SECOND SESSION OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND EMPLOYMENT

The Brazilian Delegation considers that its reservation to Article 81 has not been correctly stated and has requested that Page 157 of Document E/PC/T/180, on which the reservation appears, should be reproduced again in its entirety including the corrected version of the reservation instead of a correction being included as in other cases in the corrigenda to E/PC/T/180. A revised text of Page 157 is therefore circulated herewith to replace the page in the original text.
Section E - The Tariff Committee

Article 81

The Tariff Committee

1. There shall be a Tariff Committee which shall act on behalf of the Organization in initiating the negotiations provided for under paragraph 1 of Article 17 and in the making of recommendations and determinations pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 17.

2. The Tariff Committee shall consist of those contracting parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade referred to in paragraph 1(d) of Article 17 which are Members of the Organization.

3. [Provisions relating to the voting power of each member]

4. [Provisions relating to the majority of votes required for decisions of the Committee]

5. The Committee shall adopt its own rules of procedure, including provision for the election of its officers.

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The content of these paragraphs is referred for decision by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment.

With regard to the above note concerning Paragraph 3 relating to the possibility of a different voting power of each contracting party of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the Delegation of Brazil reserved its position. It could not agree to a discriminatory voting power in any committee charged with the functions referred to in the preceding sentence, because the result of such a procedure would eventually place the control of the Tariff Committee in the hands of a few members of this committee. Furthermore, the Delegation of Brazil objected to the implication that the Preparatory Committee was implicitly accepting, by its action, the possibility of weighted voting in the decisions of the Tariff Committee of the future International Trade Organization.