UNITED NATIONS
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL

PREPARATORY COMMITTEE
of the

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND EMPLOYMENT.

Verbatim Report
of the
EIGHTH MEETING
of
COMMITTEE V
held at
Church House, Westminster, S.W. 1.
on
Wednesday, 6th November, 1946,
at 3.0 p.m.

CHAIRMAN:  Mr. LYNN R. EDMINSTER (U.S.A.)

(From the Shorthand Notes of
W.B. GURNEY, SONS & FUNNELL,
58, Victoria Street,
Westminster, S.W.1.)
THE CHAIRMAN: Our agenda today calls for a consideration of Articles 53, 57 and 58 of the United States Draft Charter. Article 53 concerns voting in the Conference. At one of our recent meetings it was agreed that a paper on that subject should be prepared by the United Kingdom Delegation and distributed to this Committee in advance of this meeting. That has been done, and I think it would be appropriate at this time to call upon the Delegate of the United Kingdom to discuss his memorandum.

MR. HOLMES (United Kingdom): Having fulfilled our undertaking, I am not sure that, as representing the United Kingdom, I have very much to say. The paper has now been distributed, and I think it probably speaks for itself. We have made it as brief as we could, and we have left a certain amount unsaid, because we felt that if a decision in principle to have a system of weighted voting were taken, it would be probably a matter very appropriate to any Drafting Committee which may be set up at the end of this Session to work out the scheme in more detail.

The paper, as you will see, starts with a general paragraph which is simply intended to draw attention to the fact that countries which will be Members, we hope, of the Organisation are bound, for various reasons, whether by their size or the structure of their economy, to have rather differing interests in the principles and details of the Organisation.
I would point out that the main criterion of any interest in an organisation of this sort is a country's share in, or contribution to, international trade. We feel that while the principle of one State one vote has much to recommend it on the grounds of mere simplicity, the sort of field which is covered by the proposed international organisation is one which lends itself very properly to a certain functional recognition. There was, as we explain in the second main paragraph of the paper, in the proposals of the United States Government in December 1945 a provision whereby a certain number of seats on the Executive Board of the Organisation would be reserved permanently for certain countries, or would be at any rate allotted to countries presumably having a particular interest in the objects and principles of the Organisation. Now that provision disappeared when we came to examine the United States' Draft Charter, and that paragraph is merely designed to call attention to the fact that the document to which we had expressed our agreement, on certain points at any rate, did differ from the Charter.

In the third main paragraph we have attempted to call attention very shortly to the corresponding provisions in the Conventions or agreements establishing other bodies akin, rather, to the proposed organisation which we are attempting to set up. In some cases there is provision there for permanent seats on the main directing body, in other cases there is provision for weighted voting, and I think that in one or two cases there is provision for both. As regards the outline of our proposal, which is given on page 3 of the paper - in the English text - we suggest a way in which, in very general terms, our proposal might be worked out. I do not think that I need elaborate on that because of the explanation I have already given, that we should feel the subject was one which could very properly be studied by the Drafting
Committee with a view to more specific proposals being available to us when we meet again.

The last paragraph of the paper, that is the third sub-paragraph on page 3, makes a certain proposal in regard to the length of time for which an arrangement of this sort should be initially valid. It has already been stated at a previous meeting of this Committee, on behalf at least one Delegation, that a proposal of this kind ought to take account not only of a country’s actual share in international trade but also of that country’s potentialities in that direction. We have, in our sketch, suggested tentatively that some weight should be given to national income, which would be a recognition to some extent of the claim that we should take into account not only the present but also the future. We feel ourselves that on the whole that claim, while it certainly has some validity, will be more satisfactorily looked after by providing that there should be a periodic review of the weighting, so that account can be taken from time to time, after a comparatively short number of years, perhaps, of any marked changes which may have taken place in the shares in or contributions to international trade on the part of the various members of the organisation. I do not think that there is anything further which I need to say at this stage, or anything with which I could properly delay the proceedings of the Committee.

THE CHAIRMAN: A number of Delegates wish to have the floor, I presume to discuss the matter that has been put before us by the Delegate of the United Kingdom, but before I recognise any of them I should like to suggest that the Committee might be interested to hear at this time a statement by Mr. Tate, the observer from the International Labour Office who is here with us, with respect to the manner in which the system of permanent membership on the Governing Body of the International Labour Office operates. I make this suggestion because it is very clear from our previous discussion of the matter of voting in the Conference.
and likewise clear from the statement which has just been made, in the memorandum submitted by the Delegate of the United Kingdom, that there is a very definite connection between the subject matter of Article 53 and Article 57, and it might be helpful therefore to our Committee in discussing the matter of voting in the Conference if we were to have this statement from Mr. Tate at this time, with reference to the way in which permanent membership of the Governing Body of the International Labour Office works out. Would that meet the approval of the Committee?
Mr Qureshi (India): Mr Chairman, while we welcome the suggestion made by you that we should hear the observer from the International Labour Office, I wonder if at this stage it would not be a help to the Committee if we heard a statement from the representative of the United States as to what were the considerations which led them to incorporate the changes in the new proposals because they have made some considerable change in this respect in the draft Charter. This, I think, would be very relevant. Again, I wonder, in order to save time, if the ear-phone system is working all right; whether we could not do away with the duplicate interpretation, unless it is requested for some exceptional reason, as that will mean a considerable saving of time. The formal type of statement may not need that second interpretation.

The Chairman: Well, that suggestion requires me to ask the Delegates from Belgium and France whether it meets with their approval. I am referring, of course, the suggestion that we use only the simultaneous translation.

Mr Houtman (Belgium) (interpretation): Mr Chairman, I agree entirely to have for today at least just the simultaneous interpretation, if it is used in the correct manner; but I should not like to see it introduced in a general way for the future as frequently the system does not work properly and then the successive interpretation is very useful.

The Chairman: Apparently, for today, simultaneous translation is agreeable to the Delegates from Belgium and France. The Chair should perhaps add that if we are to use that system, we had better be a little bit more fastidious in using the ear-phones.

As to the suggestion of the Delegate of India with regard to the statement from the United States Delegate regarding the changes that have been made in the Charter as compared with the original proposals, I should prefer if it is acceptable to the Indian Delegate, to have a statement from the Observer of the International Labour Office first. I think that the statement from the United States Delegate could be made just as well after that, and it might be a little better order for us if we took it up in that way.

Mr Qureshi (India): That is quite acceptable to us.

The Chairman: I will call on Mr Tate.
The Constitution of the International Labour Organisation provides that of the sixteen persons representing governments eight shall be appointed by members of chief industrial importance. There is also one other provision concerning the appointment of the government representatives on the governing Board of the I.L.O., namely, that six of them shall represent non-European States.

