this sort would, however, affect the position of those sterling countries which were exporters of raw materials. Some of those countries had large programmes of economic development which might be affected by a deterioration of their own balance-of-payments position. He noted that the United Kingdom reserves were at about the same level in 1956/57 as in 1952 when the level of import liberalization was much lower. The United Kingdom could be congratulated
on this; he would like to know to what extent the current favourable position could be maintained, or improved. If the United Kingdom hoped as they did, for an improvement over the next year, would this improvement result from a better trade balance, from capital movements or from invisible transactions? The prospect of an improved trade balance seemed to him to depend on sustained or increasing demand in external markets and on the assumption that the demand, for example, from the U.S.A. would remain the same as previously or increase. He inquired whether the United Kingdom assessment of prospects had taken account of the requirements of capital development programmes in other countries of the sterling area.

22. The United Kingdom representative emphasized again the fact that the Chancellor of the Exchequer had told the IMF that, in expecting the current account balance to improve, his forecast had been based on existing trends; he had carefully judged the present and expected level of economic activity in Europe and the United States and had taken into account other relevant factors. The best the United Kingdom could expect to do was to make a fairly firm estimate for the current six months, and a rather sketchy one for the following six. On existing trends a rather large surplus was expected. Their estimate was for current account only; to obtain a complete picture the capital account would also have to be considered. The forecast concerning reserves was even more difficult than for the current account balance. He would not care to venture an opinion on the general effects of a fall or rise in prices of raw materials; they moved in different ways and the effects of some decreases might be cancelled out by other increases.

23. One member observed that the substantial increase in United Kingdom exports to the United States had displaced Australia as the United Kingdom’s largest overseas market and that the prospects for exports from primary producer countries did not seem particularly bright. He noted that in the United Kingdom there had been a rise in wages of about 6 per cent and a rise in prices of about 3 per cent between 1956 and 1957. He inquired whether the United Kingdom representative would care to make some comments about future prospects of coping with wage inflation in his country.
24. The United Kingdom representative stated that the Chancellor of the Exchequer had made the position clear about wage inflation; even if the process were a painful one, a brake must be put on the expansion of money incomes and on other inflationary tendencies.

25. One member asked to what extent the recent current trade surplus in the United Kingdom had been a result of an improvement in the terms of trade. He felt that, having regard to the trade surplus, the United Kingdom was not moving as rapidly as possible towards liberalization and was possibly over-investing. It was to be hoped that, as the United Kingdom's reserves recovered, priority would be given to dismantling restrictions. He also wondered whether the cost of reducing the remaining restrictions - and discrimination - was necessarily so great as had been imagined; in particular he inquired whether the elimination of discrimination against the dollar area would represent a high cost in the balance of payments or simply a shift in the pattern of imports and a release of local resources. He remarked that the money supply had been held down in recent years in the United Kingdom and asked what was the new element requiring the new measures; would they really bring about the results expected by the United Kingdom Government.

26. The United Kingdom representative said that, concerning the question on the terms of trade, in 1956 the average improvement was 2 per cent over 1955, that was 2 per cent of £2,500 million, or about £70 million; for the first half of 1957 the figures were not available but their impression was, with reservations, that there had been some further slight improvement. A serious estimate could not be made concerning the future.

He added that the relationship between monetary reserves and liabilities was clearly an important one. In the period from end-June 1956 to end-September 1956 reserves had deteriorated by £90 million; at the same time there had been a reduction in liabilities to all countries of £127 million. In the following six months reserves had increased by £88 million, and liabilities by £73 million, with a net result in favour of the United Kingdom.

Concerning priorities, there were difficulties associated with the capital account, the requirements of the other sterling countries being very great. The United Kingdom had not, however, given substantial priority to investment in the countries in question; they had progressively liberalized imports and further measures to this end would not be regarded as a low priority.
On the question raised about the cost of further liberalization measures, or of a reduction in discrimination the United Kingdom representative could not agree with the observations made by another member of the Committee. It was difficult to assess the strength of the suppressed demand for dollar goods, but it should be less than it had been two years previously. There was a strong latent consumer demand for such goods and the removal of all quantitative restrictions on dollar imports would have substantial internal repercussions. The risk could not be taken at that moment; the bulk of the restrictions applied to consumer goods, and the advantages to the economy of further liberalization would not be so great as they would be for machinery, tools and the like. He could not agree it would not cost the United Kingdom something if the restrictions were eliminated.

