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Annex I: Tabular Survey of Dispute Settlement Procedures under GATT Articles XXII and XXIII

Annex II: Tabular Survey of Dispute Settlement Procedures under the 1979 Tokyo Round Agreements
Introduction

1. At its meeting on 21 and 24 September 1987, the Negotiating Group requested the secretariat to prepare a summary and comparative analysis of written submissions and oral statements of participants, with due regard also to existing GATT provisions and practices in the field of dispute settlement, in order to promote more focused discussions in the Group (MTN.GNG/NG13/3, paragraph 14). A further update of this note was requested by the Group at its meeting on 3 March 1988 (MTN.GNG/NG13/6, p. 11). This revised note is based on the working papers submitted so far to the Group (documents MTN.GNG/NG13/W/1-25), together with the notes of the meetings held so far (MTN.GNG/NG13/1-7). It does not include the views expressed at the informal meeting on 27 and 28 April 1988, which the secretariat was requested to summarize in an informal note only.

2. The large number of written submissions to and oral statements in the Negotiating Group on Dispute Settlement have been summarized in chronological order in the secretariat notes on the meetings held by the Group so far, and in country-wise order in the working papers submitted to the Group. This note groups the proposals in an analytical order according to the various phases of GATT dispute settlement procedures (parts I.A to VIII.A, respectively), compares them with the existing GATT rules and practices (parts I.B to VIII.B, respectively) and lists questions relating to the proposals, which may be addressed in the negotiations (parts I.C to VIII.C, respectively). This summary and analysis is not exhaustive and has been prepared on the sole responsibility of the secretariat.

I. Objectives and Nature of the GATT Dispute Settlement System

A. Proposals

3. Several participants suggested that the GATT dispute settlement system should offer a choice among alternative and complementary techniques of dispute settlement so as to respond adequately to the differing nature of disputes and to make the dispute settlement system more flexible. Many participants proposed that the various means for the settlement of disputes within GATT should include consultations, good offices, mediation, conciliation, working parties, panels, GATT Council decisions, the various dispute settlement mechanisms provided for in the MTN Agreements, and mutually agreed arbitration. But it was also said that these various dispute settlement methods could be used already under the existing GATT rules and the existing possibilities of resorting to mediation, conciliation and arbitration on a voluntary, mutually agreed basis should be made more usable and practical by elaborating rules for their use. It was also said that a rule-oriented approach enabling legally binding interpretations should not be viewed as a hindrance to a conciliatory settlement; a "sequential approach" making use of a variety of means of dispute settlement could promote a speedy resolution of disputes and develop additional incentives and institutional mechanisms encouraging compliance by contracting parties with their voluntarily undertaken GATT obligations.
4. Many delegations emphasized that prompt and effective resolution of GATT disputes was of vital importance for the effectiveness and implementation of both existing and new GATT rules. Some participants emphasized that the dispute settlement mechanism existed to protect the rights of contracting parties and to promote security and predictability in the multilateral trading system. Other participants said that the primary objective of the mechanism is to work out mutually satisfactory solutions to the disputes in a multilateral framework, and to restore the balance of economic and trade advantages that have been nullified or impaired; according to this view, the mechanism cannot and must not be used to create, through a process of deductive interpretation, new obligations for contracting parties, or to replace the negotiating process. Again other delegates said that GATT presents a multilateral legal system and that bilaterally negotiated dispute settlements, mediation, conciliation or mutually agreed arbitration cannot adversely affect the rights of third contracting parties and the competence of the CONTRACTING PARTIES to decide on the interpretation of GATT rules. Several countries proposed additional procedural and institutional safeguards to protect the rights of third contracting parties as well as of the CONTRACTING PARTIES acting jointly from being adversely affected by bilateral dispute settlements.

5. Some delegations proposed to strengthen the domestic law effects of GATT rules and dispute settlement procedures, for instance by introducing an obligation of each contracting party to establish procedures for their domestic traders and consumers to seek trade remedies if their interests were adversely affected, or by means of an undertaking of each contracting party to make their domestic legislation and the enforcement thereof relating to countermeasures conform to Article XXIII:2.

6. Several participants said that the principle of special and differential treatment of developing countries formed part of the existing GATT dispute settlement procedures as well as of the Punta del Este Declaration and should be further enhanced in the work of this Group. The structural differences among developed and less developed contracting parties (such as less diversified export sectors and the need to produce commercial surpluses to service foreign debts) justified differential treatment also in GATT dispute settlement procedures. One proposal was to provide for special measures to make up for the limited retaliatory capacity of developing countries vis-à-vis major trading partners. It was suggested, for instance, that in the case of a matter raised by a less-developed contracting party, the recommendations of the CONTRACTING PARTIES may include measures of compensation for injury caused, the time limit for implementation of the recommendations shall not exceed ninety days and, in the event that a recommendation is not implemented within the prescribed period, the CONTRACTING PARTIES may take measures of a collective nature further to suspension of concessions by the party affected. But it was also said that small developed contracting parties could likewise lack retaliatory power and that it was doubtful to what extent differences in economic development justified differences in dispute settlement procedures. Rule-based systems favoured those with limited power of retaliation, and smaller or less-developed countries had most to benefit from improvements in the GATT system.
B. Present GATT Rules and GATT Practices

7. The existing GATT dispute settlement procedures explicitly recognize the possibility of bilateral and multilateral consultations, good offices, conciliation, working parties, panels of experts, bilaterally agreed dispute settlements and Council decisions as available means for the settlement of disputes within GATT. GATT practice indicates that contracting parties resort also to other means of dispute settlement such as "Chairman rulings" (see, e.g., BISD 28S/12, 35), fact-finding and enquiry by an independent "group of experts" (see, e.g., L/580), "advisory opinions" rendered by a GATT panel directly to the two disputing contracting parties and accepted by them as legally binding (see BISD 12S/65), and requests for binding arbitration (see C/M/212, p. 16). GATT Article X:3,b further provides that "each contracting party shall maintain, or institute as soon as practicable, judicial, arbitral or administrative tribunals or procedures for the purpose, inter alia, of the prompt review and correction of administrative action relating to customs matters." Some of the 1979 Tokyo Round Agreements explicitly stipulate a right of appeal by adversely affected traders, for instance by requiring that "the legislation of each Party shall provide for the right of appeal without penalty to a judicial authority" (Article II of the Agreement on the Implementation of Article VII), and have considerably contributed to the availability of domestic judicial review e.g. of anti-dumping and countervailing duty determinations. Various international trade agreements concluded among contracting parties also provide for the settlement of their trade disputes by means of international arbitration and international courts.

8. In a Decision of 9 August 1949, the CONTRACTING PARTIES decided that "the determination of rights and obligations between governments arising under a bilateral agreement is not a matter within the competence of the CONTRACTING PARTIES". This decision was subject to the following footnote: "This Decision by its terms clearly refers only to the determination of the rights and obligations as between the parties to a bilateral agreement and arising from the agreement. It is, however, within the competence of the CONTRACTING PARTIES to determine whether action under such a bilateral agreement would or would not conflict with the provisions of the General Agreement" (BISD Vol. II/11). In accordance with this decision, Article XXIII has been invoked also in order to settle disputes over the legal impact of bilateral agreements upon the GATT rights and obligations of the parties to the bilateral agreement (see, e.g. BISD 29S/110) or of third contracting parties (L/6129). This practice suggests that the scope for bilaterally negotiated dispute settlements among contracting parties is limited by the multilateral GATT legal system.

9. The scope of application of the Decision of 28 November 1979 on "Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries" (BISD 26S/203) is largely confined to tariffs and non-tariff trade barriers on products originating in developing countries. But a footnote to this decision explicitly states
that "it would remain open for the CONTRACTING PARTIES to consider on an ad
hoc basis under the GATT provisions for joint action any proposals for
differential and more favourable treatment not falling within the scope of
this paragraph". The Decision of 5 April 1966 on "Procedures under
Article XXIII" (BISD 14/S/139) already provided for differential treatment
of developed and less-developed contracting parties and for more favourable
procedural rights of the latter (e.g.: "the less-developed contracting
party complaining of the measure may refer the matter which is the subject
of consultations to the Director-General so that, acting in an ex officio
capacity, he may use his good offices with a view to facilitating a
solution"; see also paragraph 10 of the decision). The 1979
"Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and
Surveillance" (BISD 26/S/210) includes further provisions on differential
and more favourable treatment of less-developed contracting parties (see
paragraphs 5, 8, 21, 23, 24, 25 and the Annex, paragraph 3). The 1982
Ministerial Declaration recognized the right of "any party to a dispute" to
seek "with the agreement of the other party" the good offices of the
Director-General "if a dispute is not resolved through consultations" (see
BISD 29/S/13).

C. Issues for Consideration

10. The above-mentioned proposals raise, inter alia, the following
questions:

(a) How can the existing possibilities of resorting to mediation,
conciliation and arbitration on a voluntary, mutually agreed basis be made
more usable in the context of the GATT dispute settlement system? What
additional GATT rules and dispute settlement procedures are needed for
promoting the use of mediation, conciliation and arbitration in the context
of the GATT dispute settlement system?

(b) Is there a need for additional GATT rules regulating the relationship
among the various dispute settlement methods available under the General
Agreement? Which procedural and institutional safeguards are needed to
ensure that bilaterally agreed dispute settlements, mediation, conciliation
and arbitration do not adversely affect the rights of third GATT
contracting parties as well as the authority of the CONTRACTING PARTIES
acting jointly to interpret GATT law?

(c) Is there a need for additional GATT rules on the relationship between
the general GATT dispute settlement procedures and the special dispute
settlement provisions of the various Tokyo Round Agreements?

(d) What specific additional provisions for differential and more
favourable dispute settlement procedures for developing countries could be
contemplated?
II. Notification

A. Proposals

11. Proposals have been made with respect to improved notification procedures, including prior notification of trade measures affecting the operation of the General Agreement before they have been put into force. It was said that improved notifications and surveillance could allow earlier consultations which might assist in preventing disputes from developing.

B. Present GATT Rules and Practices

12. In paragraph 2 of the 1979 Understanding, contracting parties "reaffirm their commitment to existing obligations under the General Agreement regarding publication and notification" (BISD 26S/210). A comprehensive summary of notification procedures in force, applicable to contracting parties generally, is provided in documents C/111, Annex I, and PREP.COM(86)W/31/Add.1. The notifications received under these provisions are circulated to contracting parties and their status is also regularly being reviewed in the biannual secretariat notes on "Developments in the Trading System" (e.g. L/6205, pp. 90-101). In paragraph 3 of the 1979 Understanding, "Contracting parties moreover undertake, to the maximum extent possible, to notify the CONTRACTING PARTIES of their adoption of trade measures affecting the operation of the General Agreement" ... "Contracting parties should endeavour to notify such measures in advance of implementation" ... The notifications received under this paragraph are circulated to contracting parties and they are also reported in the biannual secretariat notes on "Developments in the Trading System".

C. Issues for Consideration

13. How can a stricter observance of existing notification requirements be ensured? Is there a need for additional, improved notification requirements in the context of the GATT dispute settlement rules and procedures? How should any additional notification requirements and procedures be designed? How to coordinate any work in this respect in this Negotiating Group with the discussions of notification requirements in other Negotiating Groups?

III. Consultations

A. Proposals

14. It was suggested that no contracting party should refuse to hold consultations when these had been requested under Article XXII and concern a matter relevant to the application of the General Agreement. One participant said that the CONTRACTING PARTIES should not accept the request of a complaining party under Article XXIII:2 unless the disputing countries had held bilateral consultations under Article XXIII:1, subject to certain agreed exceptions (e.g. in case of complaints under Article XXIII:1,c, in
In the case of consultations under Article XXII:1 that were mutually considered to meet the conditions of Article XXIII:1, or if the respondent party did not enter into consultations). It was said that the flexibility of consultations was an advantage and that rigid detailed consultation procedures could reduce the effectiveness of consultations. Recent events had demonstrated the need for clarifying who determined when consultations were concluded and whether the defending party could oppose a request for a GATT panel on the ground that consultations should continue. Some delegations doubted whether it could be left to the complaining country alone to decide whether continued consultations could still lead to a mutually satisfactory solution. One proposal was that neither party to the dispute could decide on this unilaterally and the Council could take a decision on this issue on the basis of "consensus minus two" taking into account the "principle of a right to a panel".

15. It was also proposed to review the 1958 Procedures for consultations under Article XXII on questions affecting the interests of a number of contracting parties (BISD 78/24), for instance the requirement of a "substantial trade interest in the matter" and the 45-day notification time frame. With regard to Article XXIII:1 consultations, the question was raised whether it would expedite the consultative process if time limits were established and the consultations were regularly held in the capital of the party requested to consult, unless otherwise agreed.