What, however, interests the Committee particularly is the way in which the criteria have been drawn up and applied concerning the eight States of chief industrial importance. Naturally, this question has given rise to certain difficulties, as was to be expected, but I do not think that it can be said in any sense that these difficulties have proved to be insuperable. The first thing to do, of course, was to determine the criteria and to give these criteria their appropriate weights.

At the very first meeting of the International Labour Conference in 1919, a list had to be improvised by the organizing committee, and this list gave rise to protests by certain States which were excluded by the criteria adopted. As provided by the Constitution of the I.L.O., the question was then referred to the Council of the League of Nations, and with the assistance of expert advice detailed criteria were worked out in 1922, which were applied during the succeeding years until 1934. In 1934 the question had to be reviewed, because one of the States of chief industrial importance gave notice of resignation, and at the same time two States, both of indisputable industrial importance, were admitted to the Organisation. It therefore followed that at least one, if not two, States hitherto regarded as being of chief industrial importance would have to retire from the governing body. The whole question was therefore reviewed very carefully and very exhaustively, and the governing body had the assistance of a small committee of experts to advise on the matter. In 1935 they drew up criteria which, with one slight modification made in 1940, are still in operation. These criteria, with the modification, are as follows:

Firstly, the scale of contributions to the League of Nations established by the Assembly of the League, on the basis of national wealth.
Secondly, the second criterion is based on the table of the industrial importance of States, prepared on the basis of statistics compiled by the League Secretariat for its Index of World Production.

The third criterion is the table of the volume of foreign trade, both exports and imports, prepared from the statistics compiled by the League of Nations Secretariat.

Fourthly, total figures of the occupied population.

These criteria naturally enough, I think, gave rise to some protests, but they were adopted; and of course the situation became easier by the fact that progressively Germany, Italy and Japan left the Organisation, and the States which had lost their seats regained them. As I said, before, in 1940 the question came up again, and it was then decided to maintain these criteria except for the one change which I have referred to. In 1944, again, a vacancy had to be filled, but in view of the War it was impossible to apply the criteria at that time, and a provisional appointment was made on the understanding that the whole list would be reviewed on the basis of appropriate criteria as soon as circumstances allowed.

That is the situation at the present time, and while, as I said at the beginning, the establishment and application of these criteria have naturally given rise to difficulties, it does seem that the formula has permitted the reserving of quasi-permanent seats for the States of chief industrial importance, while avoiding complete rigidity, and no other formula to achieve this result has been devised.

If any Delegate, Mr Chairman, would like to ask any questions on this I should be glad to answer to the best of my ability.

MR COUILLARD (Canada): I should like to ask Mr Tate one question; the details might have escaped me. I would like to ask him what is the relative importance attached to the various criteria that he mentioned.

MR TATE (I.L.O.): The governing body decided, on the advice of the committee of experts, that the weighting of the four criteria should be in the proportion of 3:3:3:1 — that is to say, the first three criteria are of equal weight, and the fourth criteria one-third of the weight of the other.
The Chairman: Before calling on the Delegate of the United States, with regard to the matter that was mentioned a moment ago by the Delegate of India, I should like to recognise the Delegate from Brazil.

I also want to thank Mr Tate very much for this very useful statement which he has just given to us.

Mr Cabal (Brazil) (interpretation): Mr Chairman, as far as Article 53 is concerned, which is the Article which we are going to discuss at today's meeting, the Brazilian Delegation would like to make a declaration of a general nature concerning the British proposal.

Article 53 in the American draft Charter concerns in its entirety the democratic principle of the judicial legality and equality of nations. We have all recognised that such a principle is the very foundation of all international relations and international judicial laws. The proof of all this is so evident that I have not repeated this argument. The American Government, in preparing the draft Charter, did not want to forget those democratic principles; nevertheless, we have received a proposal which has been put forward by the United Kingdom Delegation, which proposal, in my humble opinion, is opposed to this principle. As a matter of fact, the British Delegation consider, in the first place, that the true criterion which would allow us to evaluate the interest which countries might have in an International Trade Organisation is the measure in which they participate in international trade, but this criterion is not a very correct one. Countries that participate in world trade take no less an interest in trade than the great commercial powers. As a matter of fact, the contrary is true. What does really happen is that the nations, in the initial phase of their commercial expansion, really have the greatest desire to augment their foreign powers of purchase or sale, and they have the greatest interest in world trade. Moreover, one should not forget that, in spite of appearances, it is not always the countries with the greatest economic power who suffer most when trade exchange is lowered. As their
economic systems change, they can always have regard to other possibilities. The undeveloped countries suffer most, because when they have lost a little they have lost all.

In order to facilitate the argument, let us assume that the considerations offered by the British Delegation are justified.
There would be control by three or four Powers of the Organization, which is naturally the very contrary of the spirit of co-operation which we are trying to foster in order to achieve the results of our efforts. In the original proposal of the American Government there was a reference to the principle of the differential vote. This principle has been changed in the present text, and I should like to offer my congratulations to the authors of this change, which establishes once and for all the democratic spirit. In the memorandum of the British delegation we are reminded of the cumulative vote system which has already been adopted by other international agencies such as the Monetary Fund and the International Bank. It seems to me - I may, of course be wrong - that these agencies are of a very different nature from the one which we are about to put into practice. Parity of quotas does to a certain extent determine the value of their vote and thus the Brazilian delegation believes that a voting system based on the volume of international trade and on national income would present very great difficulty and a certain amount of inconvenience. It would be almost impossible to determine national income of member States, as we have already seen, and it would also be difficult to determine the real volume of international trade of every country. The Brazilian delegation believes therefore that the proposals set forth in the draft Charter concerning the system of voting to be adopted within this Conference should be adopted just as it stands at the moment and just as was proposed in the original American draft.

THE CHAIRMAN: I now call upon the delegate of the United States.

MR KELLOGG (USA): Mr Chairman, taking up first the question of voting in the Conference, the reason the United States did not put a provision for weighted voting into Article 53 is, first, because we believed the democratic principle should apply in this case, and this consideration was extremely well expressed by the delegate of France at a previous meeting, when he pointed out that a small country, even though small, might be as seriously involved in questions before the I.T.O. as a large
one; that the mere fact of its being small did not diminish the importance
of the question to that country. Also we followed the precedent set in
the United Nations Charter, which provides with respect to the Assembly
that one country should have one vote. However, we do recognize that
in some cases it might be necessary to have a difference in the system
of voting. Delegates have probably noticed that in Article 55, for
example, there are provisions for a difference; they provide in Article 55
paragraph 2 for a two-thirds vote and not a simple majority; in
Article 55 (8), again, there is provision for a two-thirds vote. In
connection with the commodity agreements there are special provisions
under which countries particularly involved are those countries which
have more say in the matter. Finally, we were very much influenced by
the fact that we felt it would be very difficult to work out a formula
acceptable to all the members of the I.T.O., and we would like to have
a provision as to voting acceptable to the largest number of countries.