27. A member of the Committee said he feared that the rules of the GATT were in danger of being forgotten, and the GATT was accordingly becoming weaker; though most people believed that the Agreement could be made really effective. He pointed out that in the United Kingdom the trade balance had improved, yet, according to both the United Kingdom Government and the IMF, quantitative restrictions on imports could still be maintained. He wanted to know if this was because of investment and banker obligations. It seemed to him that the extra income had been used for investment; what was important was the balance-of-payments position as a whole. He wanted to know when measures which were in conflict with the GATT could be eliminated. He did not wish to infer that the United Kingdom was at fault in relation to the GATT, but the Agreement seemed to enable a position to be taken under Article XII which was not consistent with the economic facts. Even when the balance of payments had improved Article XII was still invoked.

28. The United Kingdom representative stated he appreciated the fact that this point was a general one; his country's record had been good and they did not put banking and investment functions first; as the balance of payments improved quantitative restrictions had been reduced. The United Kingdom were not trying to finance investment and development at the expense of their GATT obligations. He pointed out that the real criterion under Article XII was the level of reserves, and it was permissible to use quantitative restrictions on imports to safeguard and to forestall a decline in those reserves. The IMF had confirmed that the measures taken were not in excess of those necessary.
29. A member of the Committee expressed the opinion, related to a point made by another member, that as the level of reserves was now the same as in 1952 when import restrictions had been much more severe, this indicated that the fear of removing or further reducing restrictions was probably greater than necessary; that the danger in liberalizing imports was not really so great as was thought. He referred to the IMF statement (in Document QR.17 para.5) that particular emphasis must be given to policies designed to restrain the rise in costs and to improve productivity in order to encourage a further expansion of exports. He asked if the United Kingdom representative could give further information on the progress made and the programme for improving productivity. He felt there must also be a policy allowing flexibility in the use of internal resources, and inquired whether the necessary transfers were taking place smoothly, or creating problems for the United Kingdom.

30. The United Kingdom representative said in reference to the comparison of the reserve and import restriction positions respectively in 1952 and 1957, that his Government had taken considerable risks, and that deductions should not be drawn from the comparison made, about what could be done in the future. Concerning the progress in productivity, and the programme, he said that the dis-inflationary measures had caused a certain amount of part-time employment; the index of production between 1952 and 1957 had remained fairly stable. The United Kingdom had undertaken a large programme of investment since the war and the potential increase in production, and in exports, was considerable. With the reduction in defence expenditure and in the demand for defence materials, the stage was set for a substantial shift of productive resources enabling the United Kingdom to take advantage of opportunities for an increase in exports. This change-over was taking place smoothly.

31. One member pointed out that the reserves of the United Kingdom were, in effect, the reserves of the whole sterling area and stressed the importance of the United Kingdom's role as investor and banker. His own country, in its import policy, did not distinguish between sterling and other soft currency areas, but this non-discriminatory policy was not always entirely reciprocated. He added that investment abroad by the United Kingdom made possible a higher level of economic development in other sterling area countries and elsewhere, a higher level of trade, and a reduction in discrimination. He hoped the United Kingdom would keep fully in mind the value of such investment, when they were considering the question of reducing quantitative restrictions on imports.
32. A member, speaking of the increase in the bank rate from 5 per cent to 7 per cent, asked how the United Kingdom regarded this change from the longer-term viewpoint, and how it would affect the propensity to import and the propensity to invest.

33. The United Kingdom representative stated that no government of his country could view with equanimity the perpetuation of a 7 per cent bank rate: the Chancellor of the Exchequer had said, in announcing the new rate, that the increase was made necessary because of speculative pressure against sterling. The increase would, of course, have its effect on the general level of interest rates and longer-term effects in reducing the level of investment, as indeed had been intended.

System and Methods of the Restrictions and Effects on Trade

34. Clarification was sought by a member of the Committee concerning the legal basis of the United Kingdom's import restrictions. If it were so that the importation of all goods was legally prohibited, was it in accordance with the letter and spirit of the basic legislation that the importation of all goods could be liberalized by placing them on Open General Licence or by other means?