B. Present GATT Rules and Practices

16. Article XXIII:2 stipulates that, "if no satisfactory adjustment is effected between the contracting parties concerned within a reasonable time, or if the difficulty is of the type described in paragraph 1(c) of this Article, the matter may be referred to the CONTRACTING PARTIES". This wording suggests that the General Agreement itself does not require invocation explicitly of Article XXIII:1 prior to an invocation of Article XXIII:2. But paragraph 6 of the 1979 Understanding provides that "Contracting parties should attempt to obtain satisfactory adjustment of the matter in accordance with the provisions of Article XXIII:1 before resorting to Article XXIII:2". In paragraph 4 of the same Understanding, contracting parties also "undertake to respond to requests for consultations promptly and to attempt to conclude consultations expeditiously, with a view to reaching mutually satisfactory conclusions. Any requests for consultations should include the reasons therefore" (BISD 26S/211).

The "Procedures for Dealing with New Import Restrictions for Balance-of-Payments Reasons and Residual Import Restrictions" adopted on 16 November 1960, recognize, inter alia, "that a consultation held under paragraph 1 of Article XXII would be considered by the CONTRACTING PARTIES as fulfilling the conditions of paragraph 1 of Article XXIII" (BISD 98/19, paragraph 9). Revised and simplified procedures for consultations on balance-of-payments restrictions were adopted in 1970 (BISD 18S/48), 1972 (20S/47) and 1979 (26S/205). In the 1966 Decision on "Procedures under Article XXIII" the CONTRACTING PARTIES agreed, inter alia, "that a consultation held under paragraph 2 of Article XXXVII in respect of such restrictions will be considered by the CONTRACTING PARTIES as fulfilling the conditions of paragraph 1 of Article XXIII if the parties to the consultations so agree" (BISD 14S/20, paragraph 11).
C. Issues for Consideration

17. Is there a need for additional consultation procedures and requirements in the context of the GATT dispute settlement system? Would time limits and other procedural rules be conducive to consultations under Article XXIII:1? Is there a need for revising the Procedures adopted in 1958 in respect of Article XXII (BISD 7S/24)? How should the Council proceed if a request for a panel is opposed by the defending party on the ground that consultations held under Article XXIII:1 should be continued in order to reach a mutually agreed settlement?

IV. Good Offices, Conciliation and Mediation

A. Proposals

18. Many participants proposed strengthening conciliation/mediation by the Director-General or by another neutral person. Many countries said that conciliation/mediation should be an option that could be used voluntarily by mutual agreement. It was said that, if a structured conciliation/mediation phase were to be mandatory as suggested by one participant, there would be a need for appropriate safeguards for timing and confidentiality in order to avoid any undue prolongation of the process. It was further suggested that any resolution reached through conciliation must be consistent with the General Agreement and must not prejudice the GATT rights of third parties. In case of a mutually satisfactory solution, the conciliator should inform the Council of the terms and conditions of the solution.

19. One proposal was that, in a case where consultation stops short of settlement, any disputant might request the Director-General or his designee to use his good offices with a view to finding a solution within sixty days from the date when the matter was referred to him. Concomitantly with this process, any disputant might refer the matter to the Council to avoid a possible delay. In this case, the mediation process should proceed in parallel with the deliberations of the Council on the matter and with the proceedings of a panel established by the Council.

20. Another participant proposed specific procedures for conciliation requesting the conciliator, inter alia, to "make an independent judgment as to the applicability of the General Agreement, the conformity with the General Agreement of measures giving rise to the dispute, the existence of nullification or impairment, and whether or not the attainment of any objective of the General Agreement is being impeded". "If solutions cannot be found ..., the conciliator shall make recommendations on the appropriate level of compensation with a view to restoring the balance of benefits between the parties". The appropriateness of such recommendations by a conciliator was questioned by other participants. Thus, it was said that the proposed elaboration of detailed conciliation rules could reduce the
advantageous flexibility of conciliation. It was further said that compensation as a means of conciliation could not be imposed by a conciliator but had to be agreed by the parties.

21. It was said that mediation could take place at any time following failure of finding a mutually acceptable solution in bilateral consultations or during the panel proceedings. If mediation was initiated when a panel was in the process of addressing the dispute, the panel proceedings should continue in parallel with the mediation efforts. Another participant was of the view that either party to a dispute could also request the mediation of the Director-General or of his designee during bilateral consultations. Another proposal was that, "if a dispute is not resolved through consultations the contracting parties concerned may request a contracting party, the Chairman of the CONTRACTING PARTIES or the Director-General to use their good offices with a view to the conciliation of the parties to a dispute".

22. Another proposal was that "the mediation function would be separated out from the panel process so as to make clear that the rôle of the panel is a last resort adjudicatory stage". One participant raised the question whether it would be appropriate to authorize panels to suggest conciliation proposals even if not necessarily based on provisions of the General Agreement?

B. Present GATT Rules and Practices

23. At the request of a contracting party, Articles XXII:2 and XXIII:2 enable the intervention of the CONTRACTING PARTIES with the aim of contributing to the settlement of a dispute. The 1958 Procedures adopted in respect of Article XXII (BISD 7S/24) and the 1966, 1979 and 1982 Procedures adopted in respect of Article XXIII (BISD 14S/18, 26S/210, 29S/13) make it explicitly clear that Articles XXII:2 and XXIII:2 are a sufficient basis for requesting and offering good offices and conciliation by the Director-General or by another appropriate body or individual.

24. The general GATT dispute settlement procedures provide for good offices and conciliation on a voluntary basis and - contrary to Article 17 of the Subsidy Code and Article 15 of the Anti-Dumping Code - not as a mandatory phase of the dispute settlement process. The 1966 Decision on Procedures under Article XXIII provides that, if a less-developed contracting party complaining of a measure refers the matter to the Director-General so that he may use his good offices, the developed contracting party concerned shall participate in consultations undertaken by the Director-General with a view to promoting a mutually acceptable solution. The procedures also state that, if no mutually satisfactory solution has been reached after a period of two months from the commencement of the consultations undertaken by the Director-General, the Director-General shall, at the request of one of the contracting parties concerned, submit the matter to the CONTRACTING PARTIES or to the Council. The 1982 Dispute Settlement Procedures include the following provisions on conciliation (BISD 29S/13):
"With reference to paragraph 8 of the Understanding, if a dispute is not resolved through consultations, any party to a dispute may, with the agreement of the other party, seek the good offices of the Director-General or of an individual or group of persons nominated by the Director-General. This conciliatory process would be carried out expeditiously, and the Director-General would inform the Council of the outcome of the conciliatory process. Conciliation proceedings, and in particular positions taken by the parties to the dispute during conciliation, shall be confidential, and without prejudice to the rights of either party in any further proceedings under Article XXIII:2. It would remain open at any time during any conciliatory process for either party to the dispute to refer the matter to the CONTRACTING PARTIES."

C. Issues for Consideration

25. Is there a need for additional procedures for good offices, conciliation and mediation in the context of Articles XXII and XXIII? Does the very rare recourse to good offices, conciliation and mediation in GATT practice reveal a preference of contracting parties to insist on their GATT rights rather than to compromise the multilateral rules through ad hoc conciliation proposals? Should good offices, mediation and conciliation remain optional, mutually agreed steps in the dispute settlement process? Should a conciliator be asked to make an independent judgment on the GATT conformity of the measures concerned, on the existence of "nullification or impairment" and on an appropriate level of compensation? Or should the mediation function be clearly separated from the function of GATT panels? Would it be compatible with the "rule-oriented" mandate of panels to authorize them to also submit conciliation proposals?

V. Rôle of the GATT Council

A. Proposals

26. Several participants proposed to strengthen the rôle of the Council in the GATT dispute settlement system (see also below part VIII on "surveillance"). One proposal was that the Council could resolve less complex "straightforward cases" by a decision of the Council on the basis of accepted interpretations of GATT Articles without recourse to a panel. But it was also said that such a Council decision should not be taken without the consent of the party complained against since there was a need to ensure that a full and fair hearing of the issues had been held and the party complained against was satisfied this was the case.

27. Another proposal was to remove the disputing parties from certain Council decisions, e.g. on the establishment and terms of reference of panels, on the adoption of panel reports or of the panel recommendations for remedy, and on whether a particular case is "straightforward". Other participants said that the parties to the disputes should continue to participate in the Council's decision-making process with regard to the adoption of reports and the making of recommendations because, inter alia, the consent by the defending contracting party would strengthen the political will to implement panel findings.
28. It was suggested that the Council should oversee and monitor all the on-going dispute settlement proceedings and conduct a comprehensive review of the implementation of panel recommendations four times a year on a regular basis. Another proposal was to set up a separate GATT body dedicated to dispute settlement, which would report to the Council and could discharge many of the Council's functions in respect of dispute settlement. Such an auxiliary body of the Council could meet regularly in order to keep existing disputes under review and examine the proper functioning of the dispute settlement mechanism. The establishment of a separate body for the regular review and monitoring of disputes would have to duly take into account the existing functions of the Council and of the Director-General in the field of dispute settlement.

29. As an alternative to such an additional body, it was proposed that the Council could meet regularly in a special "Dispute Settlement Mode" to carry out all the functions relating to disputes, considering and monitoring only dispute settlement matters under the chairmanship of a separate chairman appointed or elected for that purpose by the CONTRACTING PARTIES. Such Council meetings could be the forum for initiating disputes and could give greater and more systematic attention to the dispute settlement process. As soon as a dispute were brought to the attention of the CONTRACTING PARTIES, the chairman of the Dispute Settlement Council could be authorized to take appropriate action with the agreement of the parties concerned, including convening consultations and exploring the possibilities through conciliation for a satisfactory solution to individual disputes. If the dispute were not resolved through either consultation or conciliation, the Dispute Settlement Council should promptly establish the panel in accordance with the agreed procedures, monitor observance of the procedures, keep under surveillance the implementation of recommendations or rulings under GATT Article XXIII:2, conduct periodic reviews of the operation of the dispute settlement mechanism, and meet as frequently as necessary, preferably about once a month, so as to discharge promptly its functions. The Council, when meeting in its Dispute Settlement Mode, should be chaired by a chairman appointed or elected for that purpose by the CONTRACTING PARTIES for a term of possibly several years. The chairman should offer his good offices to the disputing parties, try to mediate a bilateral dispute settlement with the agreement of the parties concerned, be available for arbitration, facilitate the setting-up of a GATT panel, keep the Dispute Settlement Council informed of developments of the disputes, and advise and assist the Council in the latter's discharge of its functions. The Dispute Settlement Council would remain identical with the Council of Representatives and would report directly to the CONTRACTING PARTIES. The existence of two chairmen of the Council meeting in separate modes would not affect the unity, nature and authority of the Council which would remain the only standing body representing the CONTRACTING PARTIES.

30. In response to the proposal for a special Dispute Settlement Council, it was said that, while the institution of a special Council chairman could relieve the workload of both the Director-General and the general Council
chairman, it should not exclude a possible role of the Director-General in the dispute settlement process nor weaken the unity of the Council chairmanship. Another proposal was that the Council, sitting in Dispute Settlement Mode could be chaired by an assistant or deputy of the general Council chairman. It was also said that the capacity of the GATT Council to give full attention and focus to the settlement of disputes could be ensured by extending, if necessary, the duration of the Council sessions. Since the majority of GATT dispute settlement proceedings involved developed countries, the agenda of Council meetings in a dispute settlement mode would be likely to include more items referring to disputes among developed contracting parties than to disputes involving developing countries. This could act as a disincentive to the participation of less-developed contracting parties in a special Dispute Settlement Council. By contrast, the comprehensive agenda of the current Council meetings involved the interests of all contracting parties and promoted the close examination by less-developed contracting parties of all the steps of dispute settlement proceedings. It was further said that the creation of a new body, such as a Dispute Settlement Council, could dilute the competence and importance of the regular Council and weaken the dispute settlement process. Concern was also expressed that frequent meetings of the Dispute Settlement Council, even without a specific request by a complaining contracting party, could lead to politicization and an unwarranted burden.

31. Another submission proposed that, instead of creating a new ad hoc dispute settlement surveillance mechanism, the Council should continue to exercise this function. It could be envisaged that, in its meetings, the Council would specifically reserve a part of its agenda to questions on dispute settlement. This part of the meeting could be chaired, on an experimental basis, by a chairman "designated" (e.g. the Deputy Director-General) who could exercise the role of conciliator/mediator, arbitrator or supervisor, depending on circumstances, without encroaching on the responsibilities of the Director-General relating to dispute settlement.

32. It was suggested that all contracting parties should explicitly undertake to accept as binding all Council decisions emerging from the dispute settlement process and adopted by consensus. The question was raised whether access to Article XXIII:2 should be limited for those contracting parties which did not implement Council decisions under Article XXIII:2.

