The following speech by Mr. MINOVSKY should be inserted:

Mr. Stanislav MINOVSKY (Czechoslovakia): In the opinion of the Czechoslovakian delegation the weighted vote is not justified by the arguments so far advanced in its favour. It is assumed that countries of great economic importance should be enabled to exercise a greater influence than the others on the result of a vote. On the other hand, however, it must not be forgotten that the economic importance of a country is in itself a factor influencing the strength of its position in the Organization. The greater the economic importance of a State the more highly developed will be its friendly relations with its neighbours and with other countries, and the greater, in consequence, its influence on the result of a vote. Thus it is not true that the great countries require special protection in the Organization.

It could not even be said that an economically important State runs a greater risk, when a vote is taken, than a State of less importance.

It is true that the risks of a great State expressed in figures might be larger than those of a small State, but that does not mean that the great State would consequently be in greater danger.
For the sake of further clarity I will replace the word "risk" by the word "loss", and say that a great loss would have a less serious effect on the interests of a great State than a smaller loss on those of a small State, because the capacity to withstand an economic crisis depends precisely on the economic strength of each. What we must consider, is not the absolute extent of the risks but the effects that decisions of the Organization may have on the vital interests of Members, and the position of all States is the same whether they are great or small. The position of the great States might even be preferable since their domestic economy is stronger and better defended against external influences.

It must be remembered that the Charter is not confined to questions of foreign trade. It also deals with matters which can very seriously affect the domestic life of Members. Thus it is not possible to find a magic formula for weighted voting which would not threaten the existence of States of limited economic importance.

It is obviously difficult for economically weak States to threaten the economy of States that are rich and fully developed. It is also obvious that the contrary may very easily occur and that States of considerable economic strength can, if the need arise, impair the economic interests of small countries. It does not, therefore, seem necessary to increase their influence by artificial means.

There remains a very delicate matter which I hardly like to raise. If I refer to it, I do so against my will. When it is said that the great countries have great responsibilities, it must not be forgotten that they can assume these responsibilities, but can also evade them.
When it is said that the great countries can offer much, it must not be forgotten that they can also ask for much. Indeed, during the tariff negotiations the small countries have not been shown to be less generous than the great ones. We cannot, therefore, accept as a starting point for our discussion this idea that the great countries are always giving and never asking. This being so, the weighted vote would mean that compensation might be given for something which may, perhaps, never occur.

The Czechoslovakian delegation cannot therefore support the amendment suggesting a weighted vote.