35. The United Kingdom representative pointed out that this question was related to the structure of powers to deal with imports, and to his country's particular form of legislation. The basic legislation (the Import, Export and Customs (Defence) Act 1939) gave the Board of Trade certain powers to prohibit or regulate, by Order, the importation of all goods into the United Kingdom. The Board of Trade had issued the Import of Goods (Control) Order 1954 which states in Article 2 that "subject to the provisions of this Order all goods are prohibited to be imported into the United Kingdom". Article 2 of the Order continued to say that "Nothing in Article 1 hereof shall be taken to prohibit the importation of any goods under the authority of any licence granted by the Board of Trade under this Article and in accordance with any condition attached thereto".

The general basis of the system of control was that there should be no imports except as authorized by the Board of Trade. There was nothing in the Act which prevented complete liberalization ultimately. There was, of course, some legislation which was concerned with the prohibition of certain goods for health or similar reasons.
36. One member referred to the statement in the secretariat's basic document (English version, page 20, para.2) that: "In agreeing bilateral quotas for items in which several countries have an interest, care is taken not to give favourable treatment to a particular country at the expense of others." He would like to hear an elaboration of this point. His country did not grant individual quotas to particular countries because this created considerable difficulties in developing freer trade. He asked what treatment would be given to newcomers trying to break into the market, and how a "fair share of the trade" would be determined in these circumstances. He also inquired about the licensing treatment accorded to members of the Relaxation Countries outside OEEC; was his understanding correct that those countries received exactly the same treatment as members of OEEC.

37. The United Kingdom representative explained that the volume of trade covered by bilateral quotas was very small - about 2½ per cent of their total trade and consequently the problem was one of relatively little importance; existing bilateral quotas were of fairly long standing, and as the balance of payments improved, they had been increased; as a result many quotas had reached a position in which licences were granted liberally. The United Kingdom, as far as possible, had regard to the traditional trade interests of the countries concerned. In regard to newcomers, the United Kingdom were prepared to consider their requests and to establish new quotas. Care was always taken to ensure that third countries interested in the trade could, as far as possible, be given corresponding quotas, so that discrimination would be avoided. Their experience was that complaints on this score were not at all substantial.

Concerning the possible distinction in treatment accorded OEEC countries and other Relaxation Countries respectively, the United Kingdom representative assured the Committee that no such distinction existed; global quotas and imports on Open General Licence applied equally to OEEC and to the rest of the Relaxation Countries.

38. A member called the attention of the Committee to paragraph 3, page 5 of the basic document where it was stated that; "Most of the goods for which the United Kingdom grants limited import quotas (to Eastern European countries) in return are goods which are admitted freely from OEEC countries; the quotas do not represent discrimination in favour of the countries in Eastern Europe." He inquired whether similar quotas were, or could be, extended to other countries, and to those of the dollar area in particular, in order to help reduce discrimination.
39. The United Kingdom representative replied that they were prepared to accord similar quotas to non-OEEO Relaxation Countries; but they were unable to extend them to the dollar area.

40. Reference was made by some members of the Committee to the statement in the basic document (para. 1, page 12) that (from the dollar area) "Chemicals for the most part are not yet liberalized and are licensed only if there is no adequate alternative United Kingdom source of supply. Machinery is licensed only if there is no non-dollar alternative offering roughly similar advantages".

Considerable discussion ensued concerning the treatment of imports of chemicals and machinery, and reasons were requested in regard to the difference in this treatment. It was suggested that as United Kingdom production increased this would in effect constitute an intensification of restrictions or even an outright prohibition of such imports. The members raising these points stated they were at a loss to understand why quotas could not be established for some chemical products; they wondered to what extent commercial considerations were really taken into account in considering imports of these items from the dollar area. They inquired about the prospects for further liberalization of these items.

41. In reply to these points, the United Kingdom representative stated that the discrepancy between the respective criteria applied to the importation of machinery and of chemicals had now been eliminated - the same criteria applied to dollar machinery and chemicals - that was: "no adequate alternative United Kingdom source of supply". The prospects for further liberalization of these items depended on the balance-of-payments position. The United Kingdom would not allow a substantial price differential to develop behind the import restrictions applied; if home production became too costly licences would be given for imports from the dollar area. The main difficulties in the way of establishing quotas for chemicals were technical ones; there was an immense diversity of products under this general heading and it would be impossible to separate them into even reasonably homogeneous groups. The matter of price disparities was under constant attention in considering licensing criteria and the possibilities of further liberalization.