Going on then to the question of permanent seats in the Executive Board,
the same considerations apply. First, we are motivated by the democratic
principle which exists in the Economic and Social Council of the United
Nations. As is known, there are no permanent seats on the Economic and
Social Council; and, secondly, we found that in discussing this matter
almost all the proposed formulae working out provisions to provide for
permanent seats had distinct advantages in them and we felt they might
be unacceptable to a large number of the countries who we hope will be
members of the I.T.O. It was for those reasons that we made the provision
in Article 57 as it now stands.

MR QURESHI (India): Mr Chairman, we find ourselves in complete agreement
with the views expressed by the representative of the United States,
also supported by the Cuban delegate. We are in full agreement in regard
to the democratic principle, and we think, on the whole, it will be very
fair if each country has one vote, irrespective of its size or of its
importance. This will generally create feelings of good will and trust,
and they will find that they are really in a committee of the nations.
country one vote, we turn now to the criteria suggested by the United Kingdom delegation. Their first criterion is a basic vote for each country. Proceeding from the previous remarks, we should naturally like to see that form a very large proportion of any voting strength. This would ensure that no nation’s voice was so small that it did not count for something. But the second criterion, the number of votes to be based on external trade, is obviously one which has got to be the main criterion if there is to be any system of weighted voting, and it does measure the importance of individual countries in international trade. But when one turns to the last criterion mentioned, the number of votes based on national income, we find ourselves rather out of sympathy. It may be perhaps that that would not work our way, but irrespective of that, we think there are important considerations regarding national income in relation to international trade which make it a very unsuitable criterion.
If the national income of a country is large and its trade is proportionately small, international trade to that country is far less vital. Therefore, we do not think that decisions on international trade should be weighted in favour of that country. On the other hand, if a country has both a large national income and a large international trade, then its position would already be taken care of in giving a certain weight to international trade.

But there is another criterion which we suggest should be considered if a weighted voting system is to be considered at all, and that is the relative importance of international trade to individual countries. It is the case with certain countries, including a near neighbour of ours, and perhaps to a lesser extent ourselves, that any substantial failure of international trade can paralyse the whole of that country's economic life, and particularly if it is a small country it may, in certain circumstances, find itself somewhat powerless and completely at the sway of outside forces. That, in itself, is serious enough, but it would be even more serious if it were liable to be overborne in international councils by countries whose dependence on international trade was so much less.

Therefore, we suggest that if this weighted system is to be considered, that consideration should be given to this factor. The point has perhaps been put most effectively by Mr. Wilcox, in his opening speech for the United States, when he said: "If the trade of the world were to be governed by rules the opposite of those contained in the suggested Charter, the United States would deeply regret it, but it could adapt itself to the resulting situation. Its economy would survive the strain. But other nations in this respect are less fortunately endowed than we are. For us the strangulation of trade would necessitate a difficult readjustment. For others it would spell catastrophe."
MR. BENDA (Czechoslovakia): As I said at one of our previous meetings when we started to discuss the question of voting and the composition of the Executive Board, the Czechoslovak Delegation finds itself in sympathy with the observations made by the Delegate for France. As to voting at the Conference, the Czechoslovak Delegation fully adheres to the principle of one State, one vote. In our opinion, the Conference should be a democratic body responsible for the broad outlines of the policy of ITO, and the system of voting should conform to the accepted principles and the accepted practice for assemblies or conferences of other international organisations.

If we introduce a different system of voting at the Conference, we would have to modify other agreed Articles of the Charter accordingly, and I have some doubts whether we could come to an agreement. Moreover, since for certain decisions of ITO qualified majorities are necessary, a system of votes based on total external trade and/or on national income might perhaps endanger the interests of less developed countries which, in questions for which the Charter demands a qualified majority and which concern major problems of commercial policy vital to the interests of member countries, might be outvoted by the preponderance of votes of the more developed countries.

As to the second point raised, that is, the question of the composition of the Executive Board, the Czechoslovak Delegation agrees that the Great Powers should have permanent seats on this Board similar to the Security Council of the United Nations. We think that the Great Powers ought to be responsible for the day to day execution of the policy of ITO, and we are quite willing to accept a solution which would make the Executive Board consist of permanent members and eligible members. I should like to add that by "Great Powers" we do not mean only Great Powers in the sense of great trading Powers, so that the criterion for that is not only purely commercial.
MR. MERINO (Chile) (Interpretation): The Chilean Delegation has been greatly surprised by the proposals made here by the United Kingdom Delegation concerning voting within the International Trade Organisation. The Chilean Delegation are greatly surprised that such serious proposals should be suggested at a moment when a discussion of the subject has already gone so far. The Chilean Delegation reserve the right to express its opinion on this problem after it has consulted its Government.

Nevertheless, I can state even now that we accepted the invitation to assist at this Conference knowing that the discussions would be based on the proposals suggested by the United States Government, proposals which establish a basis of complete equality wherever voting is concerned. This, moreover, is in complete agreement with the principles expressed in the United Nations Charter. The British proposals changes in a fundamental manner this basis of discussion which had been accepted by us. Without trying to analyse in any detail the United Kingdom proposals, I believe that we can say even now that we shall not be able to accept it. However, as I have already said before, I shall have to inform my Government of the state of affairs, and have to await instructions from them, in view of the gravity of the problem.

MR. CABAL (Brazil): I do not want to elaborate on the proposal made by the Delegate of the United Kingdom, but I must call attention to the fact that our Organisation will be neither a political organisation nor an organisation of the same character as the other organisations. In the United Nations we can admit the principle of differential voting because when it is a question of re-establishing peace or the enforcement of decisions by the United Nations, Great Britain and the United States would be more responsible than the smaller countries. In that case I can understand the special position of those two countries and the other Great Powers. If it is a question of the World Bank or the International
Monetary Fund, I can also understand it, because the quotas are larger. If the United States brings 7 million dollars and the other countries bring only 7,000, I can understand the different position, the different rights, the different votes. I can understand that such a thing would have a certain relevance in Navy or Army matters. But I could not understand it if in a court a judge had two, or three, or differential votes.

In this Organisation we shall be more in the nature of a court. Everybody will be equal, everybody will be voting to maintain fair international trade. For this reason, I cannot see why a country ought to have more voting power inside the Organisation. If we want to destroy this Organisation from the beginning, the best thing we can do is to establish a differential grade of voting. I am sure that most countries will be greatly disappointed by the proposal for a differential vote. As far as we are concerned, we do not agree with differential voting inside the Organisation, because the rule of a two-thirds majority is a sufficient guarantee that no decision will be taken that is of any importance against the wishes of any big trading countries.

