1. The following notes indicate briefly the different ways in which GATT countries who conduct their trade through private enterprise are protected in their trade with each other by the provisions of the General Agreement. Given the GATT as devised in the light of the circumstances of a country in which trade is in fact conducted largely by private enterprise, the problem is to ensure, firstly, that the existing contracting parties receive from the Polish Government commitments equivalent to those which that Government would receive on accession to the GATT, and, secondly, that information can be made available to enable existing contracting parties to satisfy individual traders in their countries that treatment equivalent to that accorded to Polish goods is being accorded by Poland to their trade. It is with these considerations in mind that the CONTRACTING PARTIES invite the Polish Government to reply to the questions that follow later in this document.

2. Most-favoured-nation Treatment. Apart from two qualifications, countries afford full most-favoured-nation treatment in all matters (customs duties and other charges) to imports from and exports to all other member countries. The two qualifications permit (a) the continuation of tariff preferences in existence when the General Agreement was concluded, and (b) the establishment of customs unions or free trade areas under which the participating countries allow imports from one another to enter free of duties or restrictions.

3. Import Controls. These are forbidden except for balance-of-payments reasons or certain other narrowly defined purposes. If a country is not in balance-of-payments difficulties and uses quantitative restrictions which are not justified for any of these other reasons it can be challenged and the CONTRACTING PARTIES may authorize retaliation by any country adversely affected. A country applying quantitative restrictions for balance-of-payments reasons is free to decide the goods on which the burden of these restrictions is to fall, but has to consult with the CONTRACTING PARTIES every year or every second year and may be called upon to modify its restrictions. Discrimination, except on payments grounds, between imports from different countries is also forbidden. Changes in quantitative restrictions are notified to the GATT, and an exporter in one member country knows when negotiating sales in another within what limits import licences are likely to be issued.

4. Tariffs. While the tariff is regarded as a legitimate means of protection the GATT looks toward the stabilization and reduction of tariffs. In four successive rounds of negotiations in the GATT, tariffs on individual items have been "bound" against increase, and before binding many of these tariffs were reduced from their former levels. Tariff bindings are normally negotiated by reference to a known volume of past trade (so that equivalent concessions can be exchanged) but, once negotiated, any goods on which a bound rate of duty is paid are free to enter the country levying it (subject only to the limited use of quantitative restrictions referred to above). Tariff
commitments can be modified or withdrawn only in accordance with strictly
defined procedures and, though negotiated bilaterally with the principal
supplying countries, they apply to imports from all sources. Countries are,
in theory, free to put unlimited duties on items on which they have not bound
the tariffs, but in practice it is customary to allow some trade in these items.

5. National treatment on internal taxation and regulations. Internal taxes
and regulations cannot in general be used in such a way as to favour domestic
production at the expense of imports, i.e., they must be applied non-
discriminatorily to domestic products and to imports of corresponding goods.

6. Production subsidies. These are not forbidden, but if they operate
either directly or indirectly to increase exports or reduce imports
information about them must be supplied to the GATT by the country applying
them. Such a country may be called on to consult with the CONTRACTING PARTIES
about the possibility of limiting any subsidy which causes or threatens serious
prejudice to the interests of another contracting party.

7. Export Subsidies. Those are in principle condemned and countries are:

   (a) expected not to introduce a new or to extend any existing
       subsidy on industrial products; and

   (b) exhorted to avoid as far as possible subsidizing exports of
       primary products and, where this cannot be avoided, required
       to avoid doing it in a way which gives them more than a fair
       share of the world trade in the product concerned.

8. Dumping. This is condemned if it causes material injury to an estab­
lished industry or materially retards the establishment of a new domestic
industry. The test of dumping is that the export price is either:

   (a) less than the comparable domestic price, or

   (b) in the absence of such domestic price, less than either the
       highest comparable price charged in any third country or the
       cost of production in the country of origin plus a reasonable
       mark-up.

