2. The Working Party submits the text shown in the Annex for consideration by the Sub-Committee.

3. The Working Party considered an inquiry from the Central Drafting Committee as to where it was desired that references in Section C to primary commodities should be covered by the definition of a "primary commodity" contained in Article 53. It was agreed that the definition contained in paragraph 1 of Article 53 was applicable to all such references.

4. The following notes indicate the manner in which the Working Party has dealt with the proposed amendments and the main changes recommended in the text:

Article 26

Paragraph 1
The Working Party was unable to accept the proposal of the United States delegation to except subsidies on primary commodities from the provisions of paragraph 1, and the consequential changes proposed in regard to other Articles. The United States delegation, however, submitted alternative suggestions to which reference is made in the notes on Articles 27 and 28 below.

Paragraph 2
(a) Drafting changes proposed by the United States delegation have been accepted with slight modification.
(b) It was understood that the term "like products" is intended to mean closely similar products in the corresponding stage of production, allowing for such differences as are necessary for export purposes.

Paragraph 3
(a) The Working Party was unable to accept the proposal by the /delegation
delegation of Argentina to delete the time-limit provisions in this paragraph.

(b) The Working Party agreed to certain drafting changes proposed by the delegation of the Netherlands.

Proposed New Paragraph

The Working Party considered the proposal by the delegation of Venezuela to insert a new paragraph designed to except certain types of subsidy from the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 26. It was felt that the subsidies in question, i.e. whose effect on world trade in the commodity is of minor significance, would be largely covered by the proposed new texts of paragraphs 3 and 5 of Article 27, and of sub-paragraphs 4 (b) and 4 (c) of Article 28. In particular it was understood that the phrase "if no agreement is appropriate" in the proposed text of paragraph 5 of Article 27 meant that if Chapter VI procedure was inappropriate (including cases judged to be inappropriate by the Organization under Article 55, paragraph 2), a Member could grant or maintain an export subsidy without being bound to seek an inter-governmental agreement on the commodity in question. Moreover, in cases where negotiations did take place toward an inter-governmental agreement, a Member would be free (under paragraph 3 of Article 27), pending the outcome of such negotiations, to maintain export subsidies on the commodity in question.

Article 27

NOTE: The Members of the Working Party agreed that Articles 27 and 28, as drafted, should be considered as a unit, and that acceptance of the text of one Article was contingent upon acceptance of the other.

Paragraph 1

It was agreed to insert in sub-paragraph (a) the words "or is so designed as to result" after the words "has also resulted". It was felt that this covered the substance of a similar amendment proposed by the delegation of Venezuela.

A corresponding addition has been made in sub-paragraph (b).

Proposed New Paragraph 2

The Working Party considered the new paragraph proposed by the delegation of the Netherlands relating to certain types of price stabilization schemes. It was generally agreed that it would be sufficient to include in the Sub-Committee's Report a note to the effect that a system for the stabilization of the domestic price, or of the return to domestic producers of a primary commodity, independently of the movement of import prices, which results, or is so designed as to result, in the sale of the commodity in the domestic market at a price at times higher and at times lower.
lower than the comparable landed cost for the imported product, should be treated as a case under Article 25.

Paragraph 2

Paragraph 2 is a new provision emphasizing the responsibility of Members granting any form of subsidy on a primary commodity to cooperate in negotiating inter-governmental agreements under Chapter VI.

Paragraph 3

(a) This paragraph takes the place of paragraph 2 in the Geneva text of Article 27. The Working Party was unable to accept the proposal by the delegations of Argentina and Peru to delete the paragraph.
(b) The paragraph has been redrafted to make it clear that, as regards serious prejudice caused by the granting of a subsidy, the paragraph applies to all types of subsidization of primary commodities.
(c) A new provision has been added to permit a Member to maintain a subsidy pending the outcome of negotiations under Chapter VI.

Paragraph 4

Paragraph 4 is a new provision prohibiting a Member from granting a new subsidy or increasing an existing subsidy, affecting the export of a primary commodity, during a commodity conference dealing with the commodity in question. This provision serves to limit the above-mentioned new provision contained in paragraph 3.

Paragraph 5

(a) This paragraph takes the place of paragraph 3 in the Geneva text of Article 27. The Working Party was unable to accept the proposal by the delegations of Argentina and Peru to delete the paragraph.
(b) On the basis of a suggestion by the United States representative, the paragraph has been redrafted in order to permit Members, considering themselves seriously prejudiced, to apply or maintain export subsidies on primary commodities, without prior approval or "determinations" by the Organization, where Chapter VI procedure has failed or does not promise to succeed or where an inter-governmental agreement is not appropriate. It is recognized that any judgment by a Member, that an agreement is not "appropriate", could subsequently be challenged by any other Member through the procedure of Chapter VI.
(c) The United Kingdom representative wished it to be recorded that while he welcomed changes made in the United States delegation's original revision of Articles 26-29, particularly in regard to the proposed Article 28, some doubt was still felt by his delegation in regard to Article 27, paragraph 5.