42. A member inquired whether the United Kingdom, in their import policy for machinery, anticipated the liberalization of particular items in this category from time to time, or would they feel it necessary to wait until conditions were such that the whole category could be liberalized.
43. The United Kingdom representative replied that a forecast on this could not be made; it would depend on circumstances, but the main objective was to keep up the momentum of liberalization. Perhaps some minor changes might be possible; perhaps all would go eventually on Open General Licence; forecasts at this time did not appear fruitful.

44. Members asked if the United Kingdom were thinking of applying a more liberal import regime and criteria to products other than chemicals and machinery. They emphasized the fact that, recognizing the United Kingdom balance-of-payments position, they would prefer, in the evolution of policy, to see a move towards putting more items on Open General Licence rather than the use of intermediate measures. There would be considerable advantages to the United Kingdom in adopting a more liberal licensing policy, including a reduction in costs, and beneficial results in buying from an open rather than a restricted market. It was thought in some quarters that the United Kingdom suffered a dollar burden by importing from certain non-dollar sources, so that the "dollar impact" did not come through imports from the dollar area only.

45. The United Kingdom representative made the following main points:
the United Kingdom objective is, as the balance-of-payments position warrants, to move towards placing items on Open General Licence, but the type of criteria to be applied in import and licensing policy (Open General Licence, quotas, etc.) can only be decided in the future. The United Kingdom is most anxious to keep up the momentum of liberalization and to take advantage of the various expected benefits of that policy mentioned by certain members; it should be clear from the record of the past year what the United Kingdom intentions are - as recently as 1 July 1957 his Government introduced further liberalization of imports of certain raw materials, even when the external financial position was a difficult one.

He pointed out that with an expansion of production in the United Kingdom, there would be an increase in consumption, and the picture was not so bad as it might appear; there was, he admitted, a risk in the degree of protection being received as a result of import restrictions, but the objective was to eliminate this as soon as the balance of payments permitted; the protective effects were not intentional, only incidental. What were restricted, in the main, were consumer goods, and liberalization of these imports would not have much effect on industrial costs.
46. In reply to a question about the general pattern of United Kingdom policy on the liberalization of items still under restriction, the United Kingdom representative stated that the first objective, now attained, was to remove all restrictions on imports of raw materials, the second, to liberalize completely machinery and chemicals and finally to liberalize consumer goods. That was the general policy as seen at present, though there might, of course, be occasional exceptions (for example the reduction of restrictions on imports of American whisky).

47. Some members, referring to consumer goods, thought that consideration might be given by the United Kingdom to the liberalization of particular items in which certain countries had a traditional interest (for example, canned fruits and canned fish from the dollar area); this would not involve a heavy strain on the United Kingdom balance of payments.

48. The United Kingdom representative replied that the liberalization of such consumer goods presented a political problem of presentation, insofar as the public would find it difficult to understand why the Government could afford imports of a non-essential character while imports of essential goods, such as machinery, chemicals and so on were still being restricted.

49. The members who raised this question pointed out that imports of the consumer goods under discussion were, however, permitted from other areas, and asked if the consumers were concerned about that. They argued that the reduction or elimination of this discriminatory treatment would not be a very big problem, either politically or in regard to the balance of payments. These members also stated that their interest was not confined only to consumer goods - they were very much interested in other items, especially where the effects on the balance of payments would appear to be negligible.

50. The United Kingdom representative stated that there were difficulties concerning the items which might be selected for liberalization and in determining which were likely to have negligible effects on the balance of payments. The points made would, however, be fully kept in mind when further liberalization became possible.

51. A member referred to footnote 2 on page 12 of the basic document and asked for information on the other quotas applicable to Cuba.

52. The reply was: rum, honey and lobsters.
53. Some members hoped, in regard to the token import scheme and the importation of minimum commercial quantities, that these, though welcome, should not be regarded as a substitute for liberalization. They also hoped that other or additional requests would be favourably considered on their merits.