Where dumping causes or threatens material injury, the country affected is
entitled to levy anti-dumping duties. It may also levy countervailing duties
in the case of subsidized exports.

9. Customs regulations. The Agreement contains a series of rules (covering
such matters as valuation for customs purposes, transit trade, fees and
formalities and publicity for trade regulations) designed to prevent the use
of customs regulations to put undue obstacles in the way of imports or as a
means of practising disguised protection or discrimination.

10. Conciliation procedures. Apart from special procedures referred to in
some of the previous paragraphs countries have a general right of consultation
and complaint and in certain circumstances they may be authorized to resort to
retaliatory measures where their interests have been damaged by the action of
other contracting parties.
QUESTIONNAIRE

A. QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE EXISTING FOREIGN TRADE REGIME

The State-Trading Corporations

1. Could the Polish Government furnish an English or French text of the basic laws, regulations and orders concerning the control of imports and exports (including the Law for the establishment of foreign trade Organizations, and any regulations or decrees relating to the structure and functions of the Organizations)?

2. Could the Polish Government furnish a description of the methods used in drawing up the import and export programmes, the content of the programmes (classified by, for instance, areas, countries, commodities, settlement currencies, etc.)? Has Poland a foreign exchange budget system for imports? What discretion which may be exercised by the foreign trade organizations under the programmes and what are their obligations?

3. What information would the Polish Government be prepared to supply to the CONTRACTING PARTIES about the purchases of its State-trading bodies or import monopolies to enable exporters to test

   (a) whether commercial considerations (e.g. price, quality, delivery dates, etc.) are the only ones influencing their purchases?

   (b) whether they discriminate, except on the basis of commercial considerations,

      (i) in favour of domestic suppliers as compared with exporters in the territories of the contracting parties;

      (ii) in favour of suppliers in countries outside the GATT at the expense of suppliers in the territories of the contracting parties; or

      (iii) between contracting parties?

How would the Polish Government propose to overcome the difficulty that with respect to many kinds of goods differences of quality cannot be tested in detail?
4. How can the contracting parties be sure that the Ministry of Foreign Trade will not intervene to persuade the State trading bodies or import monopolies to direct trade in a discriminatory manner in order to fulfil import or export quotas foreseen in trade treaties?

Bilateral Trade Agreements and Relations with Eastern Countries

5. Would the Polish Government furnish details of its long-term commitments with all countries, including prices, terms, credits, etc.?

6. Would Poland be prepared to supply detailed information regarding her obligations within the framework of the Council for Mutual Economic Aid and the possible effect of such obligations on Poland's commercial relations with the contracting parties?

7. The Polish Government seems to have made certain reservations as regards trade with some of the countries with which it has concluded bilateral agreements. It would be of interest to know whether such agreements, other than those concluded with Eastern European countries, are covered by these reservations.

8. What preferential arrangements does Poland have with the USSR and other Eastern countries?

9. What is the method of settling accounts inside the Rouble bloc? (Is there a system of multilateral settlement).

10. How do Poland's clearing arrangements with Eastern European countries affect Poland's trade with other countries?

Methods of Payment for Trade with Western Countries

11. What is the method of settling accounts with countries outside the Rouble bloc? Is a clearing system applied, and if so what is the basic form of that system.

12. If a standard method of settlement by currencies is applied, what are the characteristics of that method.
13. With which countries has Poland already established multilateral payments arrangements?

The Pricing System

14. Could the Polish Government give examples of the import and export prices of major items entering international trade as compared with their domestic prices?

15. On exports what is the relationship between the export price and the cost of production? Can costs be proved from the accounting system?

16. What are the principles underlying the pricing of imported goods when sold in domestic markets? What types of mark-up are used?

17. How is the difference between the import price and the domestic selling price disposed of? Is it regarded as a tax or is it considered to be a profit? Are receipts accounted for in the budget?