B. Present GATT Rules and Practices

33. Under Article XXIII:2, "the CONTRACTING PARTIES shall promptly investigate any matter so referred to them and shall make appropriate recommendations to the contracting parties which they consider to be concerned, or give a ruling on the matter, as appropriate". The 1979 Understanding explicitly confirms that "the Council is empowered to act for the CONTRACTING PARTIES, in accordance with normal GATT practice" (BISD 268/215). It appears therefore that the present GATT rules already enable the Council to give a ruling on "straightforward disputes" directly unless the disputing parties request the referral of their dispute to a working party or panel.
34. It has been recognized that the Council has authority to take action on all matters of concern to the CONTRACTING PARTIES other than final decisions under Article XXV:5 (see SR 25/9, page 177). Thus the Council has already authority to set up an auxiliary body dedicated to dispute settlement or to meet regularly "in a dispute settlement mode". This seems to be borne out by the Council practice, since 1980, of holding periodic special meetings to review developments in the trading system. Initially, such meetings were related exclusively to the 1979 Understanding regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance. They were concerned primarily with reviewing developments covered by paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Understanding, which deal with the notification of trade measures, and by paragraph 24, which concerns surveillance of developments in the trading system. In July 1983, the Council agreed to extend the scope of its special meetings to include monitoring of paragraph 7(i) of the 1982 Ministerial Declaration (BISD 29S/11). The Council also agreed that such special meetings should preferably be held twice a year; the Director-General reports regularly on the status of work in panels at these special meetings. The Council could similarly agree to extend the scope of its special meetings to all matters under Articles XXII and XXIII and to convene the special Council meetings more frequently.

35. GATT panels are usually mandated to examine the matter in light of the relevant GATT provisions. Panel reports and Council decisions on their adoption apply existing GATT obligations to the facts of the case. They are usually neither authorized nor purport to create new obligations but only confirm the existing GATT obligations in respect of a particular dispute. The 1982 Ministerial Declaration states accordingly: "It is understood that decisions in this process cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the General Agreement" (BISD 31S/16). The CONTRACTING PARTIES remain free to depart from their earlier decisions and interpretations of GATT rules. It is often impossible to draw a neat distinction between authoritative interpretation, law-creation or amendment, because general rules inevitably undergo a change if authoritative interpretations or "understandings" by the treaty-applying agencies (e.g. the CONTRACTING PARTIES) fix the meaning of ambiguous rules or reduce the number of possible interpretations.

C. Issues for Consideration

36. Is there a need for strengthening the rôle of the Council in the dispute settlement process? How could this be achieved (e.g. by making surveillance by the Council of the dispute settlement system a more regular agenda item of Council meetings, a more frequent use of the so far biannual special Council meetings for regularly overseeing and monitoring all ongoing dispute settlement proceedings, establishment by the Council of an auxiliary body dedicated to dispute settlement, special meetings of the Council sitting "in a dispute settlement mode")? Is there a need for clarifying the legal effects of Council decisions applying existing GATT obligations to the particular circumstances of a dispute?
VI. GATT Panel Procedures

1. Establishment of panels

A. Proposals

37. There seemed to be general agreement among participants on "the principle of the right to a panel". One proposal was that, when a request for the establishment of a panel had been submitted to the Council, the Council should endorse it and could only object in cases that were obviously unfounded. Another participant was of the view that the CONTRACTING PARTIES should examine the GATT relevance of a complaint, the appropriateness of continuing or resuming bilateral consultations as well as the appropriate method of dispute settlement before deciding whether or not to accept the request to refer a matter to the CONTRACTING PARTIES; when the CONTRACTING PARTIES had accepted the request to establish a panel, they (the Council) should establish a panel normally within a period of two months from the time so requested. Another view was that the Council should decide on the constitution of a panel normally at the first, and at the latest at the second, meeting following the Council meeting in which the establishment of a panel had been requested. It was also said that in case of a dispute between a developed and a less-developed contracting party where the latter, as a complainant, had sought the good offices of the Director-General and such good offices had failed to produce a mutually satisfactory solution, the Council should decide on the establishment of a panel not later than upon the receipt of the Director-General's report on the action taken by him in accordance with the 1966 Decision on Procedures under Article XXIII. Another participant suggested that the GATT relevance of a complaint could be examined more carefully by a panel and that, "should a party request the establishment of a panel in accordance with the appropriate procedures, it should be automatically established, without debate in Council or delay". It was also said that requests under Article XXIII:2 should be made in writing and be substantiated (e.g. by a brief summary of the facts, problems and consultations held), and requests for the establishment of a panel should be accompanied by draft terms of reference. The defending contracting party should submit its reply at the latest at the Council meeting following the submission of the complaint.

38. Different views were expressed as to whether, and to what extent, "grey area trade restrictions" and the proliferation of bilaterally agreed trade restrictions should be brought within the GATT dispute settlement system. One participant proposed an understanding encouraging recourse to Article XXII and XXIII by third contracting parties adversely affected by such bilateral arrangements. Another view was that recourse to Article XXII:2 consultations could provide a more appropriate remedy for third parties vis-à-vis such bilateral arrangements.

B. Present GATT Rules and Practices

39. Article XXIII:2 provides that the "CONTRACTING PARTIES shall promptly investigate any matter referred to them and shall make appropriate recommendations to the contracting parties which they consider to be
concerned, or give a ruling on the matter, as appropriate". The 1966 "Procedures under Article XXIII" specify that, in case of a complaint by a less-developed contracting party under Article XXIII:1 and upon receipt of a report by the Director-General, "the CONTRACTING PARTIES or the Council shall forthwith appoint a panel of experts to examine the matter with a view to recommending appropriate solutions" (BISD 14S/139, paragraph 5).

The 1979 Understanding states: "It is agreed that if a contracting party invoking Article XXIII:2 requests the establishment of a panel to assist the CONTRACTING PARTIES to deal with the matter, the CONTRACTING PARTIES would decide on its establishment in accordance with standing practice... It is further agreed that such requests would be granted only after the contracting party concerned had had an opportunity to study the complaint and respond to it before the CONTRACTING PARTIES" (BISD 26S/210, paragraph 10). It appears that it has been "standing practice" of the Council so far to establish a panel, albeit in some instances only after several Council meetings, if the complaint has been referred to the CONTRACTING PARTIES pursuant to Article XXIII and the complaining contracting party has requested the establishment of a panel. The "right to a panel" has been explicitly recognized in several Tokyo Round Agreements (e.g. Article 14.14 of the 1979 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Article VII:7 of the 1979 Agreement on Government Procurement, Article 18:1 of the 1979 Subsidy Code, Article 20:5 of the 1979 Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the GATT, Article 15:5 of the 1979 Agreement on Implementation of Article VI).

40. The 1979 Understanding recognizes that, "in practice, contracting parties have had recourse to Article XXIII only when in their view a benefit accruing to them under the General Agreement was being nullified or impaired." (BISD 26S/210, 216) Panels established under Article XXIII:2 are usually requested to examine the complaint in the light of the relevant GATT provisions. There have been only very few instances where the "GATT relevance" of a complaint under Article XXIII has been put into doubt. In one instance, these doubts were taken into account by a supplementary Council decision "that the terms of reference remain as they stood, that the reservations and statements made be placed on the record and that it be presumed that the Panel would be limited in its activities and findings to within the four corners of GATT" (BISD 30S/141). In another instance, the defendant party took the view "that the Panel could not examine or judge the validity of or motivation for the invocation of Article XXI:b(iii) by the United States in this matter", and the Council then agreed to incorporate this understanding explicitly into the terms of reference of the panel (C/M/192, page 6; L/6053, page 2).

41. Complaints under Article XXIII presuppose an assertion by the complaining country "that any benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the Agreement is being impeded" (Article XXIII:1). In GATT practice, the Council has also granted requests for the establishment of a panel when the complaint was initiated by a third contracting party against trade effects resulting from bilateral preferential trade arrangements (see L/5776) or from other sectoral trade arrangements (e.g.
C. Issues for Consideration

42. Should the "principle of a right to a panel" be explicitly recognized following the precedent set by the 1966 dispute settlement procedures as well as by various Tokyo Round Agreements? Should the CONTRACTING PARTIES (Council) retain the right not to establish a panel if, for instance, there is no consensus (without the parties to the dispute) on the "GATT relevance" of the complaint, or if all contracting parties, except the complaining party, agree that another dispute settlement method might be more appropriate (e.g. continued consultations, a working party)? Should there be an explicit requirement that complaints under Article XXIII:2 be substantiated by a written summary of the facts of the case and of its "GATT relevance" and be accompanied by proposed terms of reference? Should such complaints be recognized to be prima facie "GATT relevant"? Should the choice of the most appropriate method of dispute settlement be left to the complaining contracting party? Is there a need for clarifying the applicability of Articles XXII/XXIII to "grey area trade restrictions" perceived to nullify or impair benefits accruing under the General Agreement or to impede the attainment of any objective of the Agreement?

2. Terms of reference and composition of panels

A. Proposals

43. Many participants took the view that the party raising the complaint had the right to define the scope of its complaint and have its complaint examined in the light of all relevant GATT provisions. The Council should therefore regularly give panels the traditional "standard terms of reference" unless the parties to the dispute had reached agreement on special terms of reference by the time the Council considered the request for a panel or within a specified period (e.g. ten working days or, according to another proposal, thirty days) after the Council decision to establish a panel. Divergent views were expressed as to whether special terms of reference, agreed among the parties to the dispute, required approval by the GATT Council. In its request for a panel, the complaining country should indicate whether it agreed to the use of standard terms of reference on whether it proposed special terms of reference. It was said that the terms of reference of panels should cover the entire matter raised, and no contracting party should oppose examination of the applicability of GATT provisions and compliance with them. Still another proposal was that panels themselves should decide on their terms of reference, several countries proposed that panels should be authorized to recommend also "retroactive compensation" for the prejudice caused from the moment when the disputed measure entered into force.

44. Many participants proposed that the "roster of non-governmental panelists" (see BISD 31S/9) be made permanent, expanded and improved (e.g. by indicating more clearly the qualifications of panelists). The composition of the roster should be decided upon by the Council for the
period of, for example, two years. Another proposal was that the Director-General should maintain an annually updated and published list of both governmental and non-governmental persons available for serving on panels. For this purpose the number of panelists to be indicated by each contracting party should be increased to three or four. Several participants suggested that panels should continue to be composed of government representatives and/or persons on the "roster". When an agreement on the panel membership was not reached by the parties to a dispute within a short specified period (for example, ten working days), the Director-General, in consultation with the Chairman of the Council, should complete or determine the membership without seeking the opinion of the parties concerned, also drawing on persons whose names were included in the agreed roster. Another view was that the Director-General should also consult with the parties concerned prior to such appointment of panelists. Still another proposal was that, unless the parties to a dispute reached an agreement on the composition of a panel within thirty days from the date of the Council decision to establish a panel, the Director-General, in consultation with disputants and in line with Annex 6(ii) of the 1979 Understanding regarding dispute settlement, would propose panelists from government representatives and/or the roster of panelists. In this case, the parties should retain the ability to respond to the Director-General's proposal but should not oppose nominations except for compelling reasons. After sixty days from the date of the Council decision to establish a panel, the final decision on its composition should be taken by the Director-General without delay. It was also said that citizens of countries whose governments were parties to the dispute should not be members of the panel concerned with that dispute unless such were mutually agreed upon by the parties to the dispute.

45. Some participants proposed that, as a rule, panels should continue to be composed of three persons unless the parties to the dispute agreed within a specified period on a composition of five persons. One proposal was that each disputing party should unilaterally nominate one panelist, and the Director-General should then nominate the third panelist (who would be the chairman) from a roster adopted by the CONTRACTING PARTIES. Other participants expressed concern at this proposal on the ground that it could increase the risk of split panel findings. Several participants said that non-governmental persons mentioned in the roster should be invited to serve as panelists more frequently. Another proposal was that panelists should be chosen exclusively from a roster of neutral non-governmental experts.