54. Concerning the protective effects of restrictions on certain products, one member pointed out that the production of apples in the United Kingdom had doubled over the past few years.

55. One member observed that, in considering the list of goods the import of which from the Relaxation Countries remained restricted, it seemed to him that most of them could become the subject of a request for a hard-core waiver, if the United Kingdom were unable to invoke balance-of-payments difficulties. He would like to know how the United Kingdom intended to eliminate or to justify these restrictions when it could no longer do so under Article XII or other provisions of the GATT.

56. The United Kingdom representative said that depended on how far one could see ahead; he hoped they would be able to make substantial progress in the future. There were items on which they would have to invoke the hard-core waiver when the time came but the problem could not be tackled until then. They could not accept the idea that balance-of-payments restrictions would be maintained indefinitely and they would have to face up to the hard-core waiver in the not-too-distant future.

57. One member stated that the agricultural protectionist policy of the United Kingdom, despite the recent suppression of a subsidy on egg production, had seriously damaged his own country's trade. He felt that the attention and action of the CONTRACTING PARTIES should be concentrated not only on restrictions under Article XII but directed towards the elimination of all barriers impeding international trade, especially in agricultural products.

58. Members expressed their gratification concerning the progress made towards liberalization by the United Kingdom, despite recent difficulties, and welcomed the re-affirmation of a policy directed to that end. They expressed appreciation of the valuable information and co-operation given by the United Kingdom delegation during the consultation, and expressed the hope that the various suggestions made would in due course lead to further measures designed to reduce import restrictions and discrimination.

59. The United Kingdom representative stated, in turn, that his delegation appreciated the fairness, consideration and patience shown by the Committee and the Chairman.
ANNEX I

Opening statement by the United Kingdom Representative

Last year the United Kingdom consulted with the CONTRACTING PARTIES under Article XIV:1 (g) about the continuation of discrimination. I then explained why in practice discrimination could only be further reduced by liberalization of imports. I also explained that although we had made some minor easements the state of our gold and dollar reserves had prevented us from making any substantial liberalization of imports during the year, and so from making any great progress in reducing discrimination.

2. This year we are consulting not only under Article XIV:1 (g) about the discriminatory aspects of our import restrictions, but also under Article XIV:4 (b) about the restrictions themselves. Since, as I have explained, the difficulty in reducing discrimination has been the difficulty in liberalizing the restrictions themselves, it is appropriate that I should take up the argument from the point which was reached last year, even though this year's consultations go wider than last year's.

3. The United Kingdom's surplus on current account in the first half of 1956 was substantial - it turned out to be £154 million. But as I explained, the second half of the year is seasonally unfavourable and continuance of a surplus of that magnitude was not to be anticipated. Moreover, the unfolding of events in the Middle East needed to be watched. Events proved caution to have been justified. Indeed matters turned out to be very much worse than we had feared. There were substantial speculative movements against sterling in November and December 1956, and at the end of the year we were obliged to make a drawing and obtain a large standby from the IMF and to arrange a substantial line of credit with the Export-Import Bank. This calling up of our second line of reserve was effective and the drain on sterling ceased.

4. The effects on the United Kingdom's economy of the disturbances to trade due to the closure of the Suez Canal, and of other events in the Middle East turned out to be less serious than we had anticipated and in spite of the necessity to obtain large quantities of oil from the Western hemisphere we had a surplus on current account of £86 million in the second half
of 1956, followed by a further surplus of £125 million in the first
half of 1957. A surplus of over £200 million in a year such as this
was no mean achievement. Moreover, looking forward, as the Chancellor
of the Exchequer said in his speech to the International Monetary Fund,
the trends in our economy suggest that we shall have a still bigger
surplus in the twelve months ending June 1958. Unfortunately, as I
shall explain, even this is not enough.

5. The Committee have doubtless studied the very excellent background
papers provided by the IMF. I have also circulated a statement which
elaborates a little on the information contained in those papers and
incorporates some figures which were not available when these papers
were written. It shows the current account balances of the United
Kingdom by regions for the years 1952 to 1956, and for the first half of
1957. The Committee will remember the disturbances caused by the Korean
War. They caused a sharp deterioration in our balance of payments and we
were obliged in 1951-52 to re-introduce fairly widespread quantitative
restrictions on imports. Subsequently the position improved and, as the
statement shows, in no less than four of the five following years we had
a surplus on current account. The average surplus was £160 million a year.