18. Can Poland give, for a recent year, an account of the profits made in connection with trade by its foreign trade Organizations, and can it supply the regulations under which such accounting is done?

19. Does the pricing system enable the extent of protection to local production to be determined? Will relevant information be available to CONTRACTING PARTIES?

20. Are goods imported from Western countries and those from Eastern countries priced by the same method for sale in domestic markets?

Statistics of Trade

21. What statistics of foreign trade can be made available to the contracting parties?

22. How are the statistics prepared? And how are trade values computed. How are the values of trade with the Rouble bloc and with Western countries adjusted?
Plans for Expansion of Trade

23. In what commodities and to what extent does Poland plan to expand its trade with contracting parties?

24. In which cases - with respect to countries and commodities - do formal obstacles to Polish export exist of such a kind that adhesion to the GATT could lead to their elimination? To what extent are Polish exports considered to be suffering from such obstacles?

B. FUTURE IMPORT TRADE

The General Principle of Equality of Treatment

25. In what respect and by what means can the Polish Government assure contracting parties that Poland would accord their imports treatment no less favourable than that accorded to imports from other countries?

26. Can the Polish Government give an undertaking that State-trading enterprises and trading monopolies would conduct their foreign operations in a non-discriminatory way, as required by Article XVII? How could the observance of such an undertaking be tested in practice?

27. How could Poland reconcile its bilateral arrangements to receive certain commodities from certain countries with a non-discriminatory policy toward contracting parties?

28. Would Poland seek to terminate existing bilateral trade and payments agreements with contracting parties?

29. Can an assurance be given that Poland’s import trade would not be tied to the value of the export trade with individual countries?

30. In which way and to what extent would the Polish Government extend multilateralization of payments?

The Proposed Global Quotas

31. The Polish Government has indicated that, pending the introduction of a tariff, "global import quotas" might be granted (in payment of the entrance fee required of all countries on accession in return for the tariff concessions received of right by the acceding country) in respect of traditional imports
of particular interest to other contracting parties. The CONTRACTING PARTIES will wish to be assured that such global import quotas represent genuine opportunities for selling. Will the establishment of a global import quota represent:

(a) an undertaking to buy from contracting parties goods up to the amount of the quota, or

(b) merely permission to import up to the amount of the quota if sales can be negotiated?

32. According to what principles would the total value of Poland's global purchase commitments and the amounts of the quotas for individual products be determined?

33. Can the Polish Government indicate which products would be covered by the proposed global import quotas and give some examples of the level of trade contemplated?

34. For what reasons does the Polish Government wish to limit global quotas to traditional imports? What criteria are to be used in determining whether a particular importation is "traditional"?

35. On the assumption that a global import quota will represent an undertaking to buy goods up to the amount of the quota (see 31(a) above), does the reference to "traditional" imports mean that the range of products for which global import quotas are opened will not be such as to allow scope for the development of imports of products which Poland has not hitherto imported from contracting parties?

36. Is it proposed that quotas should be opened for a volume of trade roughly equal to the Polish export trade which will be affected by the tariff concessions (including bindings of existing tariffs) which Poland will be entitled to enjoy on accession to the GATT?

37. Would the Polish Government give a guarantee that only contracting parties would benefit from global quotas?

38. Would the global quotas be greater for each product than the total of the quotas at present granted to contracting parties under bilateral arrangements? (Ref: the OEEC rule that global quotas should be 10 per cent above previous imports.)
39. What relationship would there be between global quotas and quotas granted to individual contracting parties under bilateral agreements? Is it the intention to place on a multilateral basis those quotas which already exist under bilateral agreements?

40. Tariff concessions, although negotiated by reference to a specific volume of trade, naturally become more valuable to exporting countries as imports of the items concerned increase. Is it contemplated that the global import quotas will be increased as domestic consumption of the items covered increases so as to maintain a position for imports which is comparatively no less favourable than at the date of negotiation?