We cannot accept a differential vote because of national income or because of international trade. We ought to establish the principle of equality, the same opportunity, no discrimination all round in this Organisation. Trade must be equal for everybody. The Rules must be discussed and voted -- one vote for each country, no differential system for a Great Power or a small Power.

MR. MORAN (Cuba): I expressed the opinion of the Cuban Delegation on this subject a few days ago, and I want to add very little now. We feel, like other Delegations that have taken the same position, that we would be happier if the Organisation were based on an equal vote footing. We enjoy a feeling of equality when we do business. We do not want to feel
that because of given circumstances, we are not on the same footing as the other fellow. We want to trade on an equal basis. As a matter of fact, I would like now to add only that the Cuban Delegation would not feel prepared at this time to vote for any other position than the one which is in the suggested Charter put forward by the United States.

MR. DAO (China): The Chinese Delegation has always stood in principle for one Member, one vote. In our opinion, a system of weighted voting may be admissible if it can be established that the obligations assumed by some Members of the Organisation are greater than those of the others, and that there is a common standard which is measurable with some degree of constancy or accuracy, and by which the importance of such Member's contributions to the work of the Organisation could be assessed. However, we have serious doubts about the practicability of the suggestion made by the United Kingdom Delegation, with regard to the system of weighted voting based upon the volume of external trade and/or national income, not only because the suggested criteria are variable year by year, but also because the methods of evaluation and estimation are widely different from one country to another.
We find that in the proposed Charter the obligations imposed upon Members are the same for all Members, whether of much economic importance or of less economic importance. Each Member undertakes to perform certain specific duties and to fulfil certain obligations. Both in absolute and in relative terms the obligations imposed upon Members are identical. Therefore we are in favour of the proposal contained in the draft Charter with regard to the system of voting, for the reasons stated by previous speakers and for those I have just mentioned.

MR. VAN TUYL (Netherlands): I am in the unhappy position that I cannot yet express the views of the Netherlands Delegation on this matter. The subject matter is very complicated and I am afraid the Netherlands Delegation is still considering the proposals of the United Kingdom Delegate as well as the opinions expressed by the French Delegate in a former meeting and since supported by a number of other Delegations. If you agree, Mr. Chairman, I should like to reserve my position until a later stage of the discussions.

MR. HOUTMAN (Belgium) (Interpretation): In the name of Belgium I should like to associate myself with the reservations expressed by the Delegate of the Netherlands. Belgium also believes that the question of voting is an extremely complex and important problem for the future of the Organisation and, as we have only been informed since yesterday of the memorandum of the United Kingdom Delegate, the Belgian Delegation, deeming that this memorandum is of great importance, wishes to refer the matter to its Government, and to convey to its Government the opinions and the precedents quoted in the United Kingdom memorandum. In any case, the matter does not seem to the Belgian Delegation to be so urgent, since the memorandum itself foresees that it will be submitted to a Drafting Committee for further study, and therefore the Belgian delegation prefers to express its opinion later when the discussion has progressed further.

MR. OFTEDAL (Norway): I think that at the previous meeting I expressed general agreement with the statement made by the Delegate of France to the effect
that in the full meeting of our Organisation there should be an equal vote for everybody. I would add that I have no instructions because my Government had before them only the Draft Charter submitted by the United States Delegation, and had no reason to go very fully into it at this stage but as my personal opinion I would add that, as far as the Executive Board is concerned, I would feel it entirely reasonable - I would almost say imperative - that the great trading Powers should have a special position. In the draft of Article 57 it is said that "a retiring Member shall be eligible for immediate re-election". That must certainly apply to the Governments of the great trading powers. With regard to the majority of the Executive Board, say at least ten of them, I would rather like rotation to be introduced. I just mention this tentatively so as to throw the necessary light upon my attitude with regard to Article 53, namely that it is in no way my intention to deny the special position of the great trading countries.

MR. LE COULLARD (Canada): I join with the last three or four Delegates who have spoken in recognising this question as a very complicated one and for that reason I speak necessarily without the detailed study which this question requires. On first impression, Canada would be inclined, I think to support the proposition put forward by the United Kingdom Delegate, namely, that the principle of weighted voting should apply in the Conference. On that point we differ from the Delegate of Norway in the sense that we should like the representatives of major countries to enjoy the strength reflected in their economic powers in the Conference rather than in the Executive Board. While I pause, Mr. Chairman, to allow the interpreters time to catch up, I would point out that Canada is a democratic country. We would however reserve until after clarification our view on the proposal that the same principle should be extended to voting in the Executive Board. We are not clear as to what the United Kingdom proposal intends in this regard. Our support of the principle of weighted voting in the
Conference is in agreement with the practical application of our view that, generally speaking, membership in the Organisation should be on as wide a basis as possible and that it should be on a functional basis, based on functional principles. Once a Member has adhered to the principles of the Charter of this specialised agency, and I wish to underline the word "specialised", the voice of that member in the Conference should be proportional to that member’s functional efficiency, that is to its real importance, its interest in and contribution towards the fulfilment of the objectives of the Organisation. We recognise of course the need for reviewing periodically the formula on which the relative weights will be based, so that account can be taken - and this point was made by the Delegate from India - of gradual developments in a country’s economy. Alternatively the formula might be based on a running three-year average, beginning with a base period probably immediately pre-war.

MR. NAUDE (Union of South Africa): You looked at me, Mr. Chairman, as if you expected me to say something, although I had not intended to speak at this point. However, it seems to me that there is a certain of thinking going on here, and some of us may not be clear in our own minds in any event. A suggestion was made that in the case of the Fund and the Bank the members actually brought in varying amounts, and it really seems that the interest which countries have in international trade very substantially varies too. It is for us to decide whether that varying interest, that varying amount brought into the welfare of international trade, should be recognised. The suggestion was also made that this Organisation should be based on democratic principles, and therefore one nation should have one vote. I must confess that it seems to me that one rather overdoes this talk about democratic principles. Surely it is not democratic - the organisation will not be democratic - if you are going to have an Executive Board with permanent seats?
Similarly the United Nations Organisation is by no means democratic. We have heard about the veto here this afternoon, and it vitiates the whole principle of democracy in the Organisation. We simply must recognise that there is a variation in the responsibility and in leadership. What I have said does not mean that I reject entirely the American suggestion of one vote per member, nor that I entirely accept the British proposals. It seems to me that the criteria suggested in the United Kingdom proposal can very well be explored further. I would like to wind up by saying that there is no need for us - in fact it would not be wise for us, to come to a final decision today or at this meeting. A great deal of thought will still have to go into this proposal, and it seems to me that wisdom to suggest that the Drafting Committee should further explore possible criteria that might satisfy everybody, in order to incorporate into the Charter this concept of a varying interest in world trade and in world prosperity.