6. Pari passu with this improvement in our position we liberalized our
imports. From the basic documents which we have submitted to the CONTRACTING
PARTIES you will see that our liberalization percentage for CEEC countries
and their possessions, which had fallen to 44 per cent in February 1953,
rose until it had reached 80 per cent in November 1953, 84 per cent in
December 1954 and 93 per cent in August 1956. This was rather more than the
percentage of 90 per cent which we were committed to in CEEC. The position
for the other countries to whom we accord similar treatment is broadly
the same.

7. Comparable figures are not available for the dollar countries. The
earliest CEEC figures for them relate to 1954, and as the basic document
states, the percentage of the United Kingdom imports liberalized in the
United States and Canada - on the basis of 1953 trade - rose from 50 per
cent in June 1954 to 59 per cent in August 1956.

8. Even if the pace of liberalization slowed down considerably towards the
end, the record of these five years was nevertheless one of continuing
progress.
9. The question which doubtless springs to the minds of the Committee is why, given this apparently satisfactory current account record we have not yet succeeded in removing all our restrictions. The answer lies, of course, in the state of our gold and dollar reserves. At the end of 1952 they amounted to £1,846 million. Four years later at the end of 1956, but for our IMF drawing of £561 million, they would have been even lower. In actual fact they stood at £2,133 million. They rose slowly in the first half of 1957 to £2,281 million. Subsequently, widespread speculation on the exchanges caused a heavy drain and by the end of September reserves had declined again to £1,850 million. Moreover, the EPU deficit in September amounted to £62 million and of this three quarters has to be settled in dollars in October. As the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced in Washington, we shall be drawing on the Export-Import Bank line of credit in the coming weeks.

10. Why have our surpluses on current account not been reflected in increases in our gold and dollar reserves? The answer is complex but is to be found in the triple role played by the United Kingdom in world trade and commerce. The United Kingdom is at the same time trader, investor and banker.

11. Besides being one of the world's greatest trading nations the United Kingdom normally invests large sums abroad each year. Overseas countries also invest in the United Kingdom. Such flows of long-term capital are as much part of our "commercial" affairs as the payments and receipts for imports, exports and services and property income which appear in the current account. Transactions of this kind used up the whole of our current surplus in 1956/57 and some £90 million besides. Therefore we must earn a current surplus sufficient to cover these operations and commitments (which now include the repayment of the drawing from the IMF and the Export-Import Bank) and to build up sufficient reserves to enable us properly to fulfill our third role - that of international banker.

12. It is mainly in this role that we have encountered difficulties during the past year. Sterling is widely held throughout the world. It is used to finance a large proportion, probably anything up to half, of international trade and payments. As a banker we must expect to meet withdrawals when
they come. The bulk of our sterling liabilities are held by sterling area countries and treated as normal currency reserves to cover fluctuations in their balance of payments. Some of these countries, however, hold balances in excess of their normal requirements and draw them down to finance their economic development. In doing so they impose, of course, a claim on our resources. Over the past year we have also had to meet reductions in the sterling holdings of non-sterling countries. More recently there has been speculation on the exchanges which has fallen especially heavily on sterling precisely because it is a widely used international currency. Finally, the gold and dollar reserves of the United Kingdom are naturally affected by the current account balances of sterling area countries who hold their reserves in sterling and the settlement of whose accounts outside the area in sterling naturally falls on the reserves.

13. It was the combined and continuing effects of these forces which led to a fall in the gold and dollar reserves of £90 million (or $252 million) in the second half of 1956 and despite the IMF drawing this loss was nearly but not in fact quite balanced by the rise in the ensuing six months which was in turn more than wiped out by the losses of the last three months,

14. Against this background the Committee will have little difficulty, I hope, in appreciating why during the last year we have been able to go no further along the path of liberalization than is described in the basic document. From 1 August 1957, a wide range of raw materials, foodstuffs, chemicals and semi-manufactures were placed on world open general licence. The import of some of these goods had already been licensed more or less freely in practice and in such cases the main effect of the change was to relieve traders of the paper work of complying with import licensing formalities. For other goods, however, the effect was to give United Kingdom importers access to dollar sources of supply which had previously been partly or largely closed to them. Imports of some commodities are expected to increase because of the change. The broad result of the change (the importance of which should not be exaggerated) was to remove such controls as remained on the import of the basic raw materials of industry; United Kingdom manufacturers can now buy freely from whatever sources suit them best, irrespective of currency considerations.
15. Although this Committee is not concerned with invisible imports, I feel I should mention that we also extended the £100 travel allowance to the dollar area.