41. How could the establishment of global quotas be reconciled with the requirements (in Article XVII of the General Agreement) regarding the liberal operation of State monopolies with respect to external trade?

42. Does the proposed establishment of global quotas constitute a practical guarantee that State-controlled foreign trade would, in accordance with Article XVII, be operated on a multilateral basis, or would it be an additional measure intended to complement a system of liberal operation of foreign trade monopolies?

43. What commitment would the Polish Government be willing to make about giving concessions on agricultural as well as non-agricultural items in a non-discriminatory manner?

Non-discriminatory Application of Quotas

44. In the administration of the quotas how does the Polish Government intend to ensure non-discrimination as between contracting parties? Will quotas be allocated among suppliers? If so, on what basis?

45. How would the global purchase commitment be enforced with respect to each country's exports to Poland and what special procedures would be needed to measure progress in living up to commitments?

46. Would existing bilateral commitments be maintained and, if so, how would this influence any allocation of quotas?

47. How would Poland ensure that countries with which there are no bilateral commitments will not be prejudiced in the allocation of quotas?
48. Could a system of tenders be used in order to ensure equitable purchases under global quotas? Would adequate opportunity be given to distant countries to compete? Would details of successful tenders be made promptly available?

49. Would Poland be able to honour its global purchase commitment to the contracting parties in the event that Poland's Eastern trading partners were to object that the commitment conflicts with Poland's undertakings to them?

**The Global Quotas and non-CONTRACTING PARTIES**

50. In granting global import quotas how does the Polish Government propose to demonstrate that there is no discrimination in favour of countries outside the GATT at the expense of contracting parties?

51. If global import quotas represent merely permission to import up to the amount of the quota, if sales can be negotiated, how, in deciding the size of global import quotas, will it be possible to ensure non-discrimination between contracting parties and other exporting countries?

52. Would the principle of non-discrimination between GATT and non-GATT countries govern the negotiation by Poland of bilateral commitments to non-GATT countries?

**Un-quota'ed Imports**

53. As noted in paragraph iv of the Preamble, countries are theoretically free to impose prohibitive duties on items in respect of which they have not bound duties, but in practice it is customary to allow trade to flow in these items too. What imports into Poland will be permitted of those goods which are not the subject of the global import quotas referred to above?

54. How would Poland arrange to acquire on a competitive, non-discriminatory basis commodities above and beyond its minimum global commitments?

55. What procedure would be used for allocating, in accordance with the GATT rules, any additional quotas granted bilaterally and over and above the global quotas, among interested supplying countries?

**Balance-of-Payments Import Restrictions**

56. What is Poland's balance-of-payments position at the present time?
57. How would Poland honour its global purchase commitment to the contracting parties in the event of its encountering: (1) overall balance-of-payments difficulty; (2) payments difficulty with respect to certain currency areas but not others; (3) bilateral balance-of-payments problems with some but not all members of the same currency areas?

58. Contracting parties have an obligation to increase quotas and ultimately remove controls altogether as their balance-of-payments permits. As Poland’s balance-of-payments improves would the range and volume of global import quotas granted as her entrance fee to the GATT be increased in the way that would be expected of a private enterprise economy in a similar balance-of-payments situation? If imports of other classes of goods are to be prohibited or severely restricted and the Polish Government are free to exclude then at their discretion, how would they reconcile such a system of quotas limited to certain classes of goods, all other goods being liable to total exclusion or severe restrictions on imports, with the general ban on import restrictions which applies to contracting parties with private enterprise economies?

59. Is it intended that the amounts of the global import quotas should represent a permanent ceiling to permitted imports of those goods which will be from time to time subject to limitation in circumstances in which existing contracting parties are entitled to restrict imports for balance-of-payments reasons under Article XII?