B. Present GATT Rules and Practices

46. The Agreed Description of the customary practice of the GATT in the field of dispute settlement, annexed to the 1979 Understanding, mentions that panels have normally been given standard terms of reference and that the "function of a panel has normally been to review the facts of a case and the applicability of GATT provisions and to arrive at an objective assessment of these matters". "In cases of failure of the parties to reach a mutually satisfactory settlement, panels have normally given assistance
to the CONTRACTING PARTIES in making recommendations or in giving rulings as envisaged in Article XXIII:2" (BISD 26S/215). However, there is no requirement that standard terms of reference be used for panels established under GATT Article XXIII:2. Some of the Tokyo Round Agreements do, by contrast, specify the terms of reference to be given to panels (see, e.g. Article 14.15 of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Article VII:7 of the Agreement on Government Procurement, Annex III of the Agreement on the Implementation of Article VII). The present practice of establishing the terms of reference of panels in consultation with the parties to the dispute has sometimes considerably delayed the establishment of panels and, in at least one instance, prevented the panel from examining the complaint in the light of all relevant GATT provisions. There is also evidence from other GATT panel proceedings that special terms of reference have been invoked as evidence in support of the legal arguments of the defending party and have risked prejudicing the neutral examination of the dispute by the panel.

47. The 1966 "Procedures under Article XXIII" provide that "the members of the panel shall ... be appointed in consultation with, and with the approval of, the contracting parties concerned" (paragraph 5). The 1979 Understanding includes detailed procedures for the composition of panels (paragraphs 11 to 14). The dispute settlement procedures adopted in 1984 enable the Director-General to complete the nomination of panelists at the request of either party:

"The Director-General should continue the practice of proposing panels composed preferably of governmental representatives but may also draw as necessary on persons on the approved roster. The parties should retain the ability to respond to the Director-General's proposal, but shall not oppose nominations except for compelling reasons. In the event that panel composition cannot be agreed within thirty days after a matter is referred by the CONTRACTING PARTIES, the Director-General shall, at the request of either party and in consultation with the Chairman of the Council, complete the panel by appointing persons from the roster of non-governmental panelists to resolve the deadlock, after consulting both parties." (BISD 31S/10).

These various procedures appear not to have been fully used and observed in GATT practice (e.g. as regards time limits, choice of panelists from countries who are parties to the dispute, annual updating of "an informal indicative list of governmental and non-governmental persons qualified ... and available for serving on panels"). The present GATT practice of seeking the consent of both disputing parties for the nomination of panelists has sometimes considerably delayed the composition of panels.

48. In GATT practice, most panels have been composed of three panelists. Experience with GATT panels suggests that panels composed of five members have sometimes produced panel reports that were not adopted (e.g. L/5776, SCM/43) or whose adoption was qualified by certain "understandings" (see C/M/154, page 7, as regards adoption of the four "tax panel reports" of 1976). But the controversy over the adoption of these panel reports might have been due not to the number of five panelists, which may make it more difficult to reach agreement among panel members on precise panel findings, but to the complexity of the disputes concerned.
C. Issues for Consideration

49. Do participants agree that the complaining country should propose the terms of reference of the panel in its request under Article XXIII:2 and should be recognized to have a right to the use of the "standard terms of reference" unless the parties to the dispute agree within a specified period on special terms of reference?

50. Should the existing requirement to "maintain an informal indicative list of governmental and non-governmental persons qualified ... and available for serving on panels" (paragraph 13 of the 1979 Understanding) be reactivated? Should the "roster of non-governmental panelists" be made permanent, expanded and improved (e.g. by additional information on the curriculum vitae's of panelists)? Should the Director-General be authorized to decide - even without a request of either party (see BISD 31S/10) on his own initiative - on the composition of panels if the parties to the dispute cannot agree on the panel membership within a specified period of time after the establishment of the panel? Should paragraph 11 of the 1979 Understanding be modified so as to explicitly acknowledge the recent practice of also appointing by mutual agreement panelists who are nationals of one of the disputing parties? Should the "principle of a right to a panel" be extended not only to the use of standard terms of reference but also to a normal composition of three panelists (to be nominated by the Director-General, if necessary) unless the disputing parties agree within a specified period on a composition of five panelists?

51. Since the "quality" and legitimacy of panel findings also depend on their consistency with the ever more complex GATT rules and GATT practices and since most panelists are no longer familiar with the details of the development of GATT rules over the past forty years (e.g. the more than fifty past panel reports) and often lack the time necessary for the drafting of panel reports on complex disputes (sometimes involving more than 1,000 pages of submissions), how can the panel process be further "professionalized" so as to make panel reports more predictable and consistent from one to the next as well as with past GATT practice?

3. Panel Procedures

(A) Proposals

52. Many participants proposed expediting panel proceedings and making them more predictable through the use of standard working procedures to be adopted by panels for their internal work and proceedings with the parties. These standard procedures for the work of panels could be formally adopted and their regular use recommended by the CONTRACTING PARTIES. Several participants proposed that the time limits for each phase of the panel proceedings, as well as for the dispute settlement process as a whole, should be fixed more precisely and strictly. One proposal was that a panel should aim at delivering its report to the CONTRACTING PARTIES normally
within a period of nine months and, in cases of urgency where delay would cause serious injury difficult to correct, within three months from the establishment of a panel. Another proposal was that panels should be generally requested to submit the panel report within six months unless otherwise agreed. Given the complexity of some cases, it was suggested that a maximum overall deadline of no more than twelve months be introduced. Some participants suggested maintaining a certain flexibility so that in cases where a specific time-period for panel proceedings were agreed upon among disputing parties and panelists, the panel should respect such a specifically agreed deadline. It was further proposed to specify the conditions for the applicability of the "urgency procedures" as well as the "reasonable period of time" (paragraph 18 of the 1979 Understanding) between the submission of the panel report to the disputing parties and its circulation to the CONTRACTING PARTIES. In cases where the Council established a panel upon the receipt of the report of the Director-General, whose good offices, initiated at the request of a complaining less-developed contracting party, had failed to produce a mutually satisfactory solution, the panel should endeavour to complete its work within a period of sixty days from the date the matter were referred to it in accordance with the 1966 Decision on Procedures under Article XXIII. If the panel were unable to meet the above time limit, it should report to the Council the reasons for the delay and the Council should grant extension as appropriate.

53. One participant proposed the introduction of binding, enforceable time-tables for the dispute settlement process including the various stages of panel proceedings. According to this view, "in the case of unconsented delays caused by the defending party during the work of the panel or thereafter (e.g. delays in providing written submissions or information requested by the panel), the complaining party should have the right to retaliate for damage caused by the measures at issue during the period of delay, provided that such measures are found to have infringed obligations or otherwise to have caused nullification or impairment". Another proposal was to allow for the possibility of "interim measures of protection", for instance in the case of perishable goods and supplies en route.

54. Several participants suggested clarifying and standardizing the procedures and rules for the intervention of third contracting parties and extending their rights to participate in panel proceedings and to obtain documentation submitted to the panel. It was said that all interested contracting parties were entitled to have a legal status in any panel proceeding, the outcome of which might have a direct or indirect impact on their rights and obligations. Third parties should be given access to the documentation and to make written and oral representations. If the third party were of the view that the mutually agreed bilateral solution of a dispute was not in accordance with the General Agreement, it might refer the legal questions involved in the dispute to the Council. It was also said that intervention by third parties must not lead to abuse of a panel procedure and that panels should not be authorized to also recommend compensation vis-à-vis interested third contracting parties. If the intervening third party were dissatisfied with its rights of intervention, it could invoke itself Article XXIII.
55. Many participants emphasized that any panel must reach a clear finding regarding nullification and impairment of benefits. Divergent views were expressed as to whether panels were authorized to examine the "GATT conformity" of bilaterally agreed dispute settlements among the disputing parties, or to refuse to decide on the dispute on the ground that there was a need for new GATT provisions. According to one view, the Council should be informed about the terms of a bilaterally agreed settlement of a dispute before a panel and, if the settlement were found by the Council not to be in accordance with the General Agreement, the Council could ask the panel to submit its report. If the parties to the dispute objected to the continuation of the proceeding, the Council should restrict its ruling on the legal aspects of the case. But it was also said that, if the complaining country withdrew its complaint under Article XXIII following a bilaterally agreed dispute settlement, the CONTRACTING PARTIES were entitled to examine the GATT conformity of bilateral dispute settlements only on the basis of a specific request by a third contracting party.

56. In view of the erosion of the confidentiality of panel reports prior to their consideration by the GATT Council, which could impede the prospects for conciliation during the panel process, it was suggested that the rules with respect to confidentiality be strengthened so as to avoid unwarranted release of information relating to a dispute during the panel process.

B. Present GATT Rules and GATT Practices

57. Since 1985, panels established under Article XXIII:2 have regularly adopted the standard working procedures prepared by the GATT secretariat on the basis of the existing dispute settlement procedures and practices (see MTN.GNG/NG13/W/4, pages 48 f).

58. As regards time limits and avoidance of delays, the 1979 Understanding states: "The time required by panels will vary with the particular case. However, panels should aim to deliver their findings without undue delay, taking into account the obligation of the CONTRACTING PARTIES to ensure prompt settlement. In cases of urgency the panel would be called upon to deliver its findings within a period normally of three months from the time the panel was established" (paragraph 20). The Annex to the Understanding further states: "Although the CONTRACTING PARTIES have never established precise deadlines for the different phases of the procedure, probably because the matters submitted to panels differ as to their complexity and their urgency, in most cases the proceedings of the panels have been completed within a reasonable period of time, extending from three to nine months" (BISD 26S/218). The 1984 dispute settlement procedures add: "Panels should continue to set their own working procedures and, where possible, panels should provide the parties to the dispute at the outset with a proposed calendar for the panel's work. Where written submissions are requested from the parties, panels should set precise deadlines, and
the parties to a dispute should respect those deadlines" (BISD 31S/10). GATT practice seems to suggest that the sometimes considerably longer time needed by panels was due to delays by the disputing parties and, in a few instances, to too infrequent panel meetings and insufficient legal staff within the secretariat to advise the panel on the legal aspects of the matter and prepare consistent drafts of panel findings.

59. The concept of "cases of urgency" (BISD 26S/214) is not specified in the present GATT dispute settlement procedures. Some Tokyo Round Agreements include dispute settlement provisions for expeditious dispute settlements e.g. "in the case of perishable products" or "where disputes arise affecting products with a definite crop cycle of twelve months" (Article 14.3 and 14.6 of the 1979 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade).

60. In GATT practice, the "reasonable period of time" between submission of the panel report to the disputing parties and the circulation of the report to the CONTRACTING PARTIES has varied between one week and six weeks, depending on the requests of the parties to the dispute.

61. Retaliation is permitted under Article XXIII only "if the CONTRACTING PARTIES consider that the circumstances are serious enough to justify such action (and) authorize a contracting party or parties to suspend the application to any other contracting party or parties of such concessions or other obligations under this Agreement as they determine to be appropriate in the circumstances" (Article XXIII:2).

62. The 1979 Understanding mentions with regard to bilateral dispute settlements agreed upon during the panel process: "Where a bilateral settlement of the matter has been found, the report of the panel has been confined to a brief description of the case and to reporting that a solution has been reached". One GATT panel continued the examination of the matter in spite of a bilateral agreement among the parties after the complaining party had requested the panel to continue its work with the aim of reaching substantive conclusions in view of the threat of a reintroduction of the controversial trade measure concerned (BISD 29S/94, paragraph 2.6). While panel findings are usually confined to those issues whose clarification is necessary for a ruling on the dispute, panels have regularly avoided a "non liquet" on the main issue (for an exception to this GATT practice, which was criticized by several contracting parties, see SCM/42, paragraph 5.3).

63. As regards confidentiality of panel proceedings, the standard working procedures of panels include the following provision: "The deliberations of the Panel and the documents submitted to it will be kept confidential. For the duration of the Panel proceeding, the parties to the dispute are requested not to release any papers or make any statements in public regarding the dispute." Since panel reports are circulated as L/-documents to all contracting parties prior to their deliberation in the Council, panel reports are often discussed in the press before they have been presented in a GATT Council meeting.
C. Issues for Consideration

64. Should the traditional "standard working procedures" for the work of panels be formally adopted, and their regular use be recommended, by the CONTRACTING PARTIES? Should the CONTRACTING PARTIES establish more precise and possibly shorter deadlines for the different phases and overall duration of panel proceedings? What should be the legal consequences of the non-observance of such time limits by the parties to the dispute? Should the conditions for the applicability of the "urgency procedures" and the "reasonable period of time" between the submission of the panel report to the disputing parties and their circulation to all contracting parties be further specified? Is there a need for additional rules on "interim measures of protection" or on the recourse to retaliation in case of unconsented delays? Should the rules for the intervention of third contracting parties in panel proceedings be further specified and their rights of intervention be extended (e.g. rights of access to documentation submitted to the panel)? Should panels or the Council examine the compatibility of bilateral dispute settlements with the multilateral GATT rules? How can the confidentiality of panel reports be protected more effectively prior to their circulation to all contracting parties?