THE CHAIRMAN: We have heard from most of the Delegates their views on this matter of voting in the Conference, and of course incidental to that there have been expressions of view also with reference to permanent membership of the Executive Board. However, in regard to the latter, that will be the next item on the agenda and I think we shall have to have more discussion. Meanwhile, it seems to me that a useful course of action might be this: that we should ask those members of the Committee who have indicated that they are favourable to some kind of weighted system of voting, or who have at least indicated that they are not very much opposed to it or are uncertain regarding it, should constitute themselves as a small subcommittee to prepare an alternative draft provision to that which is in the Charter as proposed by the United States. I should explain that suggestion a little further. It seems apparent from the discussions we have had this afternoon that if a poll were taken of this Committee the majority would favour this system of one country one vote in the Conference. It is equally clear that...
not all members of the Committee agree to that. As has been mentioned by the Delegate of South Africa, it is not necessary at this meeting of the Preparatory Committee, to resolve this matter. There will be an interim drafting committee which will, as I understand it, be expected to draft alternative provisions for further consideration next spring, whenever we encounter cases where there is a real division of opinion in a Committee with reference to a provision in the Charter.
It would seem to me that this is a case where that situation will apply. I would take it that so far as the majority of this Committee is concerned, the provision, as it stands in the American draft Charter, is satisfactory. Let us have the alternative draft as proposed by the minority, and let both of those positions go into the record and be available to the Drafting Interim/Committee for its work between now and the second meeting of the Preparatory Committee. Would that suggestion meet with the approval of this Committee?

Mr Paranagua (Brazil): I would like to know if we are here to decide something in principle or not. I would like to know if really the majority of the Committee is for the amendment or against the amendment, because that would be a clear indication of the feeling of this Committee, because we are here to do something. Later we can have a report, and the Committee will decide what course to take.

The Chairman: I can say, in reply to the Brazilian Delegate, that the summary record of this meeting this afternoon will clearly indicate what the majority view of this Committee is. It is already apparent from the individual remarks made by the different members. I see no particular point in going through the formality of having a show of hands about the matter, but of course if the Committee feels that we should take a formal vote on it, I am in the hands of the Committee and we will proceed to do so.

Mr Paranagua (Brazil): Otherwise people would not be sure what is the opinion of this Committee.

Mr Bury (Australia): I would suggest that this is much too early a stage to have decisions in black and white, "Yes" or "No", and that we should record the views and hand them on to the Drafting Committee. It will be obvious, as you suggest, Mr Chairman, what the feeling of the Committee is; but that should not overbear subsequent proposals coming from other quarters.

The Chairman: I should like to add to that that there are two Delegates who
have said that they have not yet received instructions from their governments in this matter, and I think it would be better if an opportunity were given to them to obtain those instructions and to have their positions indicated in the record.

R. R. NAUHA (Brazil): Does that mean that there will be abstentions by those Delegates if it is to be "Yes" or "No"?

CHAIRMAN: They would presumably abstain from voting if a formal vote were taken today.

R. HOLMES (United Kingdom): Mr Chairman, I was hoping to have an opportunity at some stage (not necessarily now) to reply to one or two of the points which have been made by certain delegates here in criticism of our proposal. I would therefore feel that perhaps for the reasons you have given, we have not quite thought this thing out as far as we should yet.

CHAIRMAN: Any position, formal or otherwise, taken by this Committee today can be nothing more than a tentative or a provisional one. Obviously, anything with reference to this Charter is open to later consideration. This is a preliminary Conference. It seems to me, therefore, that there is little to be gained by treating a matter like this, on which there is a difference of opinion, as if today were the last opportunity to deal with the matter. I believe that it is wiser to obtain the views of the Committee as freely as they care to express them, let that go into the record, and let the matter rest.

PAL THEY (France)(interpretation): Mr Chairman, I would like to make a proposal which would be submitted to the opinion of the Committee. My point of view is not different on the question of voting in the Conference, a point of view which I have already had the honour of expressing to the Committee; but perhaps we might reach a compromise solution which would consist in maintaining Article 53 as now drafted in the American proposals. Secondly, in admitting permanent members to the Executive Council, I do not think it is necessary to express any further arguments on the subject, as they have already been expressed by other Delegates. Thirdly, in order to give a certain guarantee, which I think must be recognised as necessary, we can study
the particular point of the Charter where a vote of two-thirds majority would be required. Actually, as far as Chapter 7, entitled "Organization" is concerned, the Charter foresees that a certain number of decisions would have to be taken by the Conference, and perhaps it might be opportune to look at those cases again, and to decide which of these would have to be subjected to a majority of two-thirds when they come to be discussed by the Conference. I think that we might be able to give satisfaction to everyone, since we would maintain the principle of the single vote in the Conference. We would recognize the permanent interests of some States and would entrust to them the matter of directing the policy, or at least the execution of the Organization by having permanent members in Article 57. Again, one would offer certain elements of guarantee by specifying the voting of two-thirds majority on questions which seemed to be most important.

THE CHAIRMAN: The Chair had suggested a moment ago that it might be advisable to have those countries which were inclined to favour the weighted system of voting attempt to agree on some concrete proposal, to be considered as an alternative submitted by a minority of the Committee. I am not sure whether, in the light of the subsequent discussion, that is an idea that should be adhered to. An alternative would be to let this matter of voting in the Conference rest, as it were, for a while, while we proceed to a discussion of the membership of the Executive Board voting, and if any member wishes to come back to this matter of voting in the Conference, or if it appears in the light of our further discussion of the Executive Board that a certain course of action should be taken with reference to the matter of how to submit this question of voting in the Conference to the plenary session and to the Interim Drafting Committee, we can do that at a later stage. I am in the hands of the Committee, and I would be glad to proceed from this point in any way that you see fit. It seems to me that it might be well to proceed now to a consideration of Article 57. Already there has been some discussion on Article 57 by way of anticipation growing out of the
discussion on voting in the Conference. What is the pleasure of the Committee: shall we proceed with Article 57?

OFTEDAL (Norway): Mr Chairman, the purpose of all our work here is to obtain as unanimous results as possible. We are faced with two different proposals in regard to the voting in the Conference, and I think it is very wise, as you suggested, that those who constitute spokesmen of the alternative solution should come together and see whether they can dig further into that idea, and then, at a later stage, we can see whether we can perhaps convince them that our viewpoint is the better one.

I think there is nothing to be gained by simply shelving the United Kingdom proposal. It has to be very very carefully and fully considered by those who feel that they like it. Therefore, I think that your suggestion should be acted upon. But that does not prevent us from immediately passing on to a discussion of Article 57.