60. How will other contracting parties be able to test whether the volume and range of imports effectively permitted by the Polish Government is as great as its balance-of-payments position justifies, i.e. whether the level of import restrictions applied by Poland is (a) generally or (b) as it affects specific items in excess of what is justified under Article XII for balance-of-payments reasons? Will Poland be prepared to consult annually with the CONTRACTING PARTIES about her balance-of-payments restrictions in common with other contracting parties operating under Article XII, and what types of statistical and other information will she be willing to supply to enable them in those consultations to make the test just referred to? Will Poland be willing to accept recommendations under Article XII from other contracting parties in the course of consultations for the modification of particular quota arrangements?
Membership in the International Monetary Fund
and Exchange Matters

61. Does Poland contemplate seeking membership of the International Monetary Fund? If she does not become a member, will she be prepared to enter into a special exchange agreement with the CONTRACTING PARTIES providing that the objectives of the GATT shall not be frustrated as a result of action in exchange matters by the Polish Government, as is required of any contracting party which is not also a member of the International Monetary Fund?

62. Would the Polish Government give an assurance that it will apply exchange rates which approximate to the free rates?
The proposed Customs Tariff

63. For what purpose, in view of the fact that imports are now reserved to a State monopoly, does the Polish Government intend to introduce a customs tariff in the near future?

64. Would Poland agree to introduce its tariff on certain commodities at the time of accession, at the same time undertaking (1) to bind these duties against increase and (2) to import annually certain minimum quantities of these commodities from the interested contracting parties?

65. The Polish authorities (in Spec/139/58) have expressed the opinion "that Poland with the concurrence of the countries concerned should be able to substitute ordinary tariff concessions for certain agreed quantitative commitments as soon as the customs tariff has entered into force". It is contemplated that when the tariff comes into force it will be the only barrier between the exporter in a foreign country and the Polish consumer, who will be able to buy without the intervention of any state organization or importing monopoly? If so, when is it contemplated that the tariff will be sufficiently established for the Polish Government to substitute tariff concessions for any quantitative or other commitments which might have been agreed as an "entrance fee" on accession as equivalent concessions?

66. If, after the establishment of the customs tariff, State-trading bodies or importing monopolies will still intervene between the exporter and the consumer, what advantage is it suggested that the substitution of tariff concessions for other equivalent concessions will have for the foreign exporter?

67. If, following the introduction of the tariff, contracting parties nevertheless prefer the continuation of any system of quantitative or other equivalent commitments which might have been agreed on accession, would the Polish Government be willing to maintain such a system indefinitely?

68. Would the Polish Government be prepared to give an undertaking at the present time that it will without delay submit any customs tariff that may be drawn up in the future to the GATT tariff negotiation procedure, so that tariff negotiations may be initiated.
69. Would the Polish Government be prepared to enter into tariff negotiations on the basis of such a new customs tariff in draft form - i.e. before it is brought into force under the constitutional procedures?

70. Is Poland prepared to undertake commitments as to the maximum level of duties on individual items prior to the general introduction of tariff so that a schedule can be established for Poland prior to accession?

71. When the tariff is introduced will the duties be specific or ad valorem? In so far as they are ad valorem on what basis is it contemplated that the goods will be valued for the purpose of calculating duty? What assurance will exporters have that the valuation will be related to prices outside Poland? If the valuation is related to such prices what rate of exchange will be used to convert the prices into Polish currency?

Sale of Imported Goods

72. What "reforms" are contemplated in administrative procedures with respect to internal pricing? (Vide: April 22 statement of Vice Minister of Foreign Trade.) Would the new pricing system measure costs of production?

73. How would the effect of the future customs tariff differ from that of the present internal pricing system, as far as setting a domestic price is concerned?

