Article 17

Reduction of Tariffs and Elimination of Preferences

1. Each Member shall, upon the request of any other Member or Members, and subject to procedural arrangements established by the Organization, enter into and carry out with such other Member or Members negotiations directed to the substantial reduction of the general levels of tariffs and other charges on imports and exports, and to the elimination of the preferences referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 16, on a reciprocal and mutually advantageous basis.

2. The negotiations provided for in paragraph 1 shall proceed in accordance with the following rules:

(a) Such negotiations shall be conducted on a selective product-by-product basis which will afford adequate opportunity to take into account the needs of individual countries and individual industries. Members shall be free not to grant concessions on particular products and, in the granting of a concession, they may either reduce the duty, bind it at its then existing level, or undertake not to raise it above a specified higher level.

(b) No Member shall
(b) No Member shall be required to grant unilateral concessions, or to grant concessions to other Members without receiving adequate concessions in return. Account shall be taken of the value to any Member of obtaining in its own right and by direct obligation the indirect concessions which it would otherwise enjoy only by virtue of Article 16.

(c) In negotiations relating to any specific product with respect to which a preference applies,

(i) when a reduction is negotiated only in the most-favoured-nation rate, such reduction shall operate automatically to reduce or eliminate the margin of preference applicable to that product;

(ii) when a reduction is negotiated only in the preferential rate, the most-favoured-nation rate shall automatically be reduced to the extent of such reduction;

(iii) when it is agreed that reductions will be negotiated in both the most-favoured-nation rate and the preferential rate, the reduction in each shall be that agreed by the parties to the negotiations;

(iv) no margin of preference shall be increased.

(d) The binding against increase of low duties or of duty-free treatment shall in principle be recognized as a concession equivalent in value to the substantial reduction of high duties or the elimination of tariff preferences.

(e) Prior international obligations shall not be invoked to frustrate the requirement under paragraph 1 to negotiate with respect to preferences, it being understood that agreements which result from such negotiations and which conflict with such obligations shall not require the modification or termination of such obligations except (i) with the consent of the parties to such obligations, or, in the absence of such consent, (ii) by modification or termination of such obligations in accordance with their terms.

/3. The negotiation
3. The negotiations leading to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade concluded at Geneva on October 30, 1947, shall be deemed to be negotiations pursuant to this Article. The concessions agreed upon as a result of all other negotiations completed by a Member pursuant to this Article shall be incorporated in the General Agreement on terms to be agreed with the parties thereto. If any Member enters into any agreement relating to tariffs or preferences which is not concluded pursuant to this Article, the negotiations leading to such agreement shall nevertheless conform to the requirements of paragraph 2 (c).

4. (a) The provisions of Article 16 shall not prevent the operation of paragraph 5 (b) of Article XXV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, as amended at the First Session of the CONTRACTING PARTIES.

(b) If a Member has failed to become a contracting party to the General Agreement within two years from the entry into force of this Charter with respect to such Member, the provisions of Article 16 shall cease to require, at the end of that period, the application to the trade of such Member country of the concessions granted, in the appropriate Schedule annexed to the General Agreement, by another Member which has requested the first Member to negotiate with a view to becoming a contracting party to the General Agreement but has not successfully concluded negotiations; Provided that the Organization may, by a majority of the votes cast, require the continued application of such concessions to the trade of any Member country which has been unreasonably prevented from becoming a contracting party to the General Agreement pursuant to negotiations in accordance with the provisions of this Article.

(c) If a Member which is a contracting party to the General Agreement proposes to withhold tariff concessions from the trade of a Member country which is not a contracting party, it shall give notice in writing to the Organization and to the affected Member. The latter Member may request the Organization to require the continuance of such concessions, and if such a request has been made the tariff concessions shall not be withheld pending a decision by the Organization under the provisions of sub-paragraph (b) of this paragraph.

(d) In any determination whether a Member has been unreasonably prevented from becoming a contracting party to the General Agreement, and in any determination under the provisions of Chapter VIII whether a Member has failed without sufficient justification to fulfil its obligations under paragraph 1 of this Article, the Organization shall have regard to all relevant circumstances, including the developmental, reconstruction and other needs, and the general
fiscal structures, of the Member countries concerned and to the provisions of the Charter as a whole.

(e) If such concessions are in fact withheld, so as to result in the application to the trade of a Member country of duties higher than would otherwise have been applicable, such Member shall then be free, within sixty days after such action becomes effective, to give written notice of withdrawal from the Organization. The withdrawal shall become effective upon the expiration of sixty days from the day on which such notice is received by the Director-General.
Interpretative Notes

Ad Article 17

An internal tax (other than a general tax uniformly applicable to a considerable number of products) which is applied to a product not produced domestically in substantial quantities shall be treated as a customs duty under Article 17 in any case in which a tariff concession on the product would not be of substantial value unless accompanied by a binding or a reduction of the tax.

Paragraph 2 (d)

In the event of the devaluation of a Member's currency, or of a rise in prices, the effects of such devaluation or rise in prices would be a matter for consideration during negotiations in order to determine, first, the change, if any, in the protective incidence of the specific duties of the Member concerned and, secondly, whether the binding of such specific duties represents in fact a concession equivalent in value to the substantial reduction of high duties or the elimination of tariff preferences.