ARANAGUA (Brazil): Mr Chairman, I think the United Kingdom proposal must have full consideration, but, in view of the discussion today, I propose that in the record it should be mentioned that the Delegations of such-and-such country were against the proposal and such-and-such Delegations abstained from giving their opinion on the matter. In that way we would be able to see the position absolutely clearly in the record.
MR BURY (Australia): I cannot accept the view of the Brazilian delegate at all in this matter. He seeks a clear-cut decision; he wants it clearly defined at this point and something which can be deduced from the records. The atmosphere of this gathering, in our opinion should be that of an exchange of views on the freest possible basis; and if at various stages votes are to be taken, or anything recorded in a strictly formal way as to how various delegates voted or what they said in relation to a specific item in that form of Yes or No, then that is quite inappropriate.

MR HOUTMAN (Belgium) (interpretation): I should like to support the remarks made by the delegate of Australia. As far as Belgium is concerned, we have a considerable interest in all these questions regarding organization, since Belgium is an important commercial power, and if we are forced to abstain at the moment - and we excuse ourselves for that - it is because we learnt rather late the position taken by the United Kingdom and the arguments presented by that delegation. We are desirous, however, of clarifying our position and to express our opinion as soon as possible. We would be extremely glad if the Committee would kindly allow us the necessary time in order to form this opinion and to get contact with our Government in order to express this opinion, while justifying it.

MR Le COULLARD (Canada): Mr Chairman, I should like to join the last two speakers in my opposition to the Brazilian suggestion, but for a different reason. The U.K. proposal is that weighted voting should apply in the Conference and in the Executive Board. We have not yet discussed in detail voting in the Executive Board, and for that reason we could not align the delegates here to-day into two camps pro and con. I would suggest that we go on with Article 58, voting in the Executive Board, because of the interdependence of the two Articles 53 and 58; and it may be that the opinions of the various delegations might change when the attitude of other countries is known on Article 58.

THE CHAIRMAN: I thought that some other delegate had requested the floor, but apparently he has changed his mind. I will repeat my proposal. I think it has found some support; if it has not found majority support
I shall certainly change it. My proposal is that we go forward with the discussion of Articles 57 and 58 and secondly, that a sub-committee be constituted consisting of those countries which have expressed a more or less favourable inclination towards weighted voting. They would be requested to prepare something concrete for the later consideration of this Committee and of the interim drafting committee following this Conference. If there is no overwhelming objection to that course of action, I would like to proceed on that basis.

PARANAGUA (Brazil): It might happen that we are having some question about permanent seats referred to in the course of our discussion of other Articles, and that will be reserved.

CHAIRMAN: I am not sure that I understood the full purport of your remark.

PARANAGUA (Brazil): Because other Articles are connected with Article 57 of the original American proposal. That means that if we find something - and I do not want to imply that we are accepting the British amendment -

CHAIRMAN: If I understand the purport of your remarks, it is that the position taken with reference to permanent membership of the Board will necessarily have a bearing on this question we have discussed this afternoon with regard to the system of voting in the Conference. I think that is generally recognized; and since we cannot talk about everything at once, we have talked chiefly about the Conference up to the present. Now my proposal is that we talk a little less about the Conference and a little more about the Executive Board. It would be understood, of course, that there is a connection between the two. We have already heard the views of some delegates with reference to this matter of permanent membership of the Executive Board. I do not believe, however, that we have had a very full polling of the views of this Committee on that question, and I submit that it would be appropriate and timely at this point to develop the views of the Committee further with respect to the matter of permanent seats on the Executive Board.

QURESHI (India): Mr Chairman, may I suggest for the consideration of the Chair,
that we might disperse for ten minutes for tea before taking on this important question?

MR. NAUDE (South Africa): I support that.

THE CHAIRMAN: It has been suggested that we take ten minutes out for tea; I think the suggestion is a good one for that and other reasons. We will reassemble at ten minutes past five.

(After a short interval)

THE CHAIRMAN: The 15 minutes for tea have turned out to be a little more than half an hour. It is now 5.25, and the interval seems to have had a deterrent effect on some of the members, who are not back yet. I am sure there will be very little time for a continuation of this discussion this afternoon, as I think it will be necessary for me to stop in about 20 minutes, unless the Committee very much wants to go forward now that it has had tea. I hope to adjourn the meeting at about a quarter to six. That does not leave very much time. However, any time that remains it is possible that we might complete the comments on the Executive Board in the matter of permanent votes, so that so much will be on the record for further consideration. So many members have already expressed views on that subject that there may not be very much more to be said — but that may be an over-sanguine statement. I suggest therefore that we should not take up the discussion on Article 57.

MR. LAURENCE (New Zealand): A drafting point in connection with Article 57: in drafting that paragraph it does not appear to have been taken into account that, under the proviso to paragraph 3 of Article 78 — it may be claimed here that that paragraph has not been considered, but I am noting the point — the number of members who bring the Charter into force may be under 15. It would not therefore be possible to give effect to paragraph 1 of Article 57 if the membership, under the proviso, were under 15.

MR. HOLMES (United Kingdom): That seems to me to be a perfectly sound point. I imagine it could be dealt with by a very small drafting amendment saying,
"Or shall consist of 15 members or such smaller number as may correspond with the number, if less, of countries agreeing to bring the instruments into force in accordance with Article 78(3)."

MR. L. H. E. BURY (Australia): On the subject of permanent members for the Executive Board, which I did not touch on previously, our preliminary reaction is that it should hardly be necessary to provide that the main trading nations have permanent seats on the Board, because we cannot envisage that they would not be automatically re-elected. If the Conference lacked the wisdom to elect the main trading nations to the Executive Board, its future would be extremely bleak. I take it, though, that we are also considering Article 57 now in addition?

THE CHAIRMAN: Article 57 is what we are considering.

MR. BURY (Australia): In relationship to the numbers of members of the Executive Board, in the opinion of our Delegation 15 is insufficient, on the assumption that nearly all members at least of the United Nations and perhaps even others might become members. Our preliminary view is that the figure should be nearer 20. We also think that in electing members to the Executive Board due consideration should be given to adequate geographical representation.

MR. QURESHI (India): I find myself in entire agreement with the views expressed by the Delegate of Australia. We feel that the number 15 is too small. If my memory does not fail me, I think in the former proposals the number could go to 18. I think 20 would be a very fair number and I should like to emphasise also that due consideration be given to the geographical areas represented by the various members of the Conference.
This should form a specific clause of the Charter, so that these countries receive adequate treatment.