74. In their dealings with each other contracting parties with private enterprise economies are able to test whether the opening of quotas means genuine opportunities for selling and whether these are limited only by questions of competitiveness, because the only interference between traders in different countries is by government regulations which must be notified to the CONTRACTING PARTIES if they affect international dealings between traders. If a global import quota would represent merely permission to import up to the amount provided for if sales could be negotiated (as in 3 (b) above) and not an undertaking to buy without qualification, would the Polish Government be willing to give undertakings about the maximum mark-up to be applied to imports of goods admitted under such quotas (in accordance with Article II, paragraph 4)? For example, would they be prepared to adopt the method followed by France in
For example, would they be prepared to adopt the method followed by France in the 1947 tariff negotiations in respect of imports of cigarettes by the French State Monopoly and undertake to maintain a specific ratio between the prices of imported goods and the corresponding domestic items, or a maximum percentage mark-up on imported goods? If not, what other form of undertaking can they suggest which would guarantee exporters in other countries that goods they sought to sell within the global quota were not subjected to price discrimination on entry into Poland?

75. Could the Polish Government undertake that the sales price on the Polish market of each commodity imported from the contracting parties would not exceed the f.o.b. landed cost of the commodity by more than a specified percentage?

76. Where the same commodity is imported from several countries, would the commodity be sold in Poland at the same price or at prices reflecting the differences in landed cost into Poland?
77. Would exporters in other contracting parties be free to advertise their products and make known their goods (e.g. by means of samples) to the Polish public? What steps would the Polish Government take to see that these were not, as a result of the special price mechanism, sold at prices on the domestic market which would discourage demand?

78. The Vice-Minister for Foreign Trade stated that in attempting to compare prices of imported and domestic goods in Poland it was inadvisable to take the import price expressed in foreign currency and to convert this by reference to the official exchange rate because of the special considerations involved in fixing domestic prices in Poland. Contracting parties will readily understand the problems involved in (a) the special structure of domestic prices in Poland and (b) the exchange rates that prevail. But what alternative guarantee could Poland give that the method she in fact applies (whatever it may be) does not favour domestic producers as against importers? What specific guarantees could she offer to other contracting parties to enable them to convince their exporters that if they are more efficient than (1) Polish producers or (2) producers in non-GATT countries their goods would be correspondingly cheaper on the Polish home market? What suggestions have the Polish Government to make about the appropriate conversion rate to be applied to import prices to enable exporters in other countries to compare effectively their own prices with those of Polish producers?

79. How would contracting parties be able to assess the size of any domestic subsidies and their effect on permitted imports?

C. Future Export Trade

Export Prices

80. Will Poland, on request, provide information to CONTRACTING PARTIES about its internal and external pricing system in relation to valuation of exports?

81. As noted in paragraph viii of the Preamble, contracting parties are entitled under Article VI to impose discriminatory duties on goods of which the export is being subsidized or which are being dumped by another country.
The test is normally that the goods concerned are being sold in the importing country at a price which is less than the comparable domestic price or, failing a comparable domestic price, lower than the cost of production in the country of origin plus a reasonable mark-up to cover shipping and other costs, or the highest comparable export price to a third country. Where contracting parties receive allegations from their own traders of dumping or subsidization of Polish exports they will wish to investigate such allegations as thoroughly as they would in the case of similar allegations affecting exports from a country with a private enterprise economy. The Polish Vice-Minister for Foreign Trade sees difficulties in the application of the official exchange rate to determine relative home and export prices. How far does the Polish Government see those or other difficulties as making it impracticable for contracting parties to exercise their rights under Article VI in relation to Polish exports? What suggestions have they to offer for meeting any difficulties they may see?

82. Would Poland agree to having dutiable values of Polish products determined by taking into account the prices of like or directly competitive products, if any, being imported simultaneously from other countries?

83. Would the Polish Government recognize the price level in the importing country as a standard, and would it then consider that dumping exists if the price of the exported product were considerably lower than the price level prevailing in the importing country?

84. Would the Polish Government consider determining a world market price level for all the products concerned, and would that Government recognize that a price below that level would constitute dumping? How could such a procedure be carried out, particularly for highly-processed industrial products?