4. Adoption of panel reports

A. Proposals

65. Many participants proposed additional procedural devices designed to promote the adoption of panel reports and to avoid deadlock situations undermining the credibility and effectiveness of the GATT dispute settlement system. Several participants expressed the view that the practice of consensus should be maintained in the Council's decision-making process with regard to the adoption of reports and the making of recommendations because the consensus practice ensured the effective implementation of the rulings or recommendations of the CONTRACTING PARTIES. Any party raising objections to panel findings should submit its position in writing and provide the opportunity of considering the objections prior to the Council decision on the adoption of the panel report. It was said that agreed procedures for raising objections to a panel report and for a review by the Council of a part or the whole of a controversial panel report in the light of these objections could enable the defending contracting party to participate in the adoption of the panel report without causing undue delay. According to this proposal, the parties to a dispute shall not oppose the findings resulting from the review except under explicitly predetermined terms.

66. Other participants proposed that panel reports and recommendations should be adopted by the CONTRACTING PARTIES on the basis of a consensus which would exclude the parties to a dispute and third parties which had made presentations to a panel, while affording them every opportunity to
place on record their views on the panel's findings and recommendations prior to a decision by the CONTRACTING PARTIES. No reservation or dissension should in any way modify the rights or obligations of any contracting party resulting from rulings or recommendations by the CONTRACTING PARTIES. It was also suggested for consideration whether panel findings should become binding automatically unless the Council decided by consensus against adoption of the panel report.

67. Another proposal for avoiding the blocking of panel reports was that the Council should separate the adoption of the panel report relating to the interpretation and application of relevant GATT provisions from the adoption of the recommendations to be made. According to this proposal, the interpretation and the application of a GATT provision is not a private issue of the parties to the dispute; therefore, the system itself required that the adoption of the conclusion of the panel in these questions should not be blocked by either party to the dispute. As regards the adoption of the recommendations in the panel's findings, one of the parties to the dispute might not always be in a position to adopt the recommendations. In these cases, the report should be considered as adopted, with the exception of the recommendations in the panel's report. In these cases, the adoption of the recommendations might be postponed for a period to be determined. After this period the Council might adopt the whole report, disregarding the opposition of a party to the dispute.

68. Still another submission pointed to "the two activities involved in dispute settlement, resolution of the conflict on the one hand and authoritative interpretations of GATT provisions on the other". This submission considered the following three possibilities worthy of consideration:

"(i) to continue the present practice of adoption by consensus but to make it more difficult in political terms to resist a consensus. This might be by having a more structured arrangement for justifying opposition - e.g. written submissions to the GATT Council or Code Committees which could then be discussed;

(ii) the adoption of reports could be facilitated by considering the general conclusions as regards GATT conformity separately from the specific recommendations for remedy. As regards a legal finding, the traditional consensus of all Contracting Parties would still be required, whereas a decision on the recommendations for action might be taken in a more flexible manner, e.g. where a consensus might be considered to exist although the recommendations raise difficulties for one of the parties to the dispute.

(iii) A third option might be, in cases where the full consensus as regards the legal finding is not possible, to follow the procedure of taking note (which has a weaker connotation as regards the legal precedent); but nonetheless to seek a decision on the recommendations in a pragmatic way as suggested above."
Other participants could not support the suggested separation of the adoption of the legal interpretations from the adoption of the specific recommendations for remedy because the two were logically interlinked and their separation could invite opposition to the adoption of legal interpretations as well as of recommendations for remedy which had been imposed on the defending party without its consent.

68. It was suggested that the Council should decide on the adoption of panel reports within a period of normally sixty days (or eighty days) and, in cases of urgency, thirty days after the report was first submitted to the Council. The CONTRACTING PARTIES should make a determination on any matter raised under Article XXIII and make (mandatory) recommendations or give a ruling in that respect. It was also suggested that, in case of Article XXIII complaints raised by a less-developed contracting party, the period between submission of a panel's report and the adoption of a recommendation or a ruling by the CONTRACTING PARTIES should be limited to a maximum of sixty days. It was further said that, in making recommendations or giving rulings, the CONTRACTING PARTIES should take due account of any injury caused to the economies of less-developed contracting parties and, when circumstances so warrant, recommend adjustment measures including compensation for such injury. The Council should define a reasonable time limit for implementation of the panel recommendations at the time of adopting the panel report (e.g. six/twelve months). The time limit could be extended once by the Council if the contracting party, to which a recommendation were directed, requested it. In the case of a matter raised by a less-developed contracting party, the time limit for implementation of the recommendations of the CONTRACTING PARTIES should not exceed ninety days.

70. Another proposal was that panel reports and rulings or recommendations under Article XXIII:2 should include in future an estimation of the "retroactive prejudice" caused by a measure applied by a contracting party. This retroactive prejudice should be evaluated from the time when the measure in question entered into force, and not from the time when the dispute were referred to the CONTRACTING PARTIES. It was also proposed that, in case of non-compliance with recommendations under Article XXIII:2 within the specified time limit, the contracting party concerned should grant appropriate compensation. At the request of the complaining contracting party, the Council should give a ruling or make a recommendation on the amount of compensation. Retaliation should be authorized by the Council only exceptionally since it reduced rather than created opportunities for trade. At the request of a contracting party with only limited retaliatory power vis-à-vis major trading partners, panel reports might include an appropriate recommendation on the amount of compensation due in case the main panel findings were not implemented by a developed contracting party within a specified time limit.

71. It was also said that discussions in this Negotiating Group should not focus exclusively on improvements in the dispute settlement procedures but should also address certain substantive issues such as the legal nature of panel reports and the legal effects of Council rulings or recommendations under Article XXIII:2.
B. Present GATT Rules and Practices

72. According to Article XXIII:2, "the CONTRACTING PARTIES shall promptly investigate any matter so referred to them and shall make appropriate recommendations to the contracting parties which they consider to be concerned, or give a ruling on the matter, as appropriate". GATT Article XXV:4 provides that, "except as otherwise provided for in this Agreement, decisions of the CONTRACTING PARTIES shall be taken by a majority of the votes cast". During the early years of GATT, a few disputes submitted under Article XXIII:2 were decided by a majority vote of the CONTRACTING PARTIES (see, e.g. CP.3/SR.22, page 9). But these exceptional cases apart, consensus has been the traditional method of adopting panel or working party reports, recommendations and rulings under Article XXIII:2. The 1979 Understanding states:

"Reports of panels and working parties should be given prompt consideration by the CONTRACTING PARTIES. The CONTRACTING PARTIES should take appropriate action on reports of panels and working parties within a reasonable period of time. If the case is one brought by a less-developed contracting party, such action should be taken in a specially convened meeting, if necessary. In such cases, in considering what appropriate action might be taken the CONTRACTING PARTIES shall take into account not only the trade coverage of measures complained of, but also their impact on the economy of less-developed contracting parties concerned" (paragraph 21).

The 1982 GATT Ministerial Declaration includes the following paragraphs:

Reports of panels should be given prompt consideration by the CONTRACTING PARTIES. Where a decision on the findings contained in a report calls for a ruling or recommendation by the Council, the Council may allow the contracting party concerned a reasonable specified time to indicate what action it proposes to take with a view to a satisfactory settlement of the matter, before making any recommendation or ruling on the basis of the report."

"(viii) The recommendation or ruling made by the CONTRACTING PARTIES shall be aimed at achieving a satisfactory settlement of the matter in accordance with GATT obligations. In furtherance of the provisions of paragraph 22 of the Understanding the Council shall periodically review the action taken pursuant to such recommendations. The contracting party to which such a recommendation has been addressed, shall report within a reasonable specified period on action taken or on its reasons for not implementing the recommendation or ruling by the CONTRACTING PARTIES. The contracting party bringing the case may also ask the CONTRACTING PARTIES to make suitable efforts with a view to finding an appropriate solution as provided in paragraph 22 of the Understanding."
The further action taken by the CONTRACTING PARTIES in the above circumstances might include a recommendation for compensatory adjustment with respect to other products or authorization for the suspension of such concessions or other obligations as foreseen in Article XXIII:2, as the CONTRACTING PARTIES may determine to be appropriate in the circumstances."

The Parties to a dispute would fully participate in the consideration of the matter by the CONTRACTING PARTIES under paragraph (vii) above, including the consideration of any rulings or recommendations the CONTRACTING PARTIES might make pursuant to Article XXIII:2 of the General Agreement, and their views would be fully recorded. They would likewise participate and have their views recorded in the considerations of the further actions provided for under paragraphs (viii) and (ix) above. The CONTRACTING PARTIES reaffirmed that consensus will continue to be the traditional method of resolving disputes; however, they agreed that obstruction in the process of dispute settlement shall be avoided. It is understood that decisions in this process cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the General Agreement (BISD 31S/15, 16)."

The footnote states:

"This does not prejudice the provisions on decision making in the General Agreement."

C. Issues for Consideration

73. Do contracting parties agree that the adoption of a panel report by the Council entails that the panel findings on the existing GATT rights and obligations of the disputant parties become an authoritative finding by the Council? Do contracting parties also agree that the adoption by the Council of a panel report cannot constitute a legally-binding precedent for the future interpretation of GATT rules in respect of other contracting parties? Should the GATT dispute settlement procedures include an explicit requirement to explain objections to the adoption of panel reports in a written submission to the Council no later than the meeting following the Council meeting at which the panel report were presented? Would it be desirable, in order to avoid the blocking of panel reports and in order to make the concept of "consensus minus interested parties" more acceptable, to separate the adoption of the panel report relating to the interpretation and application of relevant GATT provisions from the adoption of the recommendations or rulings for the settlement of the concrete dispute?
Should the dispute settlement procedures specify that reservations or objections by the disputing parties cannot modify the rights or obligations resulting from rulings or recommendations by the CONTRACTING PARTIES under Article XXIII:2? Is there a need for modifying the practice of consensus, for recognizing the concept of "consensus minus parties to the dispute", or for regulating the possibility (see Article XXV:4) of majority voting under Article XXIII:2? Should there be time limits for Council decisions on panel reports and, if yes, what time limits? Should panels and the Council also make recommendations on (retroactive) compensation at the request of the complaining country? Are panel reports only "advisory opinions" which the Council is free to ignore, or should there be a procedural rule that panel reports should be adopted by the Council unless the Council decides to the contrary?

5. Follow-up

A. Proposals

74. In order to promote the prompt implementation of adopted panel reports, it was suggested to reconsider the time limits and requirements for compensation and to provide for a more effective monitoring of the implementation of panel recommendations following their adoption by the Council. One proposal was that, if the CONTRACTING PARTIES recommend that a party take action to rectify a matter or provide compensation, the contracting party concerned should advise the CONTRACTING PARTIES in writing as soon as possible, and in no case later than three months after the adoption of the recommendations, of the action it has taken or proposes to take in accordance with those recommendations. The defending contracting party should submit a follow-up report six months after its initial advice, and the complaining country might request the immediate intervention of the CONTRACTING PARTIES with a view to obtaining appropriate relief, if its rights continue to be nullified or impaired. If the panel did not specify in its report a "reasonable" period for the implementation of the panel findings, the Council should specify such a time period in the range of six to twelve months for the implementation of panel findings in accordance with the normal GATT practice, taking account of the circumstances relating to the dispute.

75. Another proposal was that in case of a discord between the parties to a dispute as to the way to implement the recommendations, the Council should, at the request of either party, be empowered to reconvene the panel and request its advisory opinion relating to the points at issue, if bilateral consultations lead to no satisfactory solution within a reasonable time. Another view was that the examination of the follow-up of Council recommendations should be left to the Council itself. The question was raised whether the implementation should be reviewed also when the complaining country had not requested such a review. Still another delegation referred to the possible contribution of public opinion to the implementation of dispute settlement findings and suggested to improve the GATT information services in this respect.
76. It was also said that any disputing party should grant compensation if it failed to observe the recommendations addressed to it within a reasonable time. But compensation should not be taken as relieving the contracting party concerned of the obligation to remove the GATT-inconsistent measure. Some delegations proposed recommendations on "retroactive compensation" for the damage caused from the moment when the disputed measure entered into force. If a disputing party neither observed the recommendations nor made compensation, the CONTRACTING PARTIES (the Council) could authorize the other party to resort to countermeasures. The party which failed to observe the recommendations and to make compensations should not oppose the authorization of the countermeasures. In examining the authorization, the CONTRACTING PARTIES (the Council) should give due consideration to what measures were appropriate in light of the circumstances (i.e. the degree of the nullification or impairment of the benefit accruing to the party under GATT). After authorizing the counter-measures, the CONTRACTING PARTIES should periodically review the status of the counter-measures or the implementation of recommendations. The Council should withdraw the authorization immediately if it considered that the counter-measures were no longer needed in light of the circumstances. It was further proposed that there should be a set of procedures on when and how the Council could agree to suspend equivalent concessions; it should be reaffirmed that no contracting party should resort to counter-measures without the authorization of the CONTRACTING PARTIES. The party to which counter-measures were applied could ask the Council to find an appropriate solution, if counter-measures had been introduced without the authorization of the CONTRACTING PARTIES. Each contracting party should undertake to bring its domestic legislation and the enforcement thereof relating to countermeasures in conformity with Article XXIII:2.