MR COUILLARD (Canada): If I might carry on for a moment the trend of thought which is apparent at the moment, I am not sure whether this proposed addition would enter into Article 57 or Article 59. I rather think it would enter either in subparagraph 4 of Article 57 or be a new subparagraph. We have observed that there is what we consider one rather serious omission in the Draft Charter, in that there is no provision for attendance of non-members of the Board who are members of the I.T.O. when matters of particular concern to them are discussed. Therefore, we intend to suggest the inclusion of a paragraph something on the following lines:

"Any member of the Organization who is not a member of the Executive Board shall be invited to send a representative to any meeting of the Board called to discuss a matter of particular and substantial concern to that member. Such representative shall, for the purpose of such discussions, have all the rights of Board members, except the right to vote."

That paragraph is intended to avoid some of the ambiguity that has arisen over the interpretation of Article 31 of the United Nations Charter, for example, which left the extent of the privileges of non-members sitting in at the Security Council in some doubt, with the result that their participation has been restricted and the value of their attendance very often limited.

MR OFTEDAL (Norway): Mr Chairman, I generally adhere to the viewpoint of the Australian Delegate, but I should like to make one remark: I do not very much like the proposal that a retiring member shall be eligible for immediate re-election, because I think that a reasonable rotation is necessary. That touches also on the question of the number of the Executive Board. If we have only 15, or even 18, and if we get, say, 45 or 50 members of the Organisation, it is most important that we have a reasonable rotation. That also will assure a reasonable geographical distribution. On the other hand, as I said earlier today, it is obvious that the leading commercial powers must always be members of the Executive Board. Therefore, although I do not make any formal proposal, I would
favour something of the kind "that the Executive Board shall consist of 15 members of the Organisation elected by the Conference, five of whom shall be eligible for immediate re-election", thereby excluding the other ten from immediate re-election. In practice, obviously, that would mean that the leading commercial powers would be assured of a permanent seat.

THE CHAIRMAN: I take it that you have in mind chiefly the question of ratio; that is, if it should be 20 instead of 15, you would prefer some ratio?

MR OFTEDAL (Norway): No, I would not go higher than 5 members for permanent seats. However, that is only one way of solving the problem; there may be many others which are perhaps better.

MR QURESHI (India): Sir, I am afraid the suggestion made by my colleague the Delegate from Norway requires some clarification, because, as a matter of fact, it introduces certain elements which are open to question. Either we must agree to the principle of having certain permanent seats, and those should be equitably and fairly distributed, both in regard to the importance of the commercial powers and the geographical representation; or, if the question of permanent seats is not acceptable, then I think it would be very objectionable if we said that only five seats were to be re-elected and asked other people that they should not stand for re-election; or we could make some reservation that it should be the important commercial powers which will be re-elected at each election. This, I am afraid, will introduce a very undesirable element into our Organisation. Either we should definitely recognise the principle of permanent representation of the important powers, both as regards their trade and as regards their geographical position (and in that case we will have to have an adequate number as permanent members, as in various other organisations), or it should be free election, and then there should be no reservation as to who should be re-elected.

MR HOUTMAN (Belgium)(interpretation): Mr Chairman, I believe that, as far as the Executive Board is concerned, we might perhaps follow the same solution as the one which we adopted as far as the Secretariat personnel
are concerned. Here, we have acted on the following basis: We have said that one must always take into account the activities and also geographical representation. I believe that here also, as far as the Executive Board is concerned, we might very well follow the same basis by taking the commercial activities and on the other hand, to a certain degree, geographical representation, and we might adopt a solution analogous to the one we have adopted as far as Secretariat personnel are concerned. Such a solution conforms entirely with the United Nations Charter.

MR PALTSEI (France)(interpretation): I should like to suggest the establishment of a permanent headquarters of permanent members, and for the rest of the Executive Board I entirely agree with the Norwegian Delegate’s proposals, and I think there should be rotation, as rapid as possible rotation, so that all countries might be able to be members of the Executive Board in as short a time as possible.

MR QURESHI (India): If you will excuse me suggesting it again, if any rotation is to be introduced, it means that those countries which did not have a chance in the earlier election of obtaining a seat, would get in. If we have any reservation in our minds that the important powers should always get in, the principle of rotation seems entirely unacceptable. Supposing some important countries came in, those would have to vacate their seats and some less important countries would have to come in. I would like my Norwegian colleague to throw some light on how he suggests it.

MR OFTEDAL (Norway): In answer to my Indian colleague, I would say that I have not a very clear idea as to what is the best solution, but I thought I had made myself perfectly clear. I know perfectly well what I am aiming at. I am aiming at rotation, and I am aiming at making the great commercial powers permanent members of the Executive Board. Those are the two things we should achieve. I do not really mind how it is drafted. I do not think that I can agree with the Indian Delegate when he says he dislikes the idea of reserving permanent seats for the main commercial powers. I would mention, for the sake of illustration, that when the
Charter of the United Nations was in draft, I said to my government that I disliked the way in which the Economic and Social Council was set up, because the main economic powers have not got permanent seats. We take it for granted that they will always be members of the Economic and Social Council, and it has turned out in practice to be so. I would like to be very sincere in such things, and I think it ought to have been stated that these great powers should be members of the Economic and Social Council. In the same way, I think we can perfectly well pass a ruling according to which the main commercial powers of the world would be permanent members of the Executive Board.

Mr. ParaNuGu (Brazil): It seems to me, to a certain extent, that we are prejudging this question about permanent seats. The whole question of permanent seats -- we are not deciding about that. We are having a discussion on the basis of the American Charter without discussing the British proposal at this moment; otherwise we are prejudging this question.

Mr. Holmes (United Kingdom): Mr. Chairman, I feel some sympathy with the Brazilian Delegate's last remarks. I think it rather shows that, as we suggested ourselves, there is a certain interdependence between the two questions of permanent seats and voting. If members would look again at the beginning of the United Kingdom memorandum, it will be seen that it says: 'The United Kingdom Delegation feels that the question of weight to be given to the views of each member of the Organisation is one to which close attention must be directed'. We pointed out at the beginning that there were two ways in which weight could be given to the views of the members; and my own suggestion would be, if it meets with the approval of yourself, Mr. Chairman, and of the members of the Committee, that we should regard this discussion both on voting and I think on permanent seats, as adjourned for the moment, partly because two Delegations have not yet had an opportunity of expressing their governments' views, and partly because, as has been represented rather forcibly this afternoon, the United Kingdom proposal may not have been available in time for Delegates to give their very full attention to it. I had, as I mentioned, one or two points, for instance, which (preferably I think on a later occasion) I would still like to make on this question of 37.
voting, and on the accusations which have been directed against my country of being undemocratic. I would just like to say this, that so far from being undemocratic, the essential thinking behind our proposal was really a democratic one, because I cannot think that it is really democratic that there should be one vote, for instance, to the United Kingdom and all the various other countries associated with her, many of which have a very effective autonomy in the matters with which this Organisation is concerned.
Now that in itself is really proof I think that we have to regard these things on a functional basis, and that the sort of general principle that may be applicable to a political matter of the highest importance as enshrined perhaps in one part of the United Nations Organization arrangements may not be applicable to everything. I do not wish to make any great point about the United Nations Organization; and our proposal, of course, was on entirely different lines. But surely we should consider this particular specialized agency from one point of view, perhaps. We should consider this from every point of view and do whatever is appropriate. It would not be appropriate, we think, that the United Kingdom and the whole of the Colonial Empire should have only one vote. We feel that some recognition would have to be given to that, and that in many ways the suggestion that we have outlined is the best way of recognizing that fact in the context of the international trade organization which we are attempting to set up. We feel that it would be far from democratic that there should be one vote given to this particular member and its associates.