85. Would the Polish Government be prepared to enter into negotiations concerning export prices, and to give undertakings regarding the level of export prices in order to avoid situations in which dumping might be shown to exist?
86. Could the system of trade result in dumping through switch deals?

**Export Subsidies**

87. How would contracting parties be able to estimate the extent to which Polish exports have been subsidized? And whether they benefit from special export incentive measures?

88. Would subsidies be reported to GATT in accordance with the Decision of 2 March 1950? Would Poland be prepared to negotiate on the extent of domestic subsidies?

89. Are receipts from mark-ups on imported goods used as subsidies to cover losses from exports at prices lower than internal prices?

90. Would domestic subsidies continue after the introduction of a tariff and, if so, on what products and for what purpose?

**Export Quotas**

91. Would the Polish Government be prepared to conform to the provision in the General Agreement which prohibits the establishment of export quotas?

### D. General Questions Concerning Future Commercial Policy

92. Could the Polish Government provide an outline of the expected revision of the Customs Laws?

93. Would it be possible for Polish commercial enterprises to import directly without going through the intermediary of an import monopoly?

94. To what extent will individuals and private enterprises be allowed to engage in import trade? When will modification of the laws in this sense be introduced?

### E. Conciliation Procedures

95. Would the Polish Government be prepared to accept the conciliation methods which have been evolved within the framework of the General Agreement? In particular, would the Polish Government recognize recourse to such procedures
in any disputes which might result from action by State enterprises in external trade, in connexion with the effective application on the domestic market of conventionally-fixed prices, and in connexion with dumping and subsidies?

F. TERMS OF ACCESSION

96. Would the Polish Government agree to terms of accession which would accord each interested contracting party the right to suspend most-favoured-nation tariff treatment with respect to Poland and to levy present rates of duty on imports from Poland, provided that the contracting party exercising this right simultaneously relinquished its right to share in Poland’s global purchase commitment?

97. Inasmuch as Poland is not in a position to offer a schedule of tariff concessions, is it the understanding of the Polish Government that the rights which are accorded to countries of initial negotiation, to countries which have a principal supplying interest and to countries which have a substantial interest in the concessions of other contracting parties will not be acquired by Poland?

G. FURNISHING OF INFORMATION AND PUBLISHING OF REGULATIONS, ETC.

98. In private enterprise economics publication of customs tariff rates, combined with readily accessible information about exchange rates, production costs, etc., enables an exporter seeking markets in those countries to judge what his price must be in order to meet local competition. Those responsible for Polish exports will have the advantage of such information in planning their trade with other contracting parties. Would the Polish Government be prepared to undertake corresponding obligations under Article X in respect of the publication of all regulations affecting exports and imports? Would the Polish Government be prepared to undertake the normal obligations under Article XVII in respect of notification to the GATT of products whose import or export is handled by State-trading organizations and of the supply of information about their operations?
necessary to the carrying out of the Agreement? What statistics (including figures relating to internal production, production costs, retail prices, etc.) are at present published by the Polish Government? What supplementary statistical and other information on those matters will it be prepared to supply to the CONTRACTING PARTIES?

99. Article III of the GATT provides for national treatment with respect to internal taxation and regulations. Would the Polish Government make available to the contracting parties, now and in the future, copies of its "laws, regulations and requirements affecting the internal sale, offering for sale, purchase transportation, distribution or use of products and internal quantitative regulations requiring the mixture, processing or use of products in specified amounts or proportions" and information concerning the application of these laws, regulations and requirements?

100. Could the Polish Government furnish an English or French text of the Customs Law and the regulations relating thereto (including those relating to the handling of passengers' personal effects, household effects incidental to removal of residence, and mails, as well as the duty-exemption treatment for diplomatic officials), an explanation of the customs-clearing formalities (declaration, inspection, assessment, etc.) and a text of the laws, regulations and orders concerning the organization, authority and functions of the Central Customs Office and other customs agencies.