77. Many participants proposed an explicit new political and legal affirmation by all contracting parties that they will seek to implement the recommendations resulting from a dispute settlement case and recognize that failure to do so gives rise to a right to compensation or retaliation for adversely affected parties.

78. It was proposed that, in the case of a matter raised by a less-developed contracting party, the time limit for implementation of the recommendations of the CONTRACTING PARTIES should not exceed ninety days. In the event that a recommendation of the CONTRACTING PARTIES is not implemented within the prescribed period, the CONTRACTING PARTIES should consider what measures, further to suspension of concessions by the party affected, should be taken to resolve the matter. In the case of a matter raised by a less-developed contracting party, those measures could be of a collective nature.
B. Present GATT Rules and GATT Practices

79. Article XXIII:2 provides that

"... If the CONTRACTING PARTIES consider that the circumstances are serious enough to justify such action, they may authorize a contracting party or parties to suspend the application to any other contracting party or parties of such concessions or other obligations under this Agreement as they determine to be appropriate in the circumstances. If the application to any contracting party of any concession or other obligation is in fact suspended, that contracting party shall then be free, not later than sixty days after such action is taken, to give written notice to the Executive Secretary to the CONTRACTING PARTIES of its intention to withdraw from this Agreement and such withdrawal shall take effect upon the sixtieth day following the day on which such notice is received by him."

The 1966 "Procedures under Article XXIII" include the following provisions:

"8. Within a period of ninety days from the date of the decision of the CONTRACTING PARTIES or the Council, the contracting party to which a recommendation is directed shall report to the CONTRACTING PARTIES or the Council on the action taken by it in pursuance of the decision.

9. If on examination of this report it is found that a contracting party to which a recommendation has been directed has not complied in full with the relevant recommendation of the CONTRACTING PARTIES or the Council, and that any benefit accruing directly or indirectly under the General Agreement continues in consequence to be nullified or impaired, and that the circumstances are serious enough to justify such action, the CONTRACTING PARTIES may authorize the affected contracting party or parties to suspend, in regard to the contracting party causing the damage, application of any concession or any other obligation under the General Agreement whose suspension is considered warranted, taking account of the circumstances.

10. In the event that a recommendation to a developed country by the CONTRACTING PARTIES is not applied within the time limit prescribed in paragraph 8, the CONTRACTING PARTIES shall consider what measures, further to those undertaken under paragraph 9, should be taken to resolve the matter."

The 1979 Understanding further provides:

"22. The CONTRACTING PARTIES shall keep under surveillance any matter on which they have made recommendations or given rulings. If the CONTRACTING PARTIES' recommendations are not implemented within a reasonable period of time, the contracting party bringing the case may ask the CONTRACTING PARTIES to make suitable efforts with a view to finding an appropriate solution."
23. If the matter is one which has been raised by a less-developed contracting party, the CONTRACTING PARTIES shall consider what further action they might take which would be appropriate to the circumstances."

The Annex to the 1979 Understanding adds, inter alia:

"The aim of the CONTRACTING PARTIES has always been to secure a positive solution to a dispute. A solution mutually acceptable to the parties to a dispute is clearly to be preferred. In the absence of a mutually agreed solution, the first objective of the CONTRACTING PARTIES is usually to secure the withdrawal of the measures concerned if these are found to be inconsistent with the General Agreement. The provision of compensation should be resorted to only if the immediate withdrawal of the measure is impracticable and as a temporary measure pending the withdrawal of the measures which are inconsistent with the General Agreement. The last resort which Article XXIII provides to the country invoking this procedure is the possibility of suspending the application of concessions or other obligations on a discriminatory basis vis-à-vis the other contracting party, subject to authorization by the CONTRACTING PARTIES of such measures. Such action has only rarely been contemplated and cases taken under Article XXIII:2 have led to such action in only one case" (paragraph 4).

The 1982 dispute settlement procedures add:

"In furtherance of the provisions of paragraph 22 of the Understanding the Council shall periodically review the action taken pursuant to such recommendations. The contracting party to which such a recommendation has been addressed, shall report within a reasonable specified period on action taken or on its reasons for not implementing the recommendation or ruling by the CONTRACTING PARTIES. The contracting party bringing the case may also ask the CONTRACTING PARTIES to make suitable efforts with a view to finding an appropriate solution as provided in paragraph 22 of the Understanding" (paragraph viii).

"The further action taken by the CONTRACTING PARTIES in the above circumstances might include a recommendation for compensatory adjustment with respect to other products or authorization for the suspension of such concessions or other obligations as foreseen in Article XXIII:2, as the CONTRACTING PARTIES may determine to be appropriate in the circumstances" (paragraph ix).

80. In GATT practice, the Council has often not specified the "reasonable period of time" within which measures inconsistent with the General Agreement had to be withdrawn. Nor has the Council in the past specified
the amount of any compensation due under Article XXIII:2. The Council has rather left these matters to the parties concerned. The issues of the timely implementation of Council rulings or recommendations under Article XXIII:2 and of compensation and retaliation have been raised in the Council usually only at the request of the complaining country.

81. The Council has only rarely made use of its power to reconvene a panel to examine the implementation of the previously adopted panel recommendations (see, e.g. BISD 13S/36, 45). In most instances, the Council, at the request of the complainant party, has itself examined the follow-up of rulings or recommendations under Article XXIII:2.

82. A suspension of obligations pursuant to Article XXIII:2 was authorized in the history of GATT in only one dispute (see BISD 18/32, 62; 78/23).

C. Issues for Consideration

83. Should the monitoring of rulings and recommendations under Article XXIII be made a regular agenda item of each Council meeting following the adoption of a panel report, together with strengthened requirements on the contracting parties concerned to submit regular progress reports on their implementation of such rulings and recommendations? Is there a need for confirming the power of the Council to reconvene a panel to examine the implementation of panel recommendations? Should the Council also recommend "retroactive compensation"? Should the "reasonable time-frame" in the range of six to twelve months for the implementation of panel recommendations be fixed more precisely? Should it be reaffirmed that GATT Article XXIII:2 admits a suspension of obligations only if authorized by the CONTRACTING PARTIES? Should there be an explicit obligation to bring domestic legislation into conformity with this requirement of GATT Article XXIII:2? Is there need for GATT dispute settlement procedures specifying the conditions under which the Council may authorize under Article XXIII:2 the suspension of GATT obligations?

VII. Arbitration

A. Proposals

84. In order to further improve the GATT dispute settlement system, various proposals have been made to make available to disputing parties an arbitration procedure in addition to the various other possible means of dispute settlement within GATT. One proposal has been to provide for binding arbitration by a neutral body as a formally available technique of GATT dispute settlement for defined classes of cases, or by prior agreement of the disputing parties on an ad hoc basis. The arbitrators' decision would not require approval by the GATT Council or by a GATT Code Committee. But, to safeguard the interests of other contracting parties, it would have
to be provided that decisions of such an arbitration process could not bind other contracting parties or prejudice their rights and interests. Arbitration would be available whenever both disputing parties agree, as an alternative to the normal dispute settlement process. In addition, there might be classes of disputes where arbitration should be required in lieu of the normal panel process. If arbitration proved workable and useful, use of the device could subsequently be expanded.

85. Another proposal has been that, if a dispute is not settled through consultations or conciliation or if the GATT Council fails to adopt a Panel report submitted to it, a party to the dispute may invoke a previously agreed arbitration clause or agree with the other party on an ad hoc compromissory clause with a view to submitting the dispute to arbitration. The compromiss or arbitration clause should be submitted to the Council. The CONTRACTING PARTIES could thus exercise supervision over the subject of the arbitration and over the arbitration procedure adopted by the parties to the dispute, and the Council might reject the arbitration clause on grounds to be defined. The CONTRACTING PARTIES might also agree themselves on an arbitration procedure to be applied by the parties to the dispute. Issues not settled by such a general GATT arbitration procedure would be settled by the arbitration clause. The CONTRACTING PARTIES would see to the implementation of the arbitral decision, which would be binding and final for the parties to the dispute.

86. Many delegations emphasized that it was essential to make institutional arrangements to prevent arbitration proceedings from impairing the authority or rights of the CONTRACTING PARTIES as well as the rights or benefits of third contracting parties, or from bringing about a proliferation of bilateralism and countermeasures. Some countries took the view that it is the sole responsibility of the CONTRACTING PARTIES to decide on the conformity of a particular measure with the General Agreement and that, in order to ensure coherence of the GATT system, the GATT Council should have a formal role in the initiation of the arbitration procedure and in addressing the arbitration award. It was also also said that, because it is the sole responsibility of the CONTRACTING PARTIES to decide on the GATT conformity of a particular measure and to authorize counter-measures under Article XXIII:2, mandatory bilateral arbitration should, in principle, neither involve questions of interpretation or of conformity with the General Agreement nor justify recourse to counter-measures. Even in the case of a prior approval by the CONTRACTING PARTIES of an arbitration clause or of the initiation of an arbitration proceeding, there remained doubts about the appropriateness of a parallel jurisprudence and of a broad delegation of powers under Article XXIII:2 to an arbitration body entirely independent from the CONTRACTING PARTIES.

87. In order to ensure the neutrality of arbitrators, one proposal recommended the selection of arbitrators from the GATT roster of panelists and the referring of arbitrations to one arbitral body established by the CONTRACTING PARTIES in Geneva. Unless specifically authorized in advance
by the CONTRACTING PARTIES, the mandate of an arbitral body should be limited to fact-finding. The awards by the arbitral body should be notified to the CONTRACTING PARTIES. If any third party considered that any benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly under the GATT were being nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the GATT were being impeded as a result of the arbitration award, it might raise an objection to the award and request the Council to make a suitable effort with a view to seeking an appropriate solution. The Council (excluding the disputing parties) thus approached should, if it considered that the objection had "prima facie grounds", make a decision upon the request including the establishment of a panel or working party to examine the matter. The Council could set aside the award on the basis of the reports of a panel or working party. An arbitration award should not add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in GATT of the parties to an arbitration. The parties to an arbitration could refer the matter to the CONTRACTING PARTIES if either of them were convinced that the award added to or diminished its rights and obligations under the General Agreement. The arbitration award could bind only the parties to the arbitration and should not be construed as establishing generally applicable interpretations of GATT rules.

88. Other countries agreed that the use of mutually agreed arbitration could be facilitated by the roster of GATT panelists and the interests of third GATT contracting parties would need to be protected. The Council should have a principal role in pronouncing on arbitration agreements, the effects of arbitration awards on third parties as well as their possibly precedent-creating value. Perhaps the arbitration award could be considered to stand unless the Council "disapproved" it. Another view was that, if disputants agreed to resort to arbitration on the basis of mutually agreed terms and conditions as an alternative to panel proceedings, the arbitration clause agreed between the disputants should be referred to and approved by the Council in order to safeguard the interests of third parties. The result of the arbitration should likewise be submitted to the Council. The Council would take note of the report and allow third parties to express their views on the report.

89. A group of countries stressed the following points: The institutionalisation of a rapid arbitration procedure, as a supplementary technique of dispute settlement, could facilitate the solution of certain disputes concerning essentially factual questions (in practice, the border-line between factual points and matters of interpretation would not be always easy to determine); use of this procedure would be dependent upon the mutual agreement of the parties; the arbitration decision would be binding for the parties concerned but should not prejudice the GATT rights of third parties; the GATT Council would be informed of the arbitration result and could, if necessary, take appropriate decisions. The arbitration procedure could possibly also be used in order to allow the parties to a dispute to overcome deadlock situations if one party to a dispute were unable to accept a panel report.
90. Still another proposal was that arbitration on a consensus basis is an option that already exists in the GATT and has been used in the past. This arbitration procedure could be institutionalized. In addition, a declaration by the CONTRACTING PARTIES to have recourse to this procedure in conflicts of a factual nature could encourage greater use of it. It would be difficult to define a priori the categories of disputes where mandatory arbitration should be prescribed in place of the normal panel procedure. Moreover, it would not be easy to safeguard properly the rights and interests of third parties. Contrary to the view that the categories of disputes to be handled by arbitration should be factual and not involve questions of interpretation or of conformity with the General Agreement, it was suggested that the Council should not be obligated to accept arbitration only if it were limited to factual issues. The Council should also remain free in the exercise of its control over the arbitration proceeding. For instance, the suggested introduction of a prima facie control by the Council of objections raised by third parties vis-à-vis an arbitration award could limit the right to a panel under GATT Article XXIII:2. Doubts were expressed also as to the proposed direct Council consideration of third party objections to arbitration results without requiring that objecting parties first hold bilateral consultations pursuant to Article XXIII:1. Objecting third parties could always have recourse to Article XXIII and already had ample opportunity to raise the question of "GATT validity" of any bilaterally agreed dispute settlement.