16. Thus, even if we have not made much progress in the last year in the removal of restrictions, we have not gone back; we have sought to deal with our balance of payments problems by means other than the use of quantitative restrictions. By a firm credit policy and by other internal monetary and fiscal measures we have sought to restrict the demand for imports, to stimulate exports and thereby to improve our external position. As the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced on 19 September, the United Kingdom are determined to maintain the internal and external value of the £. The increase in the Bank rate from 5 per cent to 7 per cent and the other measures announced by the Chancellor on that date are evidence of this determination. When these measures have shown results in the strengthening of our position and in current account surpluses of sufficient magnitude to cover our commitments and build up our reserves, further steps in the process of liberalization and of the reduction of discrimination can be expected. The Committee can rest assured, as I said last year, that we shall move forward more rapidly as soon as our balance of payments permits.
### ANNEX II

#### REGIONAL CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1952</th>
<th>1953</th>
<th>1954</th>
<th>1955</th>
<th>1st half</th>
<th>2nd half</th>
<th>1957 1st half</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>£ m</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DOLLAR AREA</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports and re-exports f.o.b.</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>495</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports f.o.b.</td>
<td>-606</td>
<td>-517</td>
<td>-556</td>
<td>-732</td>
<td>-352</td>
<td>-409</td>
<td>-412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>-121</td>
<td>-53</td>
<td>-11</td>
<td>-37</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>-12</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Transactions</td>
<td>+23</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Balance</td>
<td>-294</td>
<td>-106</td>
<td>-122</td>
<td>-252</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>-99</td>
<td>-50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence Aid net of counterpart</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Balance incl. Aid</td>
<td>-173</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>-72</td>
<td>-206</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>-85</td>
<td>-32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EEC AREA</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports and re-exports f.o.b.</td>
<td>729</td>
<td>757</td>
<td>788</td>
<td>828</td>
<td>455</td>
<td>486</td>
<td>518</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports f.o.b.</td>
<td>-738</td>
<td>-678</td>
<td>-760</td>
<td>-877</td>
<td>-458</td>
<td>-454</td>
<td>-437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Balance</td>
<td>-9</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>-49</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>-7</td>
<td>-41</td>
<td>-43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Transactions</td>
<td>-27</td>
<td>-29</td>
<td>-29</td>
<td>-32</td>
<td>-20</td>
<td>-20</td>
<td>-22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Balance</td>
<td>-31</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>-47</td>
<td>-30</td>
<td>-29</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>OTHER NON-STERLING AREAS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports and re-exports f.o.b.</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports f.o.b.</td>
<td>-359</td>
<td>-367</td>
<td>-361</td>
<td>-410</td>
<td>-212</td>
<td>-209</td>
<td>-203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Balance</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-105</td>
<td>-85</td>
<td>-70</td>
<td>-15</td>
<td>-15</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>+42</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Balance</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>-51</td>
<td>-20</td>
<td>-47</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CURRENT NON-STERLING BALANCE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incl. Aid</td>
<td>-116</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>-52</td>
<td>-300</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>-94</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>REST OF STERLING AREA</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports and re-exports f.o.b.</td>
<td>1,325</td>
<td>1,209</td>
<td>1,333</td>
<td>1,407</td>
<td>736</td>
<td>714</td>
<td>723</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports f.o.b.</td>
<td>-1,241</td>
<td>-1,326</td>
<td>-1,329</td>
<td>-1,407</td>
<td>-712</td>
<td>-657</td>
<td>-749</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Balance</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>-117</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>-26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>383</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Balance</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL CURRENT BALANCE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excl. Aid</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incl. Aid</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Debit.
2. Including debits of -6, -14, -11, -8, -5, -3 and -7 to Government Transactions with non-territorial organizations.