So that, Mr Chairman, my proposal would be, if you agreed and if the Committee agreed, that we should regard this discussion as adjourned, perhaps until a later occasion, when members have had a better opportunity of considering this modest proposal that we have put in, of which, of course, I did give some warning at the meeting last week; and until other delegations who have no instructions at the moment have been able to formulate their views and perhaps some of the delegations which have already spoken with some horror - I think rather unnecessary horror - at those views, may have further time to think about them. I just wanted to add that I think it was the Chilean delegate who expressed some indignation that this had been, as it were, sprung upon the Committee and that this was not in the document on which his acceptance of the invitation to attend had been based. Well, we, too, in the United Kingdom might say that there were certain things in the United States Charter which came as a slight surprise to us, but we are nevertheless here and very glad to be here, because this is a pooling of ideas in what we hope will be the interests of everybody.
MR PARANAGUÁ (Brazil): Mr Chairman, I am sorry to come back again to this question, but the British delegate has raised the point again. There is no indignation on my part about this question. I am the first to recognize the economic importance and the commercial importance of the British Empire, as is everybody else; but if the American Government can put forward a proposal like this, being such a great economic and commercial power, why cannot other countries accept that too? I would like an explanation about that.

THE CHAIRMAN: Now, Gentlemen, as far as concerns the suggestion of the United Kingdom, that we should adjourn further discussion of this matter of the Conference and the Executive Board to some later date, I believe that time itself has taken care of that for this afternoon. I do not believe that we can continue our deliberations any longer to-day. It is now ten minutes to six, and the question would simply be whether we should, if not at the next meeting, at least at some meeting later this week, resume discussion of this whole matter. We have not completed the discussion of Article 57; we have not got to Article 58; and I think that we should endeavour, as soon as we can usefully do so, to complete this discussion of everything bearing upon the Conference, voting in the Conference, and the constitution of the Executive Board, and whether or not there might be permanent membership on the Executive Board. I do not think that we have really completed our discussion, but it is perfectly apparent, of course, that the larger number of members of this Committee are inclined, as far as the Conference is concerned, to favour a system of one country one vote; the record is clear enough upon that; but we ought to follow through and complete the whole record including this matter of the Executive Board; and I think also that there should be an opportunity for the delegates from the two countries who have not taken up a position upon the matter and who have asked for instructions to express their views upon it. Therefore, I suggest that at a later time, perhaps at a meeting later this week, we resume discussion of the Executive Board, and perhaps by that time we will have the views of the other two
members, and we will make the record as complete as possible on this sub-
ject. I would suggest, then, that for the moment we drop the matter of
the Executive Board and the Conference and that at the beginning of our
next meeting we should take up the report of the General Committee which
was set up a few days ago and consider their recommendations. I under-
stand from the Secretary of this Committee that this could be ready even
for a meeting tomorrow if we could arrange a meeting of this Committee,
and then, after we have disposed of them, we could proceed, if we were
not ready to resume discussion of the Executive Board, to take up
Article 1, Purposes, and Article 50, Functions; so that I believe we
would have plenty of grist for our mill. I am hopeful that we can go
ahead with a meeting tomorrow. I will ask the Secretary if he thinks
that is possible.

COMMITTEE SECRETARY: Mr Chairman, all I can say is that if the Committee
instructs me to arrange a meeting for tomorrow I have no doubt it will
be so arranged. I have been unable to get the exact programme for to-
morrow, but members will note in to-day's Journal there is tentatively
scheduled a meeting in the morning of Committee II and of the drafting
sub-committee of Committee IV, and in the afternoon there is tentatively
scheduled a meeting of Committee I. We could meet perhaps tomorrow after-
noon.

MR COLBAN (Norway): Could not we meet at 11 o'clock tomorrow morning?

COMMITTEE SECRETARY: We could, but it would look rather conspicuous because
all other Committees are meeting at 10.30.

MR COLBAN (Norway): My only worry about tomorrow afternoon is that the
meeting would probably go on rather late, and I have, as have perhaps
some other members, to go to the U. S. S. R. Reception. It is their great
day, November 7th.

THE CHAIRMAN: As far as the Chairman is concerned, the morning is perfectly
all right. Is there serious objection to our meeting even at 10.30, and
would the Norwegian delegate be opposed to our meeting at that time?

MR COLBAN (Norway): No, not a bit.
THE CHAIRMAN: Would 10.30 be agreeable to the Committee? We might then take up, as I say, the report of the sub-committee.

MR. PARANAGUA (Brazil): I think there will be no time to have the answer from the two members who are consulting their Governments.

THE CHAIRMAN: That would not be taken up; that would be deferred.

MR. HUTCHESON (Belgium) (interpretation): Would that be 10.30 tomorrow morning?

COMMITTEE SECRETARY: Yes.

MR. HOLMES (UK): Might I ask one question. It is this. Are we to regard Article 65, which is a function of the Committee on Business Practices, as appropriately falling to this Committee or to Committee III, which deals particularly with restrictive business practices? If I am right in thinking that the Chairman of Committee III is not anxious to take that as part of the work of that Committee, I would like guidance, because I would like to know whether it would be appropriate that we should submit on Committee V the paper, or part of the paper, which the United Kingdom has already ventured, in all humility, to put before Committee III.

THE CHAIRMAN: The thought that I had in mind with regard to those portions of the functions of the various Commissions was that they would be considered by this Committee in conjunction with the other Committee concerned; that in the case of the Commission on Business Practices we would have to review this matter in liaison with Committee III, and that there might well be a small joint sub-committee set up to correlate carefully what had been done in Committee III with that part of our proposed draft here which has to do with the Organization, so as to make sure that everything will be properly synchronized.

MR. HOLMES (UK): I think it is only a matter of your ruling whether or not Committee V is the dominant partner in the combination.