B. Present GATT Rules and GATT Practices

91. Article 93 of the still-born Havana Charter began with a first paragraph that was largely identical to the present GATT Article XXIII:1, and continued with two paragraphs dealing with arbitration in the following terms:

"2. The Members concerned may submit the matter arising under paragraph 1 to arbitration upon terms agreed between them; provided that the decision of the arbitrator shall not be binding for any purpose upon the Organization or upon any Member other than the members participating in the arbitration."

"3. The Members concerned shall inform the Organization generally of the progress and outcome of any discussion, consultation or arbitration undertaken under this Charter."

Additional provisions relating to arbitration were included in Article 94 of the Havana Charter. Paragraph 2 of this Article provided that, whenever a complaint under Article 93, paragraph 1, were referred by any member concerned to the Executive Board:

"The Executive Board shall promptly investigate the matter and shall decide whether any nullification or impairment within the terms of paragraph 1 of Article 93 in fact exists. It shall then take such of the following steps as may be appropriate:
(a) decide that the matter does not call for any action;

(b) recommend further consultation to the Members concerned;

(c) refer the matter to arbitration upon such terms as may be agreed between the Executive Board and the Members concerned;

(d) in any matter arising under paragraph 1(a) of Article 93, request the Member concerned to take such action as may be necessary for the Member to conform to the provisions of this Charter;

(e) in any matter arising under sub-paragraph (b) or (c) of paragraph 1 of Article 93, make such recommendations to Members as will best assist the Members concerned and contribute to a satisfactory adjustment."

Article 96 of the Havana Charter also made provision for referring disputes to the International Court of Justice and for requesting advisory opinions by the Court on legal questions arising within the scope of the activities of the then envisaged International Trade Organization. None of these various provisions of the Havana Charter relating to arbitration were incorporated into the General Agreement.

92. It appears that several trade agreements concluded among contracting parties (e.g. under GATT Article XXIV) provide for the possibility of settling their respective trade disputes by means of arbitration. Mutually agreed ad hoc arbitration seems to have been resorted to in GATT practice only rarely. For instance, in October 1963 the EEC and the USA requested the GATT Council to establish a Panel to render an advisory opinion to the two parties in connexion with their negotiations on poultry. The proposed terms of reference of the Panel were as follows:

"To render an advisory opinion to the two parties concerned in order to determine, on the basis of the definition of poultry provided in paragraph 02-02 of the Common Customs Tariff of the European Economic Community, and on the basis of the rules of and practices under the GATT, the value (expressed in United States dollars) to be ascribed, as of 1 September 1960, in the context of the unbindings concerning this product, to United States exports of poultry to the Federal Republic of Germany."

On 29 October 1963, the Council appointed a Panel with these terms of reference, and the two disputing parties agreed to accept the Panel finding as binding. The Panel held a number of meetings in November 1963 and presented its report to the two parties. The parties concerned have complied with the Panel's conclusions (see BISD 12S/65).
C. Issues for Clarification of the Present GATT Rules

93. In order to examine the need for additional GATT rules on arbitration, it might be useful to clarify whether, and to what extent, contracting parties agree on the following issues relating to the present GATT rules:

(a) Do contracting parties agree that the present GATT rules reserve to each contracting party the right to conclude an arbitration agreement submitting an existing or a future "GATT dispute" to international arbitration by a bilaterally-established arbitration body?

(b) Do contracting parties agree that any such bilateral arbitration agreement and arbitration award relating to rights and obligations under GATT can neither curtail the rights of third GATT contracting parties under the General Agreement (e.g. the right to invoke Article XXIII if a third party believes its GATT rights have been nullified or impaired by an arbitration process) nor constitute a "GATT precedent" legally binding on third contracting parties? Since the authoritative interpretation of the General Agreement as well as the authorization of the retaliatory suspension of GATT obligations lie within the sole responsibility of the CONTRACTING PARTIES: Should the Council, in order to ensure the coherence of the GATT system, pronounce on the (in)compatibility of arbitration clauses and arbitration awards with the General Agreement on a regular basis or only if requested to do so pursuant to Article XXIII:2?

(c) Do contracting parties agree that GATT Article XXIII:2 already allows two or more GATT contracting parties to request, by common agreement among all parties to the GATT dispute concerned, the CONTRACTING PARTIES (or the Council) to establish a Panel with the mandate of rendering an arbitration award binding on the disputing parties without need for approval of the report by the Council and without prejudice to the rights of third GATT contracting parties (see the precedent of the "chicken panel" referred to above in paragraph 88)? Do contracting parties agree that the present GATT rules do not provide for a "right to an arbitration panel" and that it remains within the discretion of the GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES (Council) to decide whether a panel requested pursuant to GATT Article XXIII:2 should be established with the traditional terms of reference or, if so requested by all disputant parties, with a mutually agreed "arbitration mandate"?

(d) Do contracting parties agree that the present GATT rules also preserve the freedom of each contracting party to conclude a general, anticipated arbitration agreement that provides for a unilateral right of each party to such an agreement to request the establishment of an arbitration panel either under GATT Article XXIII:2 by the GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES (with terms of reference to be defined by the CONTRACTING PARTIES in agreement with the disputants) or, if the CONTRACTING PARTIES decide not to grant such a request, outside GATT pursuant to procedures laid down in the arbitration agreement?
(e) Do contracting parties agree that the requirement under GATT Article X:1 - that judicial decisions affecting imports or exports "shall be published promptly in such a manner as to enable governments and traders to become acquainted with them" - extends also to awards by arbitration bodies established by GATT contracting parties either inside or outside GATT, if the arbitration award decides on the interpretation and application of GATT rules in the contracting parties concerned?

(f) Is there a need for a formal "understanding" or agreed interpretation by the CONTRACTING PARTIES clarifying the present GATT rules in respect of the availability of arbitration under the current GATT rules? Or would it be wiser to clarify these rules on a case-by-case basis whenever contracting parties actually resort to arbitration and raise the questions in GATT practice?

D. Issues for Consideration of Additional GATT Rules

94. The need for additional GATT rules on arbitration depends on the prevailing views on the availability of arbitration under the current GATT rules. The contracting parties may wish to consider the following issues:

(a) Is there a need for additional GATT rules (e.g. a GATT code or agreed "understanding") recognizing and regulating the use of arbitration among GATT contracting parties (e.g. regulation of a right of contracting parties to intervene in arbitration proceedings)?

(b) Should the CONTRACTING PARTIES formally recognize a right under GATT Article XXIII:2 to request, by common agreement (either an "ad hoc compromis" or an "anticipated compromis") among the disputing contracting parties, the establishment by the CONTRACTING PARTIES of an ad hoc panel with an arbitration mandate agreed among the disputants and accepted by the Council as being compatible with the multilateral GATT legal system?

(c) Should the GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES encourage recourse to GATT Article XXIII:2 rather than to arbitration outside GATT by recognizing that GATT Article XXIII:2 and the pertinent GATT dispute settlement procedures may be applied, mutatis mutandis, also to arbitration panels established by the GATT Council and that arbitration panels established by the GATT Council may receive the same technical, economic, legal and administrative assistance from the GATT secretariat as other GATT panels established in accordance with the traditional GATT dispute settlement procedure?
(d) Would the flexibility and acceptability of arbitration be increased by leaving the elaboration of additional arbitration rules (e.g. on arbitration clauses, forms of arbitration, selection of arbitrators, terms of reference, applicable law and procedures, effects of the award) to the initiative of those contracting parties which actually conclude arbitration agreements, subject to the proviso that the terms of reference of arbitration panels established under GATT Article XXIII:2 must be approved by the CONTRACTING PARTIES? Or should the GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES draw up general (mandatory or optional) arbitration rules and procedures?

(e) Should the CONTRACTING PARTIES introduce a requirement to notify to GATT bilaterally agreed arbitration clauses as well as the initiation and outcome of an arbitration proceeding relating to GATT rights and obligations?

(f) Should the GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES provide for a general arbitration agreement (protocol, code) enabling each party to such an agreement to unilaterally refer certain classes of GATT disputes to an ad hoc or "permanent" arbitration body (e.g. a unilateral right to request an arbitration panel under GATT Article XXIII:2)? Should such a general arbitration agreement require an additional "implementing compromis" and, if so, should it then limit the freedom of the disputant contracting parties to refuse to set up such an "implementing compromis" (e.g. by enabling the establishment of an "arbitration panel" by the GATT Council at the unilateral request of any party to a general arbitration agreement)? Should such a general arbitration agreement also limit the freedom of the disputant contracting parties to determine the contents of an "implementing compromis" (e.g. the freedom to determine the jurisdiction of the arbitral body, the arbitrators, the applicable rules and procedures)?

VIII. Surveillance (see also above chapters V and VI.5)

A. Proposals

95. Many participants considered it necessary to have a strengthened and regular procedure of surveillance and control of the dispute settlement process and proposed to strengthen the Council's surveillance function (e.g. through the setting up of an auxiliary body of the Council or through regular Council meetings in "dispute settlement mode"). Some countries proposed that this procedure should only cover matters arising from Article XXIII, thereby excluding specific dispute settlement procedures in the MTN Codes where competence for surveillance should remain with the Signatories' Committees. It was suggested to specify reasonable time limits for the implementation of recommendations adopted by the Council, to establish formal procedures for the regular surveillance by the Council of matters arising from disputes in the GATT, to examine the possibility of
involving ministers directly in the dispute settlement process, to require the contracting parties concerned to report regularly on their implementation of Council rulings or recommendations under Article XXIII:2, and to elaborate additional rules on the conditions under which (retroactive) compensation could be requested or the suspension of GATT obligations could be authorized under Article XXIII:2. The failure to implement recommendations should give rise to a right of adversely affected contracting parties to compensation or to the suspension of obligations pursuant to Article XXIII:2. It was further suggested to introduce arrangements to ensure that bilateral settlements reached through mediation, conciliation or arbitration conform to the general GATT rules and that retaliation does not adversely affect the rights of third contracting parties. Divergent views were expressed as to whether the GATT dispute settlement procedures offered an appropriate means for the checking and monitoring of bilateral trade arrangements.

96. Some countries said that, instead of creating a new ad hoc mechanism, the Council should continue to exercise this surveillance function. It could be envisaged that, in its meetings, the Council specifically reserved a part of its agenda to questions on dispute settlement. This part of the meeting could be chaired, on an experimental basis, by a chairman "designated" (e.g. the Deputy Director-General) who could exercise the role of conciliator/mediator, arbitrator or supervisor, depending on circumstances, without encroaching on the responsibilities of the Director-General relating to dispute settlement.

97. One proposal was to promote the implementation of rulings and recommendations under Article XXIII by anchoring GATT obligations more effectively within the domestic trade laws and decision-making procedures of contracting parties (e.g. by giving affected private trade interests a greater role in the domestic enforcement of GATT obligations). Another proposal was to introduce a GATT requirement to adjust domestic trade legislation and enforcement procedures in a manner ensuring the conformity of countermeasures with GATT Article XXIII:2.

B. Present GATT Rules and Practices

98. The 1979 Understanding includes the following paragraph on "surveillance":

"24. The CONTRACTING PARTIES agree to conduct a regular and systematic review of developments in the trading system. Particular attention would be paid to developments which affect rights and obligations under the GATT, to matters affecting the interests of less-developed contracting parties, to trade measures notified in accordance with this understanding and to measures which have been subject to consultation, conciliation or dispute settlement procedures laid down in this understanding."
Since 1980, the Council has held periodic special meetings to review developments in the trading system. The Director-General submits to these meetings a report on the status of work in dispute settlement panels and on the implementation of panel recommendations.

99. The 1966, 1979 and 1982 GATT dispute settlement procedures include various more specific provisions on the implementation of recommendations and rulings under Article XXIII (see above part VI.5).

C. Issues for Consideration

100. Is there a need for additional procedural rules and requirements for the regular monitoring of rulings and recommendations under GATT Article XXIII? Should the GATT Council continue to exercise this surveillance function as part of its regular meetings or in the context of "Council meetings in dispute settlement mode" or with the assistance of auxiliary bodies established by the Council? Should the central GATT monitoring mechanism also be applicable to the particular dispute settlement proceedings under the Tokyo Round Agreements "to ensure the unity and consistency of the GATT system" (BISD 26S/201)? Should there be additional requirements to submit regular reports on the implementation of rulings or decisions under Article XXIII within specified time limits? Is there a need for additional rules on compensation and suspension of obligations under Article XXIII:2? Should the regular monitoring also be extended to bilaterally agreed dispute settlements?