Article 28

In the light of the relaxation of the provisions of Article 27, the safeguards contained in Article 28 have been strengthened. In particular,
provision has been made, where consultation fails, for the Organization to make findings to which Members shall conform. Other changes which have been agreed are as follows:

(a) The Article now refers not only to export subsidies but to any form of subsidy operating directly or indirectly to increase or maintain exports; its application, however, is now limited to primary commodities.

(b) The concept of a "previous representative period" has been replaced by that of "an equitable share of world trade". This is intended to meet criticisms that the Article, as in the Geneva text, would tend to stabilize an existing trade situation to the detriment of under-developed countries. It is thought that the new text will, in this respect cover the case of these countries and go some way to meet the position of the delegation of Argentina expressed in its proposal to delete the Article.

(c) Factors are specified which, amongst others, the Organization shall take into consideration in reaching its findings on an "equitable share". In regard to sub-paragraph (b) of Article 28 it is understood that the term "the economy" means the national economy as a whole, and would include the balance of payments situation of the Members concerned. The representative of Venezuela wished it recorded that the term should be understood to cover any special aspects of the economic structure of a country.

It was felt that the new text, by its application of safeguards to general subsidies affecting exports, partly met the point raised in the amendment submitted by the delegation of Brazil (paragraph 2 of proposed Article 27 A. See E/CONF.2/C.3/H/6). Regarding the other point raised by the delegation of Brazil (paragraph 1 of proposed Article 27 A), which was referred by Sub-Committee "H" to Sub-Committee "A" (on Articles 16-19), the Working Party has noted the latter's decision, namely that a majority of the Members of Sub-Committee "A" felt that it was unnecessary to insert the amendment, whereas a minority supported the Brazilian proposal, at least in principle. (See E/CONF.2/C.3/A/W.45).

The delegate for Peru was of the opinion that there was a difference of treatment as between subsidies which operate directly or indirectly to maintain or increase the export of any primary commodity, and subsidies which operate directly or indirectly to reduce, or prevent an increase in, the imports of any primary commodity. The former were subject to the provisions of Article 28, while the latter were subject only to the much weaker provisions of Article 25. He thought that the latter type of subsidy ought to be subject also to provisions parallel to those of Article 28, because the interests of exporting countries were prejudiced just as much by a subsidy which
decreases imports in an importing country as by one which increases exports from a competing exporting country. Consequently he wished to reserve his position on this Article.

Article 29

The Working Party was unable to accept the proposal of the delegation of Argentina to delete this Article, nor its alternative proposal to replace the word "determination" by "recommendation".

Arrangement of Section C

The Working Party considered the suggestions of the International Chamber of Commerce regarding the arrangement of the Section; but thought that the present arrangement was appropriate.
ANNEX

TEXT OF SECTION 'C' - SUBSIDIES

(Note: in relation to the Geneva text, square brackets indicate proposed deletions and underlining proposed additions).

Article 23

Subsidies in General*

If any Member grants or maintains any subsidy, including any form of income or price support, which operates directly or indirectly to maintain or increase exports of any product from, or to reduce, or prevent an increase in, imports of any product into, its territory, the Member shall notify the Organization in writing of the extent and nature of the subsidization, of the estimated effect of the subsidization on the quantity of the affected product or products imported into or exported from the territory of the Member and of the circumstances making the subsidization necessary. In any case in which it is determined a Member considers that serious prejudice to the interest of any other Member is caused or threatened by any such subsidization, the Member granting the subsidy shall, upon request, discuss with the other Member or Members concerned, or with the Organization, the possibility of limiting the subsidization.

Article 26

Additional Provisions on Export Subsidies

1. No Member shall grant, directly or indirectly, any subsidy on the export of any product, or establish or maintain any other system, which subsidy or system results in the sale of such product for export at a price lower than the comparable price charged for the like product to buyers in the domestic market, due allowance being made for differences in the conditions and terms of sale, for differences in taxation, and for other differences affecting price comparability.

2. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article a Member may exempt The exemption of exported products from duties or taxes imposed in respect of like products when consumed domestically, or the remission of such duties or taxes in amounts not in excess of those which have accrued, shall not be construed to be in conflict with the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article; The use of the proceeds of such duties or taxes to make payments to domestic producers shall be considered as a case under Article 25 except in so far as such

* Article 25 was not referred to the Working Party, but is included here for convenience of reference.
far as such payments subsidize exportation, in the sense of paragraph 1 of this Article, by more than the amount of the duties or taxes remitted or not imposed, in which case the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article shall apply to such excess payments.

3. Members shall give effect to the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article at the earliest practicable date, but not later than two years from the day on which this Charter enters into force. If any Member considers itself unable to do so in respect of any particular product or products, it shall, at least three months before the expiration of such period, give notice in writing to the Organization, requesting a specific extension of the period. Such notice shall be accompanied by a full analysis of the system in question and the circumstances justifying it. It shall then be determined whether the extension requested should be made.

4. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article, any Member may subsidize the exports of any product to the extent and for such time as may be necessary to offset a subsidy granted by a non-Member affecting the Member's exports of the product. However, the Member shall, upon the request of the Organization or of any other Member which considers that its interests are adversely affected by such action, consult with that Member or with the Organization with a view to reaching a satisfactory adjustment of the matter.

**Article 27**

**Special Treatment of Primary Commodities**

1. A system for the stabilization of the domestic price or of the return to domestic producers of a primary commodity, independently of the movements of export prices, which results at times in the sale of the product for export at a price lower than the comparable price charged for the like product to buyers in the domestic market, shall be considered not to involve a subsidy on export within the meaning of paragraph 1 of Article 26, if it is determined:

   (a) that the system has also resulted, or is so designed as to result, in the sale of the product for export at a price higher than the comparable price charged for the like product to buyers in the domestic market, and

   (b) that the system is so operated, or is designed so to operate, either because of the effective regulation of production or otherwise, as not to stimulate exports unduly or otherwise seriously prejudice the interests of other Members.
2. Any Member granting a subsidy affecting a primary commodity shall co-operate at all times in all efforts to negotiate agreements under the procedures of Chapter VI.

2. In any case of subsidization of a primary commodity, if a Member considers that its interests are seriously prejudiced by the subsidy or if the Member granting the subsidy considers itself unable to comply with the provision of paragraph 3 of Article 26 within the time limit laid down therein, the difficulty may be deemed to be a special difficulty under Chapter VI, and in that event the procedure laid down in that Chapter shall be followed.

3. In any case involving a primary commodity, if a Member considers that its interests would be seriously prejudiced by compliance with the provisions of Article 26, or if a Member considers that its interests are seriously prejudiced by the granting of any form of subsidy, the procedure laid down in Chapter VI may be followed. Any Member which considers that its interests are seriously prejudiced shall, however, be exempt provisionally from the requirements of paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article 26, subject to the procedure of Article 28, in respect of that commodity.

4. No Member shall grant a new subsidy or increase an existing subsidy affecting the export of a primary commodity during a commodity conference called for the purpose of negotiating an inter-governmental control agreement for the commodity concerned unless the Organization concurs.

5. If the measures provided for in Chapter VI have not succeeded, or do not promise to succeed, within a reasonable period of time, either because or if no agreement has been reached or because the agreement is terminated, any Member adversely affected may apply for exemption appropriate, any Member which considers itself seriously prejudiced shall be exempt from the requirements of paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article 26 in respect of that commodity. If it is determined that the circumstances described in Article 59 apply to the commodity concerned and that the subsidization will not be so operated as to stimulate exports unduly or otherwise seriously prejudice the interests of other Members, the Organization shall grant such exemption for such period and within such limits as may be determined, subject to the provisions of Article 28.

**Article 28**

**Undertaking Regarding Stimulation of Exports of Primary Commodities**

Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of Article 26 and of paragraph 3 of Article 27, no Member shall grant any subsidy on the exportation of any product which has the effect of acquiring for that Member a share of world trade in that product in excess of the share which it had.
it had during a previous representative period, account being taken insofar as practicable of any special factors which may have affected or may be affecting the trade in that product. The selection of a representative period for any product and the appraisal of any special factors affecting the trade in the product shall be made initially by the Member granting the subsidy; Provided that such Member shall, upon the request of any other Member having an important interest in the trade in that product, or upon the request of the Organization, consult promptly with the other Member or with the Organization regarding the need for an adjustment of the base period selected or for the re-appraisal of the special factors involved.

1. Any Member granting any form of subsidy which operates directly or indirectly to maintain or increase the export of any primary commodity from its territory shall not apply the subsidy in such a way as to have the effect of maintaining or acquiring for that Member more than an equitable share of world trade in that commodity.

2. The Member granting such subsidy shall promptly notify the Organization of the extent and nature of the subsidization, of the estimated effect of the subsidization on the quantity of the affected commodity exported from its territory, and of the circumstances making the subsidization necessary. The Members shall promptly consult with any other Members which consider themselves likely to be materially affected by the subsidization.

3. If, within a reasonable period of time no agreement is reached in such consultation, the Organization shall make a finding as to what constitutes an equitable share and the Member granting the subsidy shall conform to this finding.

4. In making its finding, the Organization shall take into account any factors which may have affected, or may be affecting world trade in that primary commodity and shall have particular regard to:

   (a) The Member's share of world trade in the commodity in a previous representative period;
   (b) the degree of importance of the external trade in the commodity to the economy of the Member granting, and to the economies of the Members materially affected by, the subsidy;
   (c) whether the share of world trade in the commodity of the country granting the subsidy is so small that the effect of the subsidy on such trade is likely to be of minor significance;
   (d) the existence of price stabilization systems in accordance with paragraph 1 of Article 27;
   (e) the desirability of limiting measures which would make difficult the gradual expansion of production for export in those areas able to satisfy world
satisfy world market requirements of the commodity concerned in the most effective and economic manner.

Article 29

Procedure.

Any determination provided for in, or appropriate to the operation of, this Section shall be made through the Organization by consultation and agreement among the Members substantially interested in the product concerned.