IX. Strengthened Commitments and Integrated Dispute Settlement Procedures

A. Proposals

101. Many participants proposed the codification in a single instrument of the various existing texts relating to dispute settlement (Article XXIII), as amended and improved through negotiations. It was also said that such an improved and consolidated instrument for dispute settlement in GATT should be elaborated after the negotiations on specific issues had been completed and must not lead to a reopening of the substantive negotiations.

102. It was further suggested that such a single, consolidated text of GATT dispute settlement procedures would offer an adequate way of expressing a strengthened commitment to abide by the dispute settlement system in GATT. Another proposal was that the integrated GATT dispute settlement procedures should be accompanied by a declaration by the CONTRACTING PARTIES reaffirming their determination to respect these provisions and to have recourse to the machinery to settle their disputes.

103. It was also proposed that the dispute settlement procedures of the various Tokyo Round Agreements, while preserving possible particularities of those procedures, could include a reference to the single consolidated text of the GATT dispute settlement procedures.
104. Several participants said that an early successful result of the negotiations on improvements in the dispute settlement procedures was both possible and desirable because it would benefit all contracting parties and would demonstrate the importance which contracting parties attributed to an effective dispute settlement system.

B. Present GATT Rules and Practices

105. The present GATT dispute settlement procedures are set out in the General Agreement itself (notably Articles XXII and XXIII) as well as in a number of additional legal instruments adopted in 1958, 1966, 1979, 1982 and 1984. A compilation of all the relevant texts and of all past GATT dispute settlement proceedings has been published recently in a note by the secretariat (MTN.GNG/NG13/W/4) and, if published in a generally available GATT brochure, could already considerably reduce the present lack of transparency in GATT dispute settlement procedures and practices. The particular dispute settlement procedures of the various Tokyo Round Agreements differ among each other (see the survey in Annex II). But it does not seem that these procedural differences have caused any practical difficulties so far.

C. Issues for Consideration

106. Is there a need for more uniformity of the diverse dispute settlement procedures provided in the various Tokyo Round Agreements and, if so, how could this be achieved? Is there a need for codifying the various GATT dispute settlement procedures, agreed upon in the past, in one single consolidated instrument? Is there a risk that any such "codification" (e.g. by a "Drafting Committee") could lead to a renegotiation of the already agreed procedures and ultimately put into doubt already accepted rules? Could a generally available GATT publication compiling all the existing dispute settlement texts and procedures serve as a substitute for such a new "consolidated text"? Is there scope for an early, preliminary agreement ("understanding") on certain improvements in the dispute settlement rules, procedures and monitoring arrangements?
Annex I

Tabular Survey of GATT Dispute Settlement Procedures under Articles XXII and XXIII

<table>
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<th>Main Phases</th>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1 Bilateral consultations under Article XXIII:1 or under Article XXII:1 (see BISD 98/19) or under Article XXXVII:2 (see BISD 14S/20)</td>
<td>Bilateral consultations under Article XXIII:1 or under Article XXII:1 (see BISD 98/19) or under Article XXXVII:2 (see BISD 14S/20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 Possibility of plurilateral consultations under Article XXII:1 on questions affecting the interests of a number of contracting parties (see BISD 7S/24)</td>
<td>Possibility of plurilateral consultations under Article XXII:1 on questions affecting the interests of a number of contracting parties (see BISD 7S/24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Optional phase of good offices, enquiry, mediation and conciliation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1 Possibility of requesting the assistance of the Director-General in plurilateral consultations under Article XXII:1 (see BISD 7S/24)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 If the claim to be joined in bilateral Article XXII:1 consultations is not accepted, the applicant contracting party may refer its claim to the CONTRACTING PARTIES (see BISD 7S/24)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3 Possibility of multilateral consultations with the CONTRACTING PARTIES under Articles XXII:2 or XXIII:2</td>
<td>Possibility of multilateral consultations with the CONTRACTING PARTIES under Articles XXII:2 or XXIII:2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4 Possibility of requesting the good offices and conciliation by the Director-General or by another appropriate body or individual (BISD 14S/19, 26S/211, 29S/14)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5 Referral of the matter to the CONTRACTING PARTIES (Council) under Article XXIII:2 with the possible request for the establishment of a working party (see BISD 26S/212, 217) and for appropriate recommendations or rulings by the CONTRACTING PARTIES</td>
<td>Referral of the matter to the CONTRACTING PARTIES (Council) under Article XXIII:2 with the possible request for the establishment of a working party (see BISD 26S/212, 217) and for appropriate recommendations or rulings by the CONTRACTING PARTIES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panel procedure</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.1 Referral of the matter to the CONTRACTING PARTIES (Council) under Article XXIII:2 with the request for the establishment of a panel</td>
<td>Referral of the matter to the CONTRACTING PARTIES (Council) under Article XXIII:2 with the request for the establishment of a panel</td>
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### Main Phases

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| 3.2 Decision by the CONTRACTING PARTIES (see BISD 14S/19, 26S/210, 29S/13, 31S/9) on | (a) establishment of a panel;  
(b) terms of reference; and  
(c) composition of the panel |
| 3.3 Panel proceedings (see BISD 14S/19, 26S/210, 29S/13, 31S/9): | (a) submission of memoranda with facts and arguments;  
(b) meeting of panel with the parties and any interested third parties;  
(c) submission of rebuttals;  
(d) further submissions and meetings as necessary  
(e) Internal meetings of panel to prepare the part of panel report with facts and arguments;  
(f) submission of factual part of panel report to the parties to the dispute;  
(g) internal meetings of panel to prepare conclusions and recommendations;  
(h) submission of complete panel report;  
(i) subsequent submission of panel report to the CONTRACTING PARTIES (Council) |
| 3.4 Adoption (or exceptionally "taking note") of panel report by the CONTRACTING PARTIES (Council) (see BISD 14S/19, 26S/214, 29S/15) | |
| 3.5 Surveillance of implementation of adopted panel conclusions, recommendations and rulings under Article XXIII:2 with possibility of authorization of retaliatory suspension of GATT obligations (see BISD 14S/19, 26S/214, 216, 29S/15) | |

### Option of arbitration

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<tr>
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<th>4.1 Dispute settlement through national tribunals (see Article X:3)</th>
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<td>4.2 Dispute settlement through an agreed international arbitration process set up by the CONTRACTING PARTIES (Article XXIII:2)</td>
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Annex II

Tabular Survey of Dispute Settlement Procedures under the 1979 Tokyo Round Agreements

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<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Dispute Settlement Provisions and Actions to be Taken by the Disputing Parties and by MTN Dispute Settlement Bodies</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures (BISD 26S/154)</td>
<td>Article 4.2: &quot;Consultations and the settlement of disputes with respect to any matter affecting the operation of this Agreement shall be subject to the procedures of Articles XXII and XXIII of the GATT&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft (BISD 26S/162) | 1. Article 8.5: bilateral consultations  
2. Article 8.6: multilateral consultations "in order to seek a mutually acceptable solution" ... and "obviate the need for countervailing measures"  
3. Article 8.7: request for review of the matter by the Committee with the possibility of rulings, recommendations and technical assistance by the Committee  
4. Article 8.8: applicability, mutatis mutandis, of GATT Articles XXII and XXIII and of the 1979 Understanding on dispute settlement |
| Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the GATT (BISD 26S/171) | 1. Article 15.1 and 2: bilateral consultations  
2. Article 15.3 and 4: possibility of referring the matter to the Committee for conciliation and good offices if a final or provisional anti-dumping action has been taken  
3. Article 15.5 and 6: right to the establishment by the Committee of a panel;  
- Article 15.7: the 1979 Understanding on dispute settlement shall apply mutatis mutandis; |
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Footnote to Article 15: &quot;If disputes arise between Parties relating to rights and obligations under this Agreement, Parties should complete the dispute settlement procedures under this Agreement before availing themselves of any rights which they have under the GATT&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the GATT (cont'd)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>I. Dispute settlement under &quot;track I&quot; through</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1. Article 3: bilateral consultations</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2. Articles 4-6: possibility of imposition of countervailing duties or acceptance of undertakings</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>II. Dispute settlement under &quot;track II&quot; through</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Article 12: bilateral consultations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Articles 13 and 17: referral of the matter to the Committee for good offices and conciliation</td>
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<tr>
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<td>3. Articles 13 and 18: right to the establishment by the Committee of a panel which &quot;shall review the facts of the matter and ... present to the Committee its findings concerning the rights and obligations of the signatories party to the dispute under the relevant provisions of the General Agreement as interpreted and applied by this Agreement&quot; (Article 18.1)</td>
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<td>4. Article 18.9: consideration by the Committee of the panel report and committee recommendations to the parties with a view to resolving the dispute</td>
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<td>5. Article 18.9: &quot;If the Committee's recommendations are not followed within a reasonable period, the Committee may authorize appropriate counter-measures (including withdrawal of GATT concessions or obligations), taking into account the nature and degree of the adverse effect found to exist&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the GATT (BISD 26S/56)</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Code</td>
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| Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (BISD 268/8) | 1. Article 14:1 and 2: bilateral consultations  
2. Article 14.3 to 8: referral of the matter to the Committee with a view to facilitating a mutually-satisfactory solution  
3. Article 14.9 to 12 and Annex 2: right to establishment by the Committee of a Technical Expert Group to examine questions of a technical nature and, inter alia, "make such findings as will assist the Committee in making recommendations or giving rulings on the matter" (Article 14.9)  
4. Article 14.13 to 19 and Annex 3: right to establishment by the Committee of a panel to examine the matter and, inter alia, "make a statement concerning the facts of the matter as they relate to the application of provisions of this Agreement and make such findings as will assist the Committee in making recommendations or giving rulings on the matter" (Article 14.15)  
5. Article 14.19: consideration of reports and appropriate action by the Committee, including possibility of recommendations and rulings by the Committee  
6. Article 14.20 to 22: Committee surveillance over any matter on which it has made recommendations or given rulings, with possibility of authorization of a retaliatory suspension of the application of obligations  
7. Article 14.23: "If disputes arise between Parties relating to rights and obligations of this Agreement, Parties should complete the dispute settlement procedures under this Agreement before availing themselves of any rights which they have under the GATT. Parties recognize that, in any case so referred to the CONTRACTING PARTIES, any finding, recommendation or ruling pursuant to Article 14, paragraphs 9 to 18, may be taken into account by the CONTRACTING PARTIES, to the extent they relate to matters involving equivalent rights and
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<tr>
<td>Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (cont'd)</td>
<td>obligations under the General Agreement. When Parties resort to GATT Article XXIII, a determination under that Article shall be based on GATT provisions only.</td>
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| Agreement on Government Procurement (BISD 26S/33) | 1. Article VII:3 to 5: bilateral consultations  
2. Article VII:6: referral of the matter to the Committee with a view to facilitating a mutually-satisfactory solution  
3. Article VII:7 to 10: right to establishment by the Committee of a panel to examine the matter and, inter alia, "make a statement concerning the facts of the matter as they relate to application of this Agreement and make such findings as will assist the Committee in making recommendations or giving rulings on the matter" (Article VII:7)  
4. Article VII:11: consideration of the report and appropriate action by the Committee, including possibility of recommendations and rulings  
5. Article VII:12 to 14: surveillance by the Committee over any matter on which it has made recommendations or given rulings, with the possibility of authorizing a retaliatory suspension of the application of obligations under the Agreement |
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<td><strong>Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the GATT (BISD 26S/116)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Article 19: bilateral consultations</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Article 19.3: the parties engaged in consultations may request advice and assistance from the Technical Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Article 20.1 to 3: referral of the matter to the Customs Valuation Committee to &quot;investigate the matter with a view to facilitating a mutually satisfactory solution&quot;</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Article 20.2 and 4: right to request an examination of technical issues by the Technical Committee</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Article 20.5 and 6 and Annex III: right to request the establishment of a panel &quot;to make a statement concerning the facts of the matter as they relate to the application of the provisions of this Agreement and make such findings as will assist the Committee in making recommendations or giving rulings on the matter&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Article 20.7: consideration of the matter (reports) and appropriate action by the Committee, including recommendations or rulings</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Article 20.8 to 10: surveillance by the Committee over the implementation of recommendations and rulings, with the possibility of authorizing a retaliatory suspension of obligations</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Article 20.11: &quot;If a dispute arises between Parties relating to rights and obligations under this Agreement, Parties should complete the dispute settlement procedures under this Agreement before availing themselves of any rights which they have under the GATT, including invoking Article XXIII thereof.&quot